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Abstract. This paper examines the social relations of the founders of the 
first institutions of modern public accountancy in Scotland. The study 
uses archival data to construct social networks prior to 1854. Individual 
founders in the networks are identified as potentially significant sources 
of influence in the foundation events. 
The paper reports the social network analysis in several parts. First, 
relations between the founders of The Institute of Accountants in 
Edinburgh (IAE), renamed The Society of Accountants in Edinburgh 
(SAE), are networked. Second, a similar analysis is made of the founda-
tion of The Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (IAAG). 
Third, social links between individual founders of the IAE/SAE and IAAG 
are identified. 
The research results are generally consistent with prior studies but 
reveal significant matters not identified by other researchers. The social 
network analysis of the IAE/SAE founders confirms the existence of a 
cohesive and elite community and the presence of an elite within an 
elite. There is evidence of strong links to lawyers and landowners, as 
well as significant links to the insurance industry. 
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The IAAG network analysis demonstrates the Glasgow community to 
be elite but more cohesive than its Edinburgh counterpart. The IAAG 
founders had more significant links to merchants and farmers than to 
lawyers and were a social group distinctly different from that of the 
IAE/SAE. Nevertheless, relations existed between individual founders in 
the two communities that have the potential to explain why the founda-
tions took place at about the same point in time. 
The study involves the first use of social network analysis in an 
accounting history project. This methodology has been used extensive-
ly over several decades in sociology and social history. The major long-
term contribution of the paper therefore can be argued to be the intro-
duction of social network analysis to accounting historians. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine various social rela-
tions between individuals directly or indirectly involved in the 
founding of the IAE/SAE in 1853-1854 and the IAAG in 1853-1855. 
Much has been written about the Scottish founders and the foun-
dation events [e.g.; Brown, 1905; Stewart, 1977; Macdonald, 1984; 
Briston and Kedslie, 1986; Walker, 1988b, 1995; Kedslie, 1990a, b; 
Shackleton, 1995; Lee, 1996]. However, little has been reported 
about the personal and business relations that existed between 
the founders. Such relations are signals of potential influence 
within the foundation communities and offer means of identify-
ing potentially major players in the foundation events. 
The paper reports detailed archival searches and analyses of 
individual relations that indicate well-established social structures 
of potential communication and influence within the IAE/SAE 
and IAAG foundations. By means of these structures, it is possible 
to identify those Edinburgh and Glasgow accountants with the 
greatest access to their colleagues in their foundation communi-
ties and, therefore, with the most potential to influence founda-
tion events. Although personal attributes of the founding 
accountants are reported, they are used only to provide an inter-
pretable context for analysis and a means of statistically validating 
the more fundamental aspects of the social structures that were 
the foundation communities. 
The study reports that, respectively, there were 75 Edinburgh 
men and 51 Glasgow men directly or indirectly involved in the 
IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations. Each group constitutes an identi-
fiable community based on individual relations or ties that 
evolved over a number of decades in school, at university, in train-
ing and practice, and as a function of the geographic proximity of 
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business and domestic addresses. In addition, there were con-
nections between the founders through family, marriage, and 
friendship ties. In combination, these relations form social net-
works for further analysis of potential influence by individual 
founders. 
The independent variables (personal attributes) that best 
explain variations in the degree of potential influence of the 
IAE/SAE founders are practice type; land, legal, and insurance con-
nections; and geographic origins. More specifically, the most-con-
nected members of the Edinburgh founding group were those 
founders born and raised in Edinburgh with the most links to 
landowners, lawyers, and insurance companies. Other attributes, 
such as paternal occupation, age, professional experience, and 
marital status, did not explain variations in relations in the foun-
dation network. The most significant attribute to explain network 
influence in the IAE/SAE community is insurance connections. 
Most of the IAE/SAE findings are consistent wi th pr ior 
research of a broader nature. Studies such as Brown [1905], 
Stewart [1977], Macdonald [1984], Walker [1988b], Kedslie 
[1990a, b] , and Walker [1995] emphasized the strong relations in 
Edinburgh in 1853 between accountants and lawyers; lawyers and 
landowners; and accountants, lawyers, and insurance companies. 
Most researchers in this area believe London-based political and 
economic threats to court-related work to be the main reason for 
the institutionalization of Edinburgh accountants in 1853 and 
1854. This professional service depended on close relations 
between accountants and lawyers and focused on property own-
ership (including land). In addition, Edinburgh in the first half of 
the 19th century was a major location for insurance companies. 
With the protection of property owners as their major objective, 
lawyers and accountants typically managed these companies. 
What is surprising in this study is the dominance of insurance con-
nections over other variables available to explain the social struc-
ture of the IAE/SAE foundation community. Also of interest are a 
number of founders w h o were well connected wi th in the 
Edinburgh foundation community, as well as to landowners, 
lawyers, and insurance companies apparently uninvolved in the 
foundation events. 
Total network differences for the IAAG founders are best 
explained by a combination of parental occupation, legal connec-
tions, and marital status. Differences within subgroups of the 
Glasgow community are related to factors such as age, practice 
type and experience, and marital status. Overall, the most persis-
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tent explanation of differences in IAAG ties is marital status. 
Explanations of differences in the IAE/SAE community generally 
do not apply to the IAAG group. On the other hand, a comparison 
of the personal attributes of the IAE/SAE and IAAG founders 
reveals differences noted by previous researchers [e.g.; Stewart, 
1977; Macdonald, 1984]. In particular, the Glasgow founders were 
socially more connected to commerce than to law. 
A social network analysis of IAE/SAE and IAAG founders w h o 
were socially connected by 1853 reveals potential for the separate 
foundation debates, decisions, and actions to have been known 
within each community. For this reason, it is unsurprising that the 
IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations took place at approximately the 
same time. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, a 
brief review is made of previous research to provide theoretical 
bases for using archival data to look for explanations of differ-
ences in the social relations of both the IAE/SAE and IAAG com-
munities. The main expectations of the study are stated, prior to 
explanations of the archival sources and the research methodolo-
gy applied to the databases constructed from the archives. Data 
collection procedures are outlined. The founders are designated 
in terms of defined subgroups applicable to each of the IAE/SAE 
and IAAG foundations, and the personal characteristics of the two 
groups of founders are explained and compared. The social net-
work analyses are described, first in relation to IAE/SAE founders, 
then to IAAG founders, and finally with respect to linked founders 
from the two communities. The data analyses incorporate linear 
regression models in which the degree of influence of the 
founders is the dependent variable and personal attributes are the 
independent variables. These models are used to explain individ-
ual network differences. The implications of the main findings 
are discussed, as are statements of study limitations and a need for 
further research. 
PRIOR RESEARCH OF THE IAE/SAE AND IAAG FOUNDATIONS 
Brown [1905] is the earliest commentator on the IAE/SAE and 
IAAG foundations. He identified the main foundation events and 
provided brief biographical details of the IAE/SAE and IAAG 
founders and other early public accountants in Scotland. 
However, he did not attempt explanatory analyses of the founda-
tions. Brown's brief biographical notes on early accountants were 
the basis for more detailed biographical research by Stewart 
13
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[1977] of all Scottish chartered accountants between 1853 and 
1879. Stewart's biographies were used in Macdonald [1984] to 
describe and contrast the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations. 
Stewart [1977] made several claims about the Scottish founda-
tions in 1853. In relation to the IAE/SAE, he stated the existence 
in 19th century Edinburgh of strong connections between 
landowners and the legal profession, as well as between lawyers 
and accountants. He related these connections to the IAE/SAE 
foundation as a threat to the monopoly of court-related services 
by Scottish accountants. Stewart's biographical material identi-
fied some of these connections and revealed that several of the 
IAE/SAE founders were legally trained. He also argued that 
Glasgow accountants were socially different from their Edinburgh 
counterparts. He cited several reasons for this conclusion (e.g., 
close links to merchants and stockbrokers rather than to lawyers 
and a general lack of association with leading Glasgow schools 
and its main university). 
Other researchers have come to similar conclusions about the 
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders. Macdonald [1984], for example, 
examined the foundations through the theoretical lenses of col-
lective social mobility and market control. He cited early Scottish 
chartered accountancy as an example of both constructs, and 
relied on Stewart's [1977] biographical data to demonstrate his 
arguments. In particular, Macdonald described the IAE/SAE as the 
creation of an elite club in which the link between lawyers and 
accountants was crucial to its success. He also agreed with 
Stewart regarding the commercial and stockbroker backgrounds 
of the IAAG founders. 
Walker [ 1988b] stated that Edinburgh accountants in the first 
half of the 19th century were classed as an adjunct to the legal pro-
fession and accepted as such by the leading professional bodies of 
law. Kedslie [1990a, b] contrasted the IAE/SAE and IAAG 
founders' practice preferences and social origins. She reported 
that the Edinburgh founders had strong connections to other pro-
fessions, particularly law, while the IAAG founders were linked to 
mercantile activity, including stockbrokers. She also argued that 
both communities were involved in court-related and insurance 
services. 
Lee [ 1996] outlined the IAE/SAE foundation events and iden-
tified each of the founders. He classified these accountants as 
either active or inactive in the foundation, dependent on their 
attendance at known foundation meetings. From this classifica-
tion, Lee identified an inner cabinet of active and inactive men, 
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elected to the IAE/SAE Councils of 1853 and 1854, and an outer 
cabinet of active founders. The Lee classification offered an initial 
focus on potentially influential founders. With one exception, the 
cabinet members were elected to SAE committees in 1854. Lee 
concluded that this pattern suggests the existence of an elite with-
in an elite in the IAE/SAE. Fifty-four of the 75 Edinburgh founders 
did not belong to the designated cabinets. 
RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS 
Research outlined in the previous section permits several gen-
eral expectations to be stated prior to the social network analyses. 
The archival data are quantifiable, reasonably objective, and useful 
for empirical testing. The study therefore offers explanations as 
well as descriptions of the IAE/SAE and IAAG networks. 
The first expectation is that the IAE/SAE and IAAG founders 
were members of cohesive elite groups within their professional 
communities. For example, the IAE/SAE founding group did not 
contain 57 Edinburgh accountants publicly listed in 1853, while 
99 Glasgow public accountants were not involved in the IAAG 
foundation in 1853. In addition, previous research on the IAE/SAE 
founders indicated an upper-middle-class grouping of men with 
landowning and/or legal or other professional origins. In relation 
to the IAAG founders, prior studies have suggested their strong 
presence in mercantile affairs, including several business leaders 
of Glasgow [see also Maclehose, 1886]. It is therefore expected 
that identifiable networks for each foundation community identi-
fy the cohesive elite nature of the IAE/SAE and IAAG groups. 
A second expectation relates to the composition of the foun-
dation communities. First, the formation of the IAE/SAE involved 
22 individuals employed as insurance company managers rather 
than public accountants. They were introduced to the foundation 
at the creation of the IAE in 1853. However, ten of the group 
resigned from the IAE shortly before it received its royal charter as 
the SAE in 1854. Second, the IAAG foundation consisted initially 
of two groups. In 1853, 15 experienced Glasgow accountants 
(requisi t ionees) were pet i t ioned by 27 less-experienced 
accountants (requisit ionists) to form a professional body. 
According to Kedslie [1990b], the senior accountants were pri-
marily engaged as stockbrokers while their junior colleagues pro-
vided public accountancy services. All of these factors suggest 
that the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundation communities contained 
accountants who were not in public practice but were important 
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to the credibility of the foundations. It is therefore expected that 
these individuals were well connected within and outside the 
foundation communities. 
The third expectation relates to founder characteristics that 
gave credibility to the IAE/SAE and IAAG as reputable institutions 
of public accountancy. In the case of the IAE/SAE, previous 
research suggested that social connections to landowners and 
lawyers were persistent and important characteristics of the 
founders. In the case of the IAAG, on the other hand, the equiva-
lent connections were to leading merchants, stockbrokers, and 
other participants in commerce and trade rather than to lawyers 
and landowners. Thus, in the case of the IAE/SAE foundation, it is 
expected that the potential influence of individual founders is 
positively associated with the number of pre-1853 links they had 
to landowners and lawyers. In the case of IAAG founders, on the 
other hand, it is expected that this relation will hold true with 
respect to mercantile and similar links. 
A fourth expectation extends the previous argument to asso-
ciations with the insurance industry. Previous research demon-
strated strong corpora te managerial and governance links 
between Edinburgh accountants and insurance companies in the 
first half of the 19th century. Glasgow accountants, on the other 
hand, were typically involved in insurance agency [Kedslie, 
1990a]. It is therefore expected that, in the case of the IAE/SAE 
foundation, the potential influence of the individual founders is 
positively associated with the number of pre-1853 insurance con-
nections. In the case of IAAG founders, this relation is not expect-
ed to hold true. 
The overall model prescribed above suggests that the most 
influential IAE/SAE and IAAG founders were significantly connect-
ed to social groups important within their respective business com-
munities. Other models based on factors such as parental occupa-
tion, age, practice experience, and marital status are not consistent 
with any prior research or argument. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
Of specific interest in this study are the social ties between 
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders that constitute social network struc-
tures. These ties are described by means of archival material gath-
ered from various sources. These include census enumerator 
books; baptism, birth, marriage, and death certificates; school and 
university matriculation lists; university graduation books; postal 
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and trade directories; membership records of professional bodies; 
histories of professional, commercial, and charitable organiza-
tions; and published biographies and obituaries. Most of the data 
are original, but some are secondary. Where possible, secondary 
data were audited for accuracy by reference to original data 
sources. 
The concept of individual ties forming a defined social net-
work, such as the founders of the IAE/SAE or the IAAG, is a signif-
icant one for social historians. The research focus moves from 
individual attributes [e.g.; as in Macdonald, 1984; Kedslie, 1990a, 
b] to a network of ties that define potential communication, influ-
ence, and resource transfers [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. A tie between two individuals is a 
unit of measurement to assist in explaining human behavior with-
in a defined community. A collection of measured ties forms a 
social network that empowers and constrains human action 
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. 
The focus of this study is the identifiable relations between 
individuals in the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundation communities. As 
Emirbayer and Goodwin [1994] argued, analyses of networks con-
structed from measurable ties between individuals look at overall 
structure rather than specific content because social systems rest 
on defined social relations and not on the cognition of humans. 
Social relations are independent of personal attributes and can be 
measured at individual or group levels. Emirbayer and Goodwin 
[1994] also argued that network analysis has the potential to iden-
tify the cohesion necessary to provide collective identity in a 
group or community. Thus, social network analysis is not a theo-
ry of sociology; rather, it is a paradigm or perspective on social 
behavior. The analysis can objectively reveal social structure with-
out necessarily requiring subjective insights into individual 
beliefs, values, and normative commitments. 
There is a basic principle of measurement within a defined 
social network. It states that the greater the number of ties asso-
ciated with an individual, the greater is his/her potential to com-
municate, influence, or transfer resources with or to other indi-
viduals in the network [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994]. Ties are channels for communication or resource 
transmission and, once formed and identified, are analyzed to 
reveal those individuals in the structure with the greatest poten-
tial influence, as well as to derive measures of prestige. A social 
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network can be conceptualized graphically, with nodes signifying 
individuals and lines connecting nodes representing defined ties. 
Networks can be decomposed into connected blocks based on the 
structural equivalence of individuals.1 
The primary aim of social network analysis in the current 
study is to comprehend 19th century public accountancy in 
Scotland as a cohesive elite structure of social relations. This is in 
contrast to the conventional approach of categorized attributes 
independent of these relations. 
Social network analysis has been used by sociologists and 
social historians since the early 1950s.2 It is typically thought of 
as a graph-based methodology in which ties between individuals 
in a network are visually presented in an optimal manner that 
helps to identify key individuals with large numbers of directed or 
undirected ties signifying network activity; subgroups of individ-
uals with common ties to one another as well as to others (i.e., 
cliques of defined minimum size and a requirement for at least 
one related pair of individuals); isolated individuals with few or 
no ties; individuals who act as bridges between one network and 
another; and subgroups (blocks) comprising individuals with 
structurally equivalent ties that are not necessarily linked to one 
another (e.g., individuals who went to the same school or univer-
sity but at different times). Directional ties indicate individuals of 
greatest prestige in the network because of the ties directed to 
them. Ties can also be valued if such data are available (e.g., a dol-
lar amount of resources). 
For many years, the use of social network analysis was limited 
to relatively simple manual sociograms. The reason for this was 
the computational restriction on researchers attempting to find 
an optimal set of relations from even a small number of ties. 
However, with advances in computer processing and program-
ming, it is now possible to calculate speedily measures that accu-
rately describe relations in a network. The computer program 
used in this study is UCINET [Borgatti et al., 1992]. It produces 
matrices constructed from a spreadsheet that records specific ties 
1See, for example, Bearman [1993] in which the prediction of kinship in the 
English Civil War is not based on the traditional attributes of status and land own-
ership but, instead, on the structural equivalence of occupational and religious 
affiliations. 
2Social network analysis is fully explained in Wasserman and Faust [ 1994]. An 
earlier explanatory text is Rogers and Kincaid [1981]. 
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between individuals. Matrices are symmetrical for purposes of 
calculating network measures. 
Many types of measure of influence are possible in social net-
work analysis [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. Degree centrality is 
the main measure used in the current study as it is relevant and 
simplest to comprehend.3 In its most fundamental form, a cen-
trality measure describes the number of ties in the foundation net-
work associated with each founder. The more ties there are to a 
founder, the more potential influence he has in the network. The 
degree centrality of a founder is normalized to a percentage by 
dividing his ties by the maximum possible number of ties in the 
network. This percentage measure, which describes the propor-
tion of other founders in the network to which the specific 
founder is linked, is reported in this study's appendices and tables. 
The higher the percentage, the more central or potentially influ-
ential the founder is presumed to be in the network. 
The centrality of the foundation networks is also reported in 
the appendices. This measure is the dispersion between the most 
and least-related founders in a network. Group degree centrality 
is a percentage datum with the numerator being the sum of the 
differences between the actual ties and the maximum possible 
ties for each founder, and the denominator being a similar 
measure assuming one completely dominant founder. The 
measure ranges from 100% (if one founder potentially dominates 
all others) to 0% (if all founders have identical ties and equal 
potential influence). 
Social network analysis computes and reports network 
cliques. By definition in this study, a clique is a group of at least 
three founders with mutual links. No other founder in the net-
work can be added to a defined clique once all mutual relations 
are exhausted. Mutual relations therefore define cliques, and the 
founders can be members of more than one clique. In fact, 
founders can be members of numerous cliques and thereby link 
subgroups in the network without the use of direct ties. The size 
of a clique is specified for purposes of analysis depending on the 
3Other measures of centrality are described in Wasserman and Faust [1994] 
and Borgatti et al. [ 1992 ]. "Closeness" measures how close an individual is to each 
of the other individuals in the network. "Betweenness" is a measure of how many 
times other individuals in the network have to go through a specific individual in 
order to communicate. "Eigenvector" is a measure of the total number of ways an 
individual can relate to all other individuals in the network. Each of these 
measures was computed in this study, but the results are identical to those using 
the simpler degree centrality and clique measures. 
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size of the network. In this study, clique size is set at a minimum 
of five founders.4 
Empirical explanations of differences between centrality 
measures are presented by means of multivariate models of linear 
regression. In each linear model, the degree centrality scores of 
the relevant founders define the dependent variable. Selected 
founder attributes (based on theoretical arguments regarding 
expectations) are the independent variables. The constant term is 
set at zero, and the robustness of the regression is tested by means 
of a form of bootstrapping involving 1,000 random regression cal-
culations for each independent variable. The percentage of ran-
dom regression coefficients larger (assuming a positive relation) 
or smaller (assuming a negative relation) than the actual coeffi-
cient is reported. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data were gathered for 75 IAE/SAE founders listed in 
Appendix 1 and 51 IAAG founders listed in Appendix 2. The data 
are of two types. The first type concerns the ties between 
founders prior to the foundation events in 1853. These are struc-
tured on a career time line for each founder; i.e., beginning with 
school relations, followed by university ties, and completed by 
training and employment or partnership links. In addition, data 
were collected on social ties such as family, marriage, close friend-
ships, and nonbusiness relations (e.g., in charitable organiza-
tions). Finally, business and home addresses in 1853 were identi-
fied to determine those founders living within reasonable prox-
imity of one another. In order to qualify as proximate, individuals 
had to be living or working in the same or an adjacent street, a 
conventional approach in this type of research. 
The second type of data concerns the personal attributes 
of the founders. These include age and practice experience by 
1853; geographical origins and paternal occupation; marital status 
in 1853; practice type; legal, insurance, and bank connections;5 
and membership in the Institute of Actuaries [Davidson, 1956] (in 
4The minimum number is three. Five appears to be a reasonable size given 
the overall network of 75 individuals. 
5 Insurance and banking connections are defined in terms of directorships, 
appointments as auditor, or management of the insurance company. Insurance 
agencies are not included as these were common features of public accountancy 
in Scotland in the 19th century and do not relate to the overall management or 
governance of an insurance company. 
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the case of IAE/SAE founders) and the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association [Glasgow Stock Exchange Association, 1927] (in the 
case of IAAG founders). 
The bibliography identifies the various sources accessed to 
obtain data on relations and personal attributes. Baptismal, birth, 
marriage, and death certificates were analyzed, but certain 
founder names such as W. Smith and J. Watson were impossible to 
match with any degree of accuracy. Census enumerator books 
were examined. However, occasionally a founder and/or his fam-
ily members were absent on the day of the count. Information 
about leading Edinburgh schools was available from primary and 
secondary sources. These schools included George Heriot's 
Hospital [Bedford, 1872; Gunn, 1901]; the Royal High School 
[Trotter, 1911]; the Edinburgh Academy [Edinburgh Academy, 
1914]; and the Edinburgh Institution [Young, 1933]. No records 
were found for comparable Glasgow schools. University of 
Edinburgh [University of Edinburgh, various dates; University of 
Edinburgh, 1858] and University of Glasgow [Kirkpatrick, 1889; 
Addison, 1898, 1913] matriculation lists and graduation books 
were searched. So, too, were graduation books of the University 
of Aberdeen [Johnston, 1906] and matriculation lists of the 
University of St. Andrews [Anderson, 1905]. However, identifying 
the correct founder in school and university records (e.g., J. 
Mackenzie or W. Smith) was again occasionally difficult or impos-
sible. 
Postal and trade directories of Edinburgh and Glasgow were 
used for identifying practice firms and addresses, and business 
and other appointments [e.g., the New Edinburgh Almanack, var-
ious]. Membership records were examined of significant 
Edinburgh and Glasgow business, professional, and social organi-
zations to which the founders and their relations and friends 
belonged. These include the Dialectic Society [Dickson, 1887]; 
the Edinburgh Academical Club [Edinburgh Academy, 1914]; 
Edinburgh and Glasgow City Councils [Tweed, 1883; Constable 
and Constable, 1932]; the Faculty of Actuaries [Davidson, 1956]; 
the Faculty of Advocates [Grant, 1944; Walker, 1988a]; the 
Glasgow Atheneum [Lauder, 1897]; the Merchants Company of 
Edinburgh [Heron, 1903]; the Paul and Mackersey Club in 
Edinburgh [records held by ICAS]; the Royal Company of Archers 
[Paul, 1875; Hay, 1951]; the Royal Society of Edinburgh [Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, undated]; the Solicitors of the Supreme 
Court [Barclay, 1984]; the Society of Writers to the Signet [Society 
of Writers to the Signet, 1936]; and the Speculative Society 
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[Watson, 1905; Guild, 1968]. Various church histories (e.g.; the 
Church of the Canongate [Wright, 1956], St. George's Church 
[MacLagan, 1876], and St. Steven's Church [Sands, 1927]) provid-
ed useful data, as did histories of leading Scottish banks 
[Anderson, 1910; Munro, 1928; Rait, 1930; McCulloch and Stirling, 
1936; Reid, 1938; Malcolm, 1945, 1950; Munn, 1988; Saville, 1996]. 
Obituaries and major texts [e.g.; Douglas, 1882; Eddington and 
Pike, 1904; Maclehose, 1886] that include researched data relating 
to the founders were used as additions to original data. 
THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS 
Lee [1996] has described the IAE/SAE foundation. His 
analysis began with an initial set of 15 men involved with the first 
meeting and revealed a growing number of accountants attending 
each subsequent meeting. The original 15 accountants were 
established public accounting practitioners in Edinburgh and rep-
resented nine partnerships. For purposes of the current study, the 
sequencing of the foundation is defined at each stage as including 
closely connected individuals to the known participants. This per-
mits inclusion of partners and senior employees who did not 
attend specific meetings but who undoubtedly would have been 
aware of them. This definition has the advantage of not restrict-
ing each subset of the foundation group at each point of time to 
those actually attending a meeting. In Table 1, therefore, the 75 
founders are identified in relation to specific stages in the IAE/SAE 
foundation. These are the bases for the social network analysis 
measures in Appendix 1. 
There are a number of factors to consider in Table 1. First, 
with respect to the structure of the paper, the items marked 
relate to the social network analysis in Appendix 1 and the regres-
sion models in Table 5. Second, the initial foundation group pre-
dominantly comprised public accountants. It is approximately 
twice the size conventionally recorded by researchers such as 
Kedslie [1990a]. This is due to expanding the group to include 
partners and significant employees of the initial invitees. Third, 
the initial planning group contains the most prominent 
Edinburgh public accountancy firms in 1853, as well as court-
based accountants closely connected to the work of public 
accountants (e.g., the accountant and assistant accountant of the 
Court of Session). Fourth, the second group of participants con-
tains 18 insurance company managers who were IAE members. 
22
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
14 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
TABLE 1 
The Foundation of the IAE/SAE 
January 17 and 22, 1853: preparatory meetings 
J.M. Baillie & W. Moncreiff; A. Borthwick & S. Raleigh (with H. Callender); J. Brown & C. 
Pearson (with J.A. Brown); J.J. Dickson & A. Horne; T.G. Dickson & H.G. Watson; R. 
Gordon; A. Jamieson & J.M. Macandrew; D. Lindsay & G.A. Esson (with G.A. Jamieson); 
T. Martin; K. Mackenzie & G. Todd *; G. Meldrum; J.S. Moncrieff; J.S. Ogilvy; A.W. 
Robertson *; T. Scott; J. Maitland ** & W. Wood (with J.C. Fraser **) (a total of 29, columns 
1 and 2 of Appendix 1). 
January 31, 1853: .formation of IAE 
R. Balfour *; J. Barron **; C.M. Barstow; J. Borthwick *; F.H. Carter; T.R. Chaplin & D.R. 
Souter; R. Christie snr. *; R. Christie jnr.*; D. Cormack **; H.D. Dickie *; C.H. Douglas (with 
D. Marshall); G. Dundas; G.L. Finlay *; J. Fraser *; A. Gibson; T. Grant ***; J. Grieve; J. 
Howden *; J. Hunter *; H. Ivory *; W. Low *; J. Mackenzie *; D. Maclagan *; T. Mansfield & 
R. Spottiswoode; G.T. Mitchell; G. Murray; J.J. Ogilvy; D.S. Peddie; G. Ramsay *; W. Russell; 
R.E. Scott *; W. Smith *; C.W.W Thomson; W.T. Thomson *; J. Watson *; and J. Wilkie (a fur-
ther 39 and a total of 68,6 columns 3 and 4 of Appendix 1). 
April 8, 1853, February 1, 1854, May 29, 1854: petition for SAE royal charter 
J. M. Liddell *; P. Morison; A.M. Paterson; A.T. Niven * (four new members); J. Borthwick; 
R. Christie snr.; H.D. Dickie; G.L. Finlay; J. Fraser; J. Grieve; H. Ivory; J. Mackenzie; W. 
Smith; W.T. Thomson; and J. Watson (11 resignations from the IAE) (a royal charter peti-
tion total of 61; columns 5 and 6 of Appendix 1). 
December 29, 1854: presentation of royal warrant of incorporation to SAE Council 
members 
C.H. Douglas (resigned); J. Moinet *; D. Murray; and W. Myrtle ** (Lord Advocate's peti-
tioners) (giving an initial SAE membership of '63). 
Overall Summary 
Initial planning~ 
IAE meeting~ 
Additions 
SAE petition~ 
SAE charter 
Resignation 
Gross totals~ 
Net totals 
Public 
Accountants 
25 
19 
3 
-
1 
1 
48 
47 
Insurance 
Managers 
2 
18 
1 
10 
1 
-
22 
12 
Lawyers 
2 
2 
-
1 
1 
-
5 
4 
Total 
29 
39 
4 
11 
3 
1 
75! 
63 
Cumulative 
Total 
29 
68 
72 
61 
64 
63 
75 
63 
*manager of insurance company; ** lawyer; *** bank manager; ! columns 7 and 8 of 
Appendix 1. 
6Histories of the IAE/SAE formation [e.g., Lee, 1996] stated that 65 men were 
suggested for membership of the IAE in 1853. However, three others (J.C. Fraser, 
G.A. Jamieson, and D. Marshall) were connected to events at this point through 
their employment as senior accountants with, respectively, the firms of Maitland & 
Wood, Lindsay & Esson, and C.H. Douglas. 
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Other movements in the IAE/SAE foundation numbers in 
Table 1 are relatively small and relate to either young accountants 
joining the IAE after its formation, resignations prior to the SAE 
royal-charter petition, or the Lord Advocate's recommendations. 
In total, 64% of the 75 founders can be classified as public 
accountants. Ten of the 12 resignations from the IAE/SAE were 
insurance managers. This means that 16 of the 61 founding SAE 
members were not public accountants in terms of their main pro-
fessional service focus. 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS 
Prior to analyzing the social network of the IAE/SAE founders, 
it is appropriate to examine their personal attributes that are the 
basis for the independent variables used in the regression analy-
ses. Several attributes are completely identified (i.e.; birthplace, 
age, practice type, insurance and bank links, business and private 
addresses, and membership in the Institute of Actuaries). Other 
attributes are identified as much as the available archives permit 
(i.e.; father's occupation, school and university attendance, prac-
tice experience by 1853, legal links, and marital status in 1853). 
Thus, there are missing data in the analyses. 
Three attributes (i.e.; school, university, and address) are the 
basis for determining ties between founders (e.g., founders in the 
same school or university class). They are therefore not used as 
independent variables in the regressions. To do so would result in 
specific attributes being part of both sides of the linear equation, 
thereby creating spurious correlation. Schooling was determined 
in a majority of cases. These involve the two most prestigious 
Edinburgh schools of the time (37 founders attended Edinburgh 
Academy and/or the Royal High School of Edinburgh, suggesting 
they were typically from upper-middle-class families) [see also 
Walker, 1988b]. Eighty-one percent of the founders attended the 
University of Edinburgh to take arts or law classes. A small num-
ber attended the Universities of Aberdeen and St. Andrews. 
Although many founders attended university for several years, 
only G.A. Jamieson received a degree (University of Aberdeen). 
Founders' addresses were almost totally located in Edinburgh's 
most prestigious residential and business area, the New Town. 
Seventy-two of the 75 founders had either a business or domestic 
address in this small area. The full range of attributes other than 
those used for ties is disclosed in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
The IAE/SAE Founders' Attributes b y 1853* 
Father's 
Occupation 
Landowner 
and/or lawyer 
Other 
professions 
Merchant 
or other 
Unknown 
Total 
Legal 
Links 
n 
5,6,7 
3,4 
1,2 
0 
Total 
% 
35 
35 
18 
12 
100 
% 
12 
17 
46 
25 
100 
Birth 
Place 
Edinburgh 
Region 
Other 
% 
56 
13 
31 
100 
Insurance 
Links 
n 
3,4,5 
1,2 
0 
% 
14 
59 
27 
100 
Age 
Years 
20-39 
40-59 
60+ 
Bank 
Links 
n 
2,3 
1 
0 
% 
32 
53 
15 
100 
% 
8 
17 
75 
100 
Practice Type 
Accountancy 
Insurance 
Legal and 
banking 
Institute 
of Actuaries 
Yes 
No 
% 
68 
24 
8 
100 
% 
28 
72 
100 
Practice 
Experience 
Years % 
<10 17 
10-29 65 
30-49 11 
Unknown 7 
100 
Marital 
Status 
% 
Married 58 
Unmarried 37 
Unknown 5 
100 
*A11 data are expressed as percentages of the 75 founders listed in 
Appendix 1. 
There is evidence in Table 2 of a bias to upper-middle-class 
background. Seventy percent of the founders had fathers w h o 
were landowners and/or lawyers (26) or other professionals (26). 
This is consistent with previous research [e.g., Kedslie, 1990a]. 
The number of links to lawyers is separately disclosed; 75% had at 
least one connection to a lawyer through family, marriage, or 
employment ties. These data exceed previous calculations. For 
example, Kedslie [ 1990a] stated 18% of the 61 SAE charter peti-
tioners had lawyer fathers (23% in this study).7 
Table 2 reports the birthplace of more than two-thirds of the 
founders was Edinburgh or its surrounding region, suggesting a 
reasonably cohesive geographical group. The founders were well 
established and experienced in practice. The average age in 1853 
was approximately 44 years, and the equivalent experience datum 
was approximately 16 years. The predominant practice type was 
public accountancy [consistent with Kedslie, 1990a, b] , with a 
sizeable minority of 24% in insurance management [again consis-
tent with Kedslie, 1990a, b; Macdonald, 1984]. The insurance 
7Other comparisons are difficult to make as previous writers either covered 
Scottish chartered accountants from 1853 to 1879 [e.g.; Stewart, 1977; Macdonald, 
1984; Briston and Kedslie, 1986] or segments of the foundation groups [Kedslie, 
1990a, b] . Nevertheless, each of these studies suggests an understatement com-
pared to the current study. 
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links are magnified by related data; i.e., 73% of the founders had at 
least one actuarial, directoral, or managerial link to insurance 
companies, and 28% were members of the London-based Institute 
of Actuaries by 1853. Twenty-five percent of the group had 
observable managerial or governance relations with banks. Most 
of these links took the form of executive or non-executive 
appointments with leading institutions. Approximately six of 
every ten founders were married by 1853. In total, 20% of the 
group died unmarried, consistent with Walker's [ 1988b] review of 
the SAE membership to 1914. 
MEASURES OF DEGREE CENTRALITY FOR 
THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS 
To determine the social network of the IAE/SAE foundation 
community in 1853, it is necessary to identify social ties between 
individual founders. This is completed in five distinct stages, each 
approximating a period in a founder's time line. The first stage is 
school attendance, followed by classes at the University of 
Edinburgh. The third stage concerns apprenticeship, employ-
ment, and partnership associations. The fourth stage involves 
social relations, including family, marriage, and close friendships. 
The last covers geographic proximity in terms of addresses in the 
same or adjacent streets in the New Town. In each stage, extreme 
care was taken to match dates for individuals. In no case is a tie 
weighted to proxy for actual communication (e.g., as in a partner-
ship or close friendship). In addition, in no case is a tie labeled as 
directed to one individual from another. Weight and direction of 
ties are impossible or exceedingly difficult to determine in most 
cases. 
Identified ties were recorded in a spreadsheet database. The 
networks constructed from these data focus solely on links 
between one individual and another. Multiple relations are 
recorded as a single tie, resulting in a symmetrical matrix with cell 
values of either one (there is a tie) or zero (there is no tie). This 
approach avoids the problem of subjective weighting, although it 
can be argued to understate the influence of founders with multi-
ple relations. However, social network researchers argue that 
multiple relations do not magnify the link between two individu-
als [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981]. 
Degree centrality and clique measures are repor ted in 
Appendix 1. As previously stated, degree centrality is measured as 
a percentage of the maximum ties available to each accountant in 
the founder group, and cliques are measured with a minimum 
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number set according to the network size (i.e., five). Mean degree 
centrality is also reported in Appendix 1, as are the mean number 
of cliques per individual and the group centrality score. For exam-
ple, in the initial founding group, J. Maitland is connected to 43% 
of the other 28 founders in the group and is a member of six 
cliques of five or more individuals. The group has a centrality 
score of 32%, suggesting no particular dominance in it. Degree 
centrality and clique measures are reported in Appendix 1 for the 
initial planning group (29 members), the expanded group at the 
IAE foundation (68), the SAE royal-charter petition group (61), 
and the total group in the foundation (75). 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES OF THE IAE/SAE SOCIAL NETWORK 
Combining measures of degree centrality and clique member-
ship for each founder as a proxy for potential influence, the ten 
most connected founders in each group are ranked in Table 3 in 
descending order of connection. 
TABLE 3 
Most-Connected IAE/SAE Founders 
Initial Group 
K. Mackenzie 
T.G. Dickson 
C. Pearson 
H.G. Watson 
J.A. Brown 
A. Horne 
A. Borthwick 
J.J. Dickson 
J. Brown 
J. Maitland 
IAE Group 
K. Mackenzie 
C. Pearson 
T.G. Dickson 
R. Balfour 
J.J. Dickson 
H.G. Watson 
J. Maitland 
J. Mackenzie 
A. Horne 
A. Borthwick 
Petition Group 
K. Mackenzie 
T.G. Dickson 
C. Pearson 
J. Maitland 
H.G.Watson 
J.J. Dickson 
R. Balfour 
A. Borthwick 
A. Home 
W. Wood 
Total Group 
K. Mackenzie 
C.Pearson 
T.G. Dickson 
H.G. Watson 
J.J. Dickson 
A. Horne 
J. Maitland 
A. Borthwick 
R. Balfour 
W. Wood 
The initial planning group's individual degree centrality 
scores range from 64%, reflecting connections to nearly two-
thirds of the group, to four percent, linked to one twenty-fifth of 
the group. Equivalent percentage ranges for the IAE, petition, and 
total groups are, respectively, 52 to 6%, 52 to 0%, and 49 to 3%. 
These ranges suggest that, despite UCINET determining the 75 
founders were directly or indirectly tied to one another in a single 
block (i.e., this was a closely networked group), there is sufficient 
variation within the group to support Lee's [ 1996] argument of an 
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elite within an elite. For example, disclosures in Table 3 and 
Appendix 1 suggest T.G. Dickson, C. Pearson, and K. Mackenzie 
had ties to a considerable proport ion of each group in which they 
were networked. 
More generally, and based on the four rankings in Table 3, the 
ten most potentially influential individuals are, in descending 
order of connection: K. Mackenzie, C. Pearson, T.G. Dickson, H.G. 
Watson, J.J. Dickson, A. Home, J. Maitland, A. Borthwick, R. 
Balfour, and W. Wood. The remaining three founders in Table 3 
are J. Brown, J.A. Brown, and J. Mackenzie. Of these 13 men, five 
(A. Borthwick, J. Brown, A. Home, K. Mackenzie, and H.G.Watson) 
were elected to the 1853 IAE Nominating Committee of 17 and the 
first IAE Council of 11. With respect to Lee's [1996] analysis of 
most active founders, only A. Borthwick, J. Brown, J.J. Dickson, K. 
Mackenzie, and W. Wood in Table 3 are classed as active. 
These results suggest that the IAE/SAE foundation and its ini-
tial management were not based solely on factors such as the mag-
nitude of individual network ties or the level of organizational 
involvement. For example, two of the most-connected IAE/SAE 
members, R. Balfour and J. Maitland, were never involved in the 
management of the institution. One other, J. Mackenzie, resigned 
as an IAE member pr ior to the SAE royal-charter peti t ion. 
However, J.J. Dickson, T.G. Dickson, C. Pearson, and W. Wood 
eventually became SAE Council members, with Wood serving as 
SAE treasurer between 1879 and 1892 and T.G. Dickson (1889-
1892) and Pearson (1876-1879) elected to its presidency. 
An additional means of determining the potential influence of 
individual IAE/SAE founders is network cliques. For example, in 
the total founder group in Appendix 1, the most-connected 
founders, K. Mackenzie, C. Pearson, and T.G. Dickson, are, respec-
tively, members of 67, 60, and 56 of the 169 cliques of five or more 
founders. In other words, each of these men are members of more 
than one-third of the largest cliques in the network, thus taking 
their potential influence beyond the direct, one-on-one relations 
measured by degree centrality data. Even apparently uninvolved 
founders are members of a large number of five-man cliques. R. 
Balfour and J. Maitland are, respectively, members of 49 and 42 
cliques and joint members of 17. 
These data reflect the intricate nature of a social network such 
as the IAE/SAE foundation and reinforce earlier data about the 
group's interconnectedness and elite nature. The data for the 75 
founders were analyzed by the UCINET program to identify clusters 
or blocks of founders with ties that denote structural equivalence 
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and, thus, to test Lee's [ 1996] suggestion of an elite within an elite. 
To illustrate, if founders A, B, and C each have ties to founders D and 
E, they are defined by UCINET as structurally equivalent and form-
ing a cluster. 
Using a search method that divides the total network into a 
defined number of partitions, the aim is to identify founders with 
identical relationships that form a cluster. An optimal solution to 
the partitioning starts from a random partition by the program and 
proceeds through multiple iterations of the data until a fit is 
achieved. In addition to clustering the founders, the program pro-
vides a correlation coefficient R-squared of the partitioned network 
compared to an ideal structure constructed from mean measures of 
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the data. In this case, the fit is 0.854 when the network is divided 
into 12 clusters.8 
Table 4 emphasizes the complexity of the IAE/SAE network. 
Clusters 1,5,8, and 9 have a majority of founders with ties greater 
than the group mean in Appendix 1. This involves 24 of the 
founders. Cluster 1, however, has no active founder as defined by 
Lee [1996], and clusters 5, 8, and 9 contain an aggregate of six such 
men. In contrast, clusters 2, 6, 7, 10, and 12 contain no founders 
with network ties above the group mean but have a total of five 
active founders, again as defined in Lee [1996]. Similar contrasts 
can be seen with the Nominating Committee and the first IAE 
Council. For example, cluster 1 has no active founder but has four 
men on the Nominating Committee and two on the Council. By 
contrast, despite a 50% proportion of well-connected founders, 
cluster 3 has no Nominating Committee or Council members. 
Cluster 4 has a minority of well-connected accountants and three 
individuals on each of the Nominating Committee and the first 
Council. 
The overall pattern in Table 4 is therefore difficult to inter-
pret. Well-connected and structurally equivalent founders were 
not necessarily active in the foundation or involved in the initial 
IAE/SAE management. For example, cluster 3 contains one of the 
most-connected founders, J. Maitland, who was the Accountant of 
Court; R. Christie and J. Watson, both insurance company man-
agers who withdrew from IAE membership; and C. Douglas, J. 
Howden, D. Marshall, and A.M. Paterson, who were among the 
youngest members of the Edinburgh public accountancy commu-
nity in 1853. None of these men was active in the foundation or 
the initial management of the IAE/SAE. However, W. Wood, one of 
the most-connected and active founders, completes the cluster. 
By contrast, in cluster 4, despite a relatively few members with sig-
nificant connections within the foundation group, there were a 
number of older and well-respected Edinburgh publ ic 
accountants who gave the IAE/SAE leadership and credibility (i.e.; 
CM. Barstow, J. Brown, T.R. Chaplin, and D.R. Souter). Cluster 11 
has a mix of founders—J.M. Liddell and P. Morrison, both with rel-
atively few connections and no foundation activity; W. Moncreiff 
and A.W. Robertson, well connected, active, and involved in insti-
8A perfect fit gives an R-squared of 1.00. The robustness of the statistic was 
tested by running the data through the program several times to ensure consistent 
results based on different random seed starts. 
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tutional management at each stage of the foundation; and W. 
Myrtle, one of the Lord Advocate's petitioners. 
What this part of the analysis suggests is that, IAE/SAE founda-
tion activity and later management were determined by factors in 
addition to potential influence within the network (e.g.; by age 
and practice experience, professional reputation, and practice 
type). Nevertheless, structurally equivalent founders did reach 
the highest positions in the IAE/SAE (e.g.; D. Lindsay and H.G. 
Watson from cluster 1; CM. Barstow, J. Brown, and D.R. Souter 
from cluster 4; A. Horne and T. Mansfield from cluster 5; A. 
Borthwick and T. Scott from cluster 8; K. Mackenzie and R.E. Scott 
from cluster 9; and W. Moncreiff and A.W. Robertson from cluster 
11). In other words, the initial IAE and SAE Councils included five 
pairs and one trio of structurally equivalent founders from six sep-
arate clusters. This suggests a reasonable degree of interconnec-
tion in the institutional leadership of 1853 and 1854. 
FINDING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE IAE/SAE NETWORK 
Generalized comments on the foundation and the founders of 
the IAE/SAE are appropriate at this point. First, the social network 
analysis indicates that the number of ties and cliques (and the 
structural equivalence of ties in the network) are not good pre-
dictors of activity in the foundation or its subsequent institutional 
management. However, certain individuals may have had an invis-
ible role in facilitating the foundation. For example, R. Balfour, an 
insurance company manager, became a SAE member but never 
participated directly pre or post-foundation. J. Maitland was also 
an inactive SAE member but in the strategically significant posi-
tion of Accountant of Court. J. Mackenzie, manager of the Scottish 
Widows Fund, resigned from the IAE, did not participate directly 
in its foundation, and became Treasurer of the Bank of Scotland a 
decade later. A study that focuses on this social network feature is 
Padgett and Ansell [1993]. They demonstrated the hidden domi-
nation and influence of the Medici family in 15th century 
Florence. The Medicis "invisibly" arranged strategic marriages, 
business affairs, and financial funding through their deliberately 
constructed network of direct and indirect connections with 
other families. Given the nature of the IAE/SAE network, founders 
such as Balfour, Maitland, and Mackenzie may have served a simi-
lar role in the foundation. 
Second, following on from the previous point, several of the 
most-connected founders appear to have been useful to the 
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IAE/SAE foundation as much for their social or business connec-
tions as their public accountancy reputations. For example, R. 
Balfour was the Edinburgh manager of a Glasgow insurance com-
pany and, by 1853, had numerous family connections to advocates 
and Writers to the Signet, and a lifetime connection to K. 
Mackenzie, the first IAE/SAE secretary. A. Borthwick's father was 
the first manager of the National Bank of Scotland and worked 
closely with several of the managers of large insurance companies. 
T.G. Dickson had numerous family connections to Writers to the 
Signet, and his father was the senior partner of one of Edinburgh's 
leading law firms. J. Maitland not only had strong legal and land-
owning connections, but was the first Accountant of the Court of 
Session at the time of the IAE/SAE foundation, a position of con-
siderable relevance to the Edinburgh founding accountants, who 
believed their court-related services were under attack from 
Parliament [Walker, 1995]. 
W.. Moncreiff was well connected to the legal profession. His 
father was an advocate, judge, and landowner, and his brother was 
Lord Advocate for Scotland at the time of the IAE/SAE foundation, 
a position of considerable importance to the SAE royal charter and 
also the troubling bankruptcy and insolvency legislation of the 
time. J. Mackenzie came from a distinguished family of landown-
ers and lawyers, and his brother was married to the daughter of 
the Solicitor General of Scotland during the foundation period. K. 
Mackenzie belonged to one of Scotland's most distinguished fami-
lies of lawyers and landowners, and his family was linked through 
marriage to T. Mansfield, later to become the second SAE presi-
dent. C. Pearson's father and grandfather were senior executives 
in the Scottish Board of Excise and had numerous legal connec-
tions. He was partner to J. Brown, the first IAE/SAE president, 
who was arguably the senior public accountant in Edinburgh in 
1853. One of Pearson's sons became Solicitor General and Lord 
Advocate of Scotland during the early history of the SAE. A.W. 
Robertson's father and grandfather were Writers to the Signet and 
his uncle was a Scottish judge. H.G. Watson's brother was presi-
dent of the Royal Society of Painters, and Watson himself was sec-
retary to the Royal Company of Archers in 1853. Eleven other 
founders were Company members at that time. 
In other words, many of the IAE/SAE founders came from lead-
ing families in the upper-middle-class of Edinburgh. They not only 
had strong professional reputations and connections, but were 
also members of organizations involving royalty and nobility in 
their membership and management. This undoubtedly provided 
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valuable social connections in addition to professional credibility. 
The most obvious direct connections were to the landowning 
community, the legal profession, and the insurance industry. 
These are matters investigated in the later empirical analysis of 
Table 5. Indirect connections, however, are much more difficult 
to analyze. In this study, they are attributed to board and individ-
ual memberships of organizations involving individuals from the 
highest social classes. These memberships involve boards of 
directors of major banks, such as the Bank of Scotland [Saville, 
1996]; significant clubs and institutions, such as the Speculative 
Society at the University of Edinburgh [Watson, 1905] and the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh [Royal Society of Edinburgh, undated]; 
and the Queen's Bodyguard in Scotland, the Royal Company of 
Archers [Paul, 1875; Hay, 1951]. 
Having analyzed IAE/SAE degree centrality and clique 
measures, it is appropriate to determine explanations for their 
considerable variation. For this purpose, the Borgatti et al. [1992] 
UCINET program permits linear regression models to be tested 
with variables generated by it. These are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 describes four regression models. Each equates a 
dependent variable (degree centrality for each founder) with two, 
four, or five independent variables (i.e.; practice type; number of 
landowner, legal, and insurance company links; and birthplace, 
each as described in Table 2). For purposes of this analysis, actu-
al measurements are used with the dependent variable (as per col-
umn 7 of Appendix 1) and the three independent variables con-
cerning links. With practice type, however, a coding frame is 
adopted (i.e.; public accountancy set at three, insurance manage-
ment at two, and legal and banking positions at one). For birth-
place, a coding frame is also used, with Edinburgh set at three, 
Lothians at two, and other regions at one. In order to provide 
validity to the regression calculations, a rule of thumb of one inde-
pendent variable for approximately every 15 observations is used 
in each model. The robustness of the regression results is auto-
matically tested in the UCINET program by 1,000 random regres-
sion calculations for each independent variable. The results of 
this bootstrapping are reported in the last five columns of Table 5 
(i.e., as a percentage of the 1,000 random tests). 
With respect to the four variations of the IAE/SAE foundation 
group in Table 5,9 the results reveal a consistent pattern. The high-
9Other regression models were run using data summarized in Table 2. Factors 
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er the degree centrality score, the larger the number of landown-
er, legal, and insurance links and the more likely the founder was 
such as parental occupation, age in 1853, practice type, practice experience, mem-
bership in the Institute of Actuaries, bank connections, and marital status in 1853 
have little or no explanatory power with respect to variations in degree centrality. 
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a public accountant originating from Edinburgh. Typically, the 
most-connected founders, at whatever stage of the IAE/SAE foun-
dation, were Edinburgh-born public accountants, the most con-
nected to landowners and the legal profession, and the most 
involved with the management and governance of the insurance 
industry. The statistically weakest part of the models concerns 
practice type as an explanation of variations in degree centrality 
in the petitioning group. The overall result, however, reinforces 
the impression of cohesiveness in the IAE/SAE foundation group. 
The strongest explanation for potential influence variation relates 
to insurance connections. The most-connected founders in the 
group had the greatest association with the insurance industry. In 
addition, each variation of model provides reasonably strong and 
statistically robust results. 
THE IAAG FOUNDERS 
The 51 IAAG founders are listed in Appendix 2. There were 27 
requisitionists (less-experienced practitioners) and 15 requisi-
tionees (more-experienced practitioners) in October 1854, and 
nine other members admitted during 1854. Following two with-
drawals, this resulted in 49 signatories to the royal-charter petition 
of October 1854. The IAAG foundation involved 22 meetings until 
the receipt of the royal charter in 1855. Individual involvement in 
the foundation was bimodal as in the IAE/SAE foundation. There 
were five accountants (approximately 10% of the group) who 
attended more than 60% of the 22 meetings (W. Mackenzie, 22 
meetings; J. McClelland, 20; P. White, 19; A. McEwan, 18; and W. 
Anderson, 14). All five men were requisitionees and officers or 
members of the first governing IAAG Committee. A further four 
founders played a less active part in the process (T.G. Buchanan, 
eight meetings; A. Cuthbertson, D. Dreghorn, and J.W. Guild, 
seven each). Buchanan, Cuthbertson, and Dreghorn were requisi-
tionees and members of the first governing IAAG Committee. 
Guild was the son of a Solicitor of the Supreme Court in 
Edinburgh, a requisitionist, and a member of the first IAAG 
Bankruptcy Committee. He became an IAAG Council member in 
1856 and was IAAG president in 1873-1874 and 1878-1881. The 
remaining founders played little or no explicit part in the founda-
tion. In fact, 17 of the 51 men (33%) attended no recorded meet-
ing in the foundation process. 
The personal attributes of the IAAG founders are described in 
Table 6. They are similar in nature to those of the IAE/SAE 
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founders and are contrasted where relevant with the Edinburgh 
data reported in Table 2. 
A large proport ion (55%) of the IAAG founders were born out-
side the city of Glasgow and its surrounding region. This is unsur-
prising given the quadrupling of Glasgow's population by immi-
gration in the first half of the 19th century [Strang, 1862]. 
However, it does suggest that a significant number of Glasgow 
founders did not have the same childhood, education, and train-
ing contacts of founders who originated in the city. This finding 
is different from the IAE/SAE situation where approximately six of 
every ten founders were born in Edinburgh, thus having an 
opportunity to build a closer community at an earlier stage in 
their lives. 
Second, paternal occupation also provides a clear distinction 
between the IAAG and IAE/SAE founders. Approximately one in 
every ten IAAG founders was the son of a landowning and/or 
lawyer father, compared to approximately four of every ten 
IAE/SAE founders. By contrast, 49% of IAAG founders had banker, 
merchant, manufacturer, or farmer fathers, compared to 18% of 
the IAE/SAE founders. 
Third, the age of Glasgow founders in 1853 reveals further dif-
ferences in the two communities. The majority of IAAG founders 
were aged between 20 and 39, whereas the majority of IAE/SAE 
founders were between 40 and 59. The mean ages of the respec-
tive groups are 39 and 44 years. This suggests that the Edinburgh 
founders were members of a more mature and established com-
munity, which is also reflected in the contrast of practice experi-
ence by 1853. Sixty-three percent of IAAG founders had less than 
ten years of practice experience, compared to 65% of IAE/SAE 
founders with between ten and 29 years of experience. The mean 
experience for the two groups in 1853 is nine and 16 years, 
respectively. 
Fourth, 53% of Glasgow founders had practices in which 
stockbroking or a combination of accountancy and stockbroking 
and other commercial activities were the main services provided. 
This contrasts with a significant proport ion of the Edinburgh 
founders (32%) involved in insurance management , cour t 
appointments, or banking. These findings are supported by a con-
trast of memberships in non-accounting bodies. Fifty-one percent 
of IAAG founders were members of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association in 1853, and 28% of the IAE/SAE founders were mem-
bers of the Institute of Actuaries in the same year. 
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Fifth, the large majority of IAAG founders (67%) had no 
observable connections to the legal profession, compared to 25% 
of the IAE/SAE founders. Similarly with respect to insurance con-
nections (excluding agencies), 88% of IAAG founders had no man-
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ager, director, or audit connect ion to insurance companies, 
whereas 73% of IAE/SAE founders had at least one connection. 
Only in the case of banking connections is there some similarity 
between the two foundation groups with 96% of the IAAG 
founders and 75% of the IAE/SAE founders having no links to 
banking management or governance. 
Overall, this analysis of the personal attributes of the IAAG 
founders discloses interesting features and points of contrast with 
those of the IAE/SAE founders. It suggests that, consistent with a 
variety of previous studies [e.g.; Brown, 1905; Stewart, 1977; 
Macdonald, 1984; Kedslie, 1990b], the IAAG and IAE/SAE founders 
were members of distinguishable public accountancy communi-
ties. 
THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF IAAG FOUNDERS 
The social network of IAAG founders is described by two sets 
of relational measures. The first set comprises degree centrality 
scores derived from the observed social ties between each of the 
Glasgow founders by 1853. The second set describes cliques of 
founders with clique size set at a minimum of five founders. 
Degree centrality and clique measurements are computed and 
presented as for the IAE/SAE foundation. Individual and mean 
degree centrality measures are reported in Appendix 2 for the req-
uisitionist, requisitionee, and total foundation groups. Because of 
the small size of the subgroups, individual and mean clique mem-
berships are reported for the total group only. 
With respect to the requisitionist group of 27 individuals, the 
group centrality score of 25% indicates no particularly dominant 
requisitionist. C. Cairns, C. Cunningham, J. Fleming, and W.G. 
McLean are the most-connected accountants within the group, 
tied to at least 11 of the 26 other members. A. McNicholl, on the 
other hand, is connected to no other requisitionist. Nine of the 27 
requisitionists are linked to approximately one-third of their col-
leagues. 
For the smaller requisitionee group of 15 individuals, there is 
greater cohesion compared to the requisitionist group. The 
degree centrality index of 25% indicates no domination by any 
individual. However, the mean score of 64% signals close connec-
tions within the group. A. Black and P. White are connected to 12 
of their 14 colleagues, and 11 of the 15 individuals are linked to at 
least half of the group. A. Cuthbertson and D. Dreghorn, who are 
the least-connected members, became initial IAAG Committee 
members. 
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The mean degree centrality score for the total foundation 
group is 29%. On average, each IAAG founder was connected to 
approximately 15 of the other 50 founders. The group centrality 
score is 28%, suggesting no particularly dominant founder existed 
in the total group. 
Of additional interest in Appendix 2 is how the potential influ-
ence of the requisitionists and requisitionees changed when they 
are considered as part of the total group of founders. In terms of 
degree centrality scores, and in the case of the requisitionists, the 
predominant feature is of little or no change. Twenty-five of the 
27 requisitionists fall into this category, and only C. Gairdner and 
H. Kerr demonstrate a significant increase in influence as part of 
the total group. Respectively, they were partners of P. White (the 
first IAAG treasurer) and W. Anderson (an initial IAAG Committee 
member), two of the most-connected founders. In the case of the 
requisitionees, the tendency is for individual influence to drop 
significantly within the total group. Fourteen of the 15 in this sub-
group can be classified in this manner, and only J. McClelland's 
influence increases within the larger group, thus providing a pos-
sible reason why he became the first IAAG president. 
What these analyses reveal is that, the requisitionists and req-
uisitionees were two relatively distinct groups of public 
accountants in Glasgow. Most of the founders have proportional-
ly fewer connections within the total founding community than in 
their requisition subset. In order to explore this issue further, 
Table 7 reports the most-connected members of each of the three 
groups analyzed. To provide a reasonable proxy for potential 
influence within the IAAG foundation, the degree centrality and 
clique scores for the total group in Appendix 2 are combined. For 
the subgroups, influence is measured by degree centrality alone. 
TABLE 7 
The Most Influential IAAG Founders 
Requisitionists Requisitionees Total Group 
C. Cunningham A. Black W. Anderson 
J. Fleming P. White P. White 
W.G. McLean W. Anderson W. Auld 
J. McGeorge T.G. Buchanan A. Black 
J.L. McKirdy J.C. Foulds C. Cunningham 
W. Cowan R. Aitken W.G. McLean 
D.E. Outram W. Auld A. McEwan 
G. Wink A. McEwan R. Aitken 
W. Mackenzie 
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None of the most-connected requisitionists became an initial 
IAAG officer or Committee member, even though C. Cunningham 
and W. McLean were two of the most influential men in the total 
group. Cunningham was the 45-year-old son of a leading Glasgow 
merchant and a founding member of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association. He was never involved in IAAG affairs and died in 
1861. McLean was a 49-year-old Glasgow town councilor and mag-
istrate and became an IAAG Council member in 1872. 
Six of the nine most-connected requisitionees are also among 
the most-connected men in the total group, who also became ini-
tial IAAG officers and Committee members. W. Auld and A. Black 
had no later involvement in the IAAG, and J.C. Foulds became an 
IAAG Council member in 1858. Each of these men was a stock-
broker and significantly involved in the management of the 
Glasgow Stock Exchange Association. By contrast, J. McClelland, 
the first IAAG president, was regarded as the leading Glasgow 
accountant of his time [Maclehose, 1886]. A. Cuthbertson and D. 
Dreghorn were elected to the first IAAG Committee with relative-
ly small connections within the requisitionee and total foundation 
groups. Cuthbertson was one of Glasgow's leading merchant-
accountants in 1853. He was the youngest son of William 
Cuthbertson, the "founder of public accountancy" in Glasgow 
[Stewart, 1977], and a partner with his brother in a leading firm of 
merchants that also provided public accountancy services. 
Dreghorn was a well-known member of the Glasgow business 
community and an active town councilor and magistrate of the 
city [Tweed, 1983]. 
What the previous analysis clarifies is that, the Glasgow 
founders comprised an elite group of two sets of individuals. The 
requisitionists were relatively younger and less experienced than 
the requisitionees. Although they were less networked than the 
requisitionees, they contained a number of members who were 
well connected within the context of the total group, thus pro-
viding a potential to bridge the two subgroups. Nevertheless, not 
even these individuals became part of the original management of 
the IAAG. On the other hand, several requisitionees did join the 
initial IAAG Committee despite relatively fewer connections in 
the requisitionee and total groups. 
The elite nature of the IAAG foundation is further clarified by 
examining some of the original officers and committee members 
not previously mentioned. All were requisitionees. R. Aitken, son 
of the Glasgow agent for the Bank of Scotland, was one of the 
founders of the Glasgow Stock Exchange Association in 1844, 
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active in its management and governance, a former partner of T.G. 
Buchanan, and a partner in 1853 of W. Mackenzie, the first IAAG 
secretary. W. Anderson was well connected to the legal profes-
sion, a leading bankruptcy practitioner, trained by J. McClelland, 
and a partner of H. Kerr (one of the most-connected requisition-
ists). T.G. Buchanan was linked to Glasgow merchant houses and 
banks (e.g., the Union Bank and the West of Scotland Bank) and 
was first vice-chairman of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association. A. McEwan, a former apprentice of J. McClelland, was 
a partner with W. Auld (one of the most-connected requisition-
ists), the first secretary of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association, and connected to the legal profession and insurance 
industry. W. Mackenzie was the son of a landowner and lawyer, 
trained with and then became a partner of J. McClelland, and mar-
ried the daughter of the Sheriff-Substitute of Renfrewshire. P. 
White was one of the founders of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 
Association, active in its management, and a partner of C. Gairdner 
(one of the most-connected requisitionists). 
Table 8 provides a concluding statement about the elite struc-
ture of the IAAG foundation community. Using a tabu search 
routine, a cluster analysis of the total founder group provides 
further evidence of its interconnectedness. The search split 
the group into 12 clusters of founders with identical relationships. 
The routine was executed several times to ensure consistent 
results. As seen in Table 8, seven of these clusters 
contain relative isolates who did not necessarily lack connections 
within the group as a whole (i.e.; A. Cuthbertson, D. Cuthbertson, 
W. Jamieson, M. Mitchell, A. McNicholl, R. Scobie, and J. Watson). 
The five remaining clusters contain 26 of the 27 requisitionists, 12 
of the 15 requisitionees, and eight of the nine most active 
founders, all of whom became initial IAAG officers or Committee 
members. These clusters strongly evince the cohesiveness of the 
IAAG foundation group. 
EXPLAINING THE IAAG COHESION 
In order to explain differences in the ties between IAAG 
founders, linear regression models were constructed for four 
founder sets (requisitionists, requisit ionees, officers and 
Committee members, and the total foundation group). The mod-
els are reported in Table 9. The degree centrality scores reported 
in Appendix 2 represent the dependent variable indicative of dif-
ferences in ties in each model. The independent variables are as 
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stated in Table 6 (parental occupation, age in 1853, practice type 
and experience, legal connections, and marital status in 1853). 
These characteristics include factors significant in the IAE/SAE 
study (practice type and legal connections). Others have been 
emphasized in earlier research of the Glasgow founders; i.e., 
parental occupation (a proxy for connections to the commercial 
community) and practice experience (representing the 1853 req-
uisition division between experienced and less-experienced 
accountants). With two exceptions, the independent variables are 
based on actual measurements and dealt with as for the IAE/SAE 
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founders. The exceptions are parental occupation (1 = landown-
er and/or lawyer, 2 = other professionals, 3 = merchants, etc.) and 
marital status (1 = married, 0 = unmarried). In order to protect 
the validity of the regression calculations, a conventional rule of 
thumb of one independent variable for approximately every 15 
founder-observations is adopted in each model. As with the 
IAE/SAE founders, the robustness of each model is tested in the 
UCINET program by a form of bootstrapping. The results are 
reported in Table 9 as a percentage of 1,000 random regression 
calculations. 
The data in Table 9 represent the best explanatory models for 
each of the four IAAG groups within the inevitable constraint of 
the data collected. Use of other independent variables provided 
significantly weaker explanatory models. For the requisitionists, 
those founders with the largest number of ties are the oldest in 
the subgroup and have the greatest amount of public accountan-
cy experience. An explanation of this finding suggests that social 
connections are a function of age and experience. For the requi-
sitionees, on the other hand, those with the greatest number of 
ties are those who practiced either exclusively as stockbrokers or 
in combination with public accountancy services. For the initial-
officer and Committee-member group, marital status is the only 
significant explanation of tie differences; i.e., the most-connected 
founders in the group were married. For the total group, tie vari-
ations are explainable in part by a combination of three indepen-
dent variables. Those founders with the greatest number of net-
work ties had fathers connected to the commercial, manufactur-
ing, or farming communities. They were married and most con-
nected to the legal profession. 
These results suggest that, for the IAAG foundation and unlike 
the IAE/SAE foundation, there is no particularly consistent expla-
nation of variations in network ties. There are statistically signifi-
cant results to suggest married IAAG founders from a commercial 
background with legal connections had the highest degree cen-
trality scores. These findings are consistent with prior expecta-
tions wi th respect to mercanti le and related connect ions . 
However, the marital-status and legal-connection variables suggest 
other factors at play not evident in prior studies. It is also clear 
that factors significant in the IAE/SAE foundation (birthplace, 
practice type, and insurance connections) are not significant in 
the case of the IAAG. 
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COMPARING THE IAE/SAE AND IAAG NETWORKS 
Table 10 compares the interconnectedness of the IAE/SAE 
founders with those of the IAAG group: 
The greater cohesion of the IAAG group compared to its 
IAE/SAE equivalent is evident in the above data. Differences are 
significant at p<0.05 using the chi-squared test of association. 
Eighty percent of the IAE/SAE founders were connected to less 
than one-third of their colleagues. The equivalent IAAG datum is 
58%. Similarly, whereas only 8% of the IAE/SAE group were con-
nected to 40% or more of their fellow founders, 28% of the 
Glasgow founders fell into this category. The respective mean 
centrality scores of 21% and 29% reinforce this observation. 
TABLE 10 
A Comparison of Degree Centrality Measures of the Founders 
Degree Centrality 
Measure 
00-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-60 
Total 
n 
Mean 
Group 
IAE/SAE 
% 
47 
33 
12 
8 
100 
75 
% 
21 
28 
SAE 
% 
27 
31 
14 
28 
100 
51 
% 
29 
28 
However, both groups have a low 28% group centrality score, sug-
gesting no particularly dominant individual existed in either 
group. In addition, there are 169 IAE/SAE cliques of five or more 
founders, compared to 52 IAAG cliques, with a mean size of six 
individuals in both cases. Finally, the 12 IAE/SAE cluster member-
ships ranged from four to ten members, whereas the 12 IAAG clus-
ter memberships ranged from one to nine individuals. Most of 
this evidence supports the notion that a more cohesive group 
than its IAE/SAE counterpart initiated the IAAG foundation. 
A search of the IAE/SAE and IAAG archival databases reveals a 
data set that both connects the two foundation groups and 
describes school, university, training, and business ties involving 
one or more individuals from each foundation community. These 
connect ions provide evidence of potential communica t ion 
between the two communities. In other words, in addition to 
individual non-foundation links to either city, there was a social 
network of IAAG and IAE/SAE founders by 1853. This network 
X2 pValue 
10.23 0.02 
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was a bridge between the two groups and had the potential for 
information flows about their respective intentions and activities. 
Appendix 3 reports the degree centrality scores and cliques for 
the 30 founders linking the two foundation communities in this 
way. 
The data in Appendix 3 reveal ties between the founding com-
munities that involved some of the most-connected founders in 
each group. J.M. Baillie, for example, was well connected to 
Edinburgh landowners and lawyers and was a par tner of W. 
Moncreiff, brother of the Lord Advocate for Scotland. R. Balfour 
was Edinburgh secretary of the City of Glasgow Assurance 
Company and one of the most-connected IAE/SAE accountants to 
the legal profession. As previously stated, J. Maitland was the 
Accountant of Court. Other IAE/SAE founders who also had 
potentially great influence are J. Brown and T. Mansfield, the first 
two presidents of the SAE. In the IAAG group, D. Cuthbertson was 
one of Glasgow's best-known accountants, with strong board-of-
directors links to the insurance industry in Edinburgh. His 
younger brother, A. Cuthbertson, was active in the IAAG founda-
tion and an initial IAAG Committee member, as was A. McEwan, 
the brother of a lawyer and the first IAAG auditor. J.W. Guild, 
whose father was a Solicitor to the Supreme Court in Edinburgh, 
trained as a lawyer there and moved to Glasgow in 1848 as a 
bankruptcy specialist. 
The above brief analysis suggests there were social network 
ties between leading IAAG and IAE/SAE founders. This introduces 
the potential for debates, decisions, and actions of the two foun-
dation communities to be known to each other. A linear regres-
sion model supports this conclusion. The dependent variable is 
the degree centrality scores of the bridging founders named in 
Appendix 3. The most significant independent variables are prac-
tice type and degree centrality scores in the individual founda-
tions. The results suggest that the interconnected founders with 
the highest degree centrality scores are those in practice as public 
accountants, with the highest Centrality scores in their individual 
foundation network (R2 0.33; F value 6.58; p value 0.00). This is 
consistent with the proposition of a potential bridging influence 
by founders in the two communities. In other words, those pub-
lic accountants with the highest bridging connections were those 
with the highest connections within their own foundation com-
munity. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study contributes in a number of ways to the early history 
of institutionalized public accountancy in Scotland. First, it 
demonstrates that the social networks of the IAE/SAE and IAAG 
founders evolved gradually over several decades through a combi-
nation of school, university, practice, business, social, and address 
ties. By 1853, both networks were established and mature. The 
social network analysis of the IAE/SAE foundation demonstrates 
that the 75 founders were a single social group or block with no 
isolates. All Edinburgh founders were connected directly or indi-
rectly to each other, with a range of degree centrality scores from 
three to 49%. In the case of the IAAG foundation, the situation is 
almost identical with only one isolate in that community and 
degree centrality scores for the other 50 founders ranging from 
four to 56%. The network analyses reveal that the IAAG founders 
were more closely networked than their IAE/SAE counterparts. 
These findings portray both groups of founders as cohesive com-
munities, with a small minority of each group acting as a bridge 
between the IAE/SAE and the IAAG. 
In general terms, the personal attributes of the IAE/SAE and 
IAAG founders suggest that most individuals had at least middle-
class origins. More specifically, the personal attributes and social 
ties of the IAE/SAE founders provide evidence that they were a 
predominantly upper-middle-class community within Edinburgh. 
On the other hand, the personal attributes and social ties of the 
IAAG founders are socially consistent with the mercantile and 
farming nature of Glasgow and its surrounding regions in the mid-
dle of the 19th century. In combination, and in the context of 
other accountants in both cities, these findings suggest that the 
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders were cohesive and elite communities 
by 1853. 
The range of degree centrality measures for the 75 IAE/SAE 
founders confirms Lee's [19961 tentative conclusion of the exis-
tence of an elite within an elite in the IAE/SAE. The Edinburgh 
founders with the highest scores were predominantly public 
accountants with Edinburgh origins and the largest number of 
ties to landowners, lawyers, and insurance companies. A similar 
super-elite cannot be detected in the IAAG foundation. It involved 
two subsets of founders differentiated by age and experience 
rather than by network ties and social connections. Thus, 
although the evidence for both foundation groups is consistent 
with the expectation of overall cohesiveness and elitism, the 
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IAE/SAE founders were different from their IAAG counterparts in 
terms of predominant social class and inner elitism. 
In both the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations, there appear to be 
two sets of individuals at work in the process. The first set con-
tains founders most concerned to institutionalize their profession 
of public accountancy. They are typically to be found in the initi-
ating groups of founders. The second set comprises individuals 
invited by members of the first set to be involved in the founda-
tions. In the case of the IAE/SAE, the invitees were mainly insur-
ance managers who were well connected within and outside the 
IAE/SAE network. Because they were not primarily public 
accountants, they were termed honorary members of the IAE in 
1853. However, by the time of the SAE royal charter, most of the 
honorary members chose to leave the IAE. It can therefore be con-
cluded that the brief association of the IAE with well-connected 
insurance managers provided credibility to the foundation at a 
critical stage of its early history. 
By contrast, the IAAG foundation did not involve the tempo-
rary or honorary membership of leading practitioners in areas 
outside public accountancy. However, the foundation started 
with one set of junior practitioners petitioning a more senior set 
to join with them in institutionalizing public accountancy in 
Glasgow. The invitees were typically well connected within the 
overall group and predominantly involved in stockbroking rather 
than public accountancy. However, unlike their Edinburgh insur-
ance counterparts, these men were involved in the foundation 
and became IAAG members and its initial officers. Unlike the 
IAE/SAE foundation and the involvement of insurance managers, 
the conclusion here must be that these senior providers of pre-
dominantly non-public accountancy services were necessary to 
the long-term credibility of the IAAG. These findings are consis-
tent with the second expectation of the study that both founda-
tions involved individuals who would not ordinarily be described 
as public accountants. 
The various regression analyses of the social network data 
confirm the pr ior expecta t ion that the most-connected 
Edinburgh founders were most associated with landowners, 
lawyers, and insurance companies. By contrast, the Glasgow 
founders were most connected to merchants, manufacturers, and 
farmers, only moderately to lawyers, and rarely to insurance man-
agement and governance. These findings are also consistent with 
a prior expectation. However, in the case of the IAAG founders, 
marital status appears to be strongly related to variations in the 
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network connections of the founders (the most-connected men 
were married by 1853). There is no obvious explanation for this 
unexpected result. 
Although most of the founders with the greatest number of 
ties and clique memberships were the most involved in their 
respective foundations, there were a number of founders w h o 
established different patterns. For example, R. Balfour, T.G. 
Dickson, J. Maitland, and C. Pearson are four of the most-connect-
ed founders in the IAE/SAE network; yet, they did not openly par-
ticipate in the foundation or its subsequent management . 
Similarly, in the case of the IAAG, J. Gourlay, J. Fleming, J.C. Foulds, 
and H. Kerr were well connected but relatively uninvolved. This 
suggests that certain IAE/SAE and IAAG founders with potentially 
influential positions in their respective communities had either 
little incentive to participate explicitly in the foundation events or 
preferred to be involved in a less public way. This emphasizes the 
value of social network analysis and is consistent with analyses in 
other social history areas [e.g.; Bearman, 1993; Padgett and Ansell, 
1993]. In other words, network analysis helps to identify those 
individuals with strong ties in a network that did not need to be 
visibly active to exercise influence. Alternatively, as in this study, 
there are others with relatively fewer ties that appeared to com-
pensate by being very involved (e.g., T. Martin and G. Meldrum of 
the IAE/SAE and J.W. Guild of the IAAG). 
Overall, the institutionalization of Edinburgh and Glasgow 
public accountants in 1853 was based on strongly networked 
groups of typically experienced public accountants who, general-
ly speaking, were well entrenched in the upper strata of their 
respective local societies. The study reveals the considerable 
insights to be gained from examining a social situation in terms of 
the relations and attributes of the participants rather than the lat-
ter alone. The major contribution of the study, therefore, is to 
bring social network analysis to accounting history research and, 
in so doing, to provide a better understanding of the IAE/SAE and 
IAAG foundations and their founders. 
The limitations of the study are equally clear. First, the analy-
sis is based on the relations discovered in accessible archives. 
There may well be more evidence undiscovered. The results of 
the study are therefore conservatively stated. Second, the study 
does not attempt to measure the actual influence of the individu-
al founders. It allows generalizations to be made about possible 
behavior but not about actual activity. The latter would require a 
different type of archival research that may not be possible 
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because of lack of evidence. That attempts should be made to do 
such research is not in doubt. Likewise unquestioned is the need 
to examine more specifically the lives and roles of individual 
founders to discover more about their involvement, or lack there-
of, in the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations. In particular, the spe-
cific roles of the most connected but least active founders are wor-
thy of future research. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Founders of the IAE/SAE 
NAME INITIAL INITIAL IAE IAE PETITION PETITION TOTAL TOTAL 
DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES 
J.M. Baillie 
R. Balfour 
J. Barron 
CM. Barstow 
A. Borthwick 
J. Borthwick 
J. Brown 
J.A. Brown 
H. Callender 
F.H. Carter 
T.R. Chaplin 
R. Christie 
R. Christie Jr 
D. Cormack 
H.D. Dickie 
J.J. Dickson 
T.G. Dickson 
C.H. Douglas 
G. Dundas 
G.A. Esson 
G.L. Finlay 
J. Fraser 
J.C. Fraser 
A. Gibson 
R. Gordon 
T. Grant 
J. Grieve 
A. Horne 
J. Howden 
J. Hunter 
H. Ivory 
A. Jamieson 
% 
43 
46 
43 
50 
43 
46 
57 
25 
4 
18 
50 
29 
G.A.Jamieson 21 
J.M. Liddell 
D. Lindsay 
W. Low 
J. Maitland 
T. Mansfield 
D. Marshall 
25 
43 
(5)n 
4 
7 
6 
8 
4 
5 
11 
1 
0 
1 
8 
0 
1 
2 
6 
% 
31 
43 
3 
28 
39 
6 
33 
30 
33 
15 
9 
24 
9 
6 
12 
43 
43 
21 
21 
24 
36 
7 
6 
21 
24 
15 
25 
39 
12 
15 
33 
24 
22 
25 
13 
42 
33 
25 
(5)n 
19 
44 
0 
15 
33 
0 
28 
20 
24 
0 
1 
9 
0 
0 
2 
41 
54 
5 
4 
7 
20 
0 
0 
2 
14 
0 
3 
34 
1 
0 
28 
3 
1 
10 
0 
37 
14 
10 
% 
27 
42 
0 
27 
38 
30 
28 
33 
13 
10 
8 
7 
43 
42 
22 
22 
20 
5 
20 
25 
15 
37 
12 
15 
25 
25 
13 
22 
12 
42 
30 
23 
(5)n 
10 
23 
0 
11 
20 
15 
14 
14 
0 
1 
0 
0 
22 
31 
7 
1 
3 
0 
2 
11 
0 
19 
1 
0 
3 
1 
2 
2 
0 
26 
4 
7 
% 
28 
41 
3 
26 
36 
5 
31 
27 
30 
14 
8 
23 
8 
5 
12 
43 
41 
20 
19 
23 
34 
7 
5 
19 
23 
14 
23 
36 
11 
15 
31 
22 
23 
14 
26 
14 
39 
31 
24 
(5)n 
19 
49 
0 
15 
35 
0 
30 
20 
24 
0 
1 
9 
0 
0 
2 
46 
56 
8 
4 
7 
22 
0 
0 
2 
14 
0 
3 
35 
1 
0 
29 
3 
1 
3 
10 
0 
42 
16 
11 
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APPENDIX 1 (Cont.) 
The Founders of the IAE/SAE 
NAME INITIAL INITIAL IAE IAE PETITION PETITION TOTAL TOTAL 
DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES 
% 
T. Martin 7 
G. Meldrum 7 
G.T. Mitchell 
J. Moinet 
J.S. Moncrieff 29 
W. Moncreiff 39 
P. Morrison 
D. Murray 
G. Murray 
W. Myrtle 
J.M. Macandrew29 
J. Mackenzie 
K. Mackenzie 64 
D. Maclagan 
A.T. Niven 
J.J. Ogilvy 
J.S. Ogilvy 18 
A.M. Paterson 
C. Pearson 57 
D.S. Peddie 
S. Raleigh 25 
G. Ramsay 
A.W. Robertson36 
W. Russell 
R.E. Scott 
T. Scott 25 
W. Smith 
D.R. Souter 
R. Spottiswoode 
C.W. Thomson 
W.T. Thomson 
G. Todd 18 
J. Wilkie 
H.G. Watson 57 
J. Watson 
W. Wood 39 
Mean/total 34 
No. of 
observations 29 
Centrality index32 
(5)n 
0 
0 
2 
6 
2 
11 
0 
11 
1 
1 
3 
0 
11 
5 
21 
29 
% 
6 
6 
15 
21 
24 
22 
22 
33 
52 
9 
25 
16 
43 
28 
15 
21 
22 
13 
25 
21 
12 
22 
19 
13 
28 
16 
18 
43 
22 
33 
23 
68 
30 
(5)n 
0 
0 
4 
9 
23 
7 
6 
41 
63 
0 
13 
0 
58 
16 
4 
4 
8 
2 
8 
8 
1 
9 
4 
2 
19 
1 
1 
41 
5 
27 
154 
68 
% 
7 
7 
13 
20 
25 
8 
23 
22 
52 
10 
13 
32 
17 
15 
37 
28 
18 
22 
25 
12 
25 
22 
22 
22 
15 
13 
18 
40 
33 
22 
61 
31 
(5)n 
0 
0 
2 
8 
16 
0 
6 
3 
43 
0 
1 
11 
0 
10 
33 
12 
6 
3 
4 
2 
6 
9 
5 
3 
2 
0 
1 
27 
18 
90 
61 
% 
5 
5 
14 
12 
19 
27 
8 
19 
22 
11 
20 
32 
49 
9 
12 
30 
15 
16 
41 
28 
18 
20 
24 
12 
23 
20 
11 
20 
19 
12 
27 
15 
19 
41 
20 
32 
21 
75 
28 
(5)n 
0 
0 
4 
0 
9 
30 
1 
3 
7 
1 
6 
47 
67 
0 
2 
14 
0 
11 
60 
16 
6 
4 
10 
2 
8 
9 
1 
9 
6 
2 
20 
1 
1 
42 
5 
31 
169 
75 
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APPENDIX 2 
The Founders of the IAAG 
NAME REQUISITIONIST 
R. Aitken 
W. Anderson 
W. Auld 
A. Black 
J.A. Brodie 
T.G. Buchanan 
C. Cairns 
W. Cowan 
C. Cunningham 
A. Cuthbertson 
D. Cuthbertson 
D. Dreghorn 
J. Fleming 
J.C. Foulds 
C. Gairdner 
J. Gourlay 
J. Graham 
J.W. Guild 
D. Hamilton 
W. Hendrie 
W. Jamieson 
H. Kerr 
H. Leck 
J. Mann 
J. Miller 
M. Mitchell 
J. McClelland 
R. McCowan 
D. McCubbin 
A. McEwan 
G. McFarlane 
J. MacGeorge 
W. Mackenzie 
J.L. McKirdy 
W.G. McLean 
W. McNaughton 
A. McNicholl 
D.E. Outram 
J.C. Reid 
A. Ritchie 
G. Robson 
R. Scobie 
DEGREES 
% 
19 
50 
31 
46 
42 
15 
27 
27 
27 
15 
19 
19 
27 
23 
35 
35 
42 
23 
0 
31 
19 
23 
27 
REQUISITIONEE 
DEGREES 
% 
71 
79 
7i 
86 
79 
21 
64 
29 
79 
43 
43 
71 
71 
TOTAL 
DEGREES 
% 
50 
56 
54 
52 
22 
44 
42 
28 
50 
10 
32 
26 
42 
40 
36 
38 
32 
28 
24 
22 
4 
42 
22 
22 
20 
14 
50 
24 
32 
50 
20 
40 
42 
24 
50 
18 
0 
24 
26 
20 
28 
12 
TOTAL 
CLIQUES 
(5)n 
12 
25 
16 
17 
4 
7 
5 
2 
16 
0 
9 
7 
11 
11 
14 
17 
1 
1 
2 
4 
0 
7 
2 
8 
3 
1 
14 
10 
14 
13 
1 
5 
10 
1 
15 
1 
0 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
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J. Smith 
J. Thomson 
W. Tolmie 
J. Watson 
P. White 
J. Wilkie 
G. Wink 
A. Woodside 
A. Wylie 
Mean/total 
Number of 
observations 
REQUISITIONIST 
DEGREES 
19 
15 
• 27 
31 
27 
27 
APPENDIX 2 (Cont.) 
The Founders o f the IAAG 
REQUISITIONEE 
DEGREES 
64 
86 
TOTAL 
DEGREES 
16 
18 
18 
26 
46 
24 
26 
18 
20 
29 
51 
28 
TOTAL 
CLIQUES 
26 
52 
51 
64 
15 
Cen t ra l i ty i n d e x 25 2 5 
APPENDIX 3 
Links Between IAAG and SAE Founders 
NAME DEGREE CENTRALITY BRIDGING 
IN IAAG IN SAE IN BRIDGE CLIQUES 
% % % n 
J.A. Brodie 22 10 1 
W. Cowan 28 10 1 
D. Cuthbertson 32 31 3 
J.C. Foulds 40 . 7 1 
J .Graham 32 10 1 
J.W. Guild 28 17 2 
H.Kerr 42 3 0 
A. McEwan 50 10 1 
D.E. Outram 24 10 1 
J.Smith 16 3 0 
J.M. Baillie 28 21 4 
R. Balfour 41 17 1 
CM. Barstow 26 10 1 
J. Borthwick 5 3 0 
J .Brown 31 10 1 
H.D.Dickie 12 10 1 
T.G.Dickson 41 14 1 
A.Gibson 19 10 1 
A. Howden 11 7 1 
J. Hunter 15 7 1 
J.M. Liddell 14 3 0 
J. Maitland 39 3 0 
T.Mansfield 31 10 1 
G. Meldrum 5 7 1 
J. Moinet 14 10 1 
W. Moncreiff 27 21 3 
P. Morrison 8 7 1 
A.M. Paterson 16 3 0 
H.G.Watson 41 10 1 
J. Wilkie 20 3 0 
Mean/total 31 20 10 9 
Number of observations 10 20 30 30 
Centrality index 25 28 22 
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Abstract: In 1940, Walt Disney was faced with crafting a message of 
corporate accountability under duress. His company, the product of 
his creative genius, had been forced to submit to public account-
ability. It had a pressing need to raise preferred equity finance for a 
major expansion during a period of market uncertainty, war, and 
reported losses. This paper conducts a "close reading" of the "Letter 
to Stockholders" in Walt Disney Productions' 1940 annual report, 
the first such letter signed by Walt Disney. The letter's rhetorical fea-
tures, including metaphor and ideology, are examined in the con-
text of the times. What is revealed is an accountability document 
skillfully crafted with the exigencies faced by Disney's company 
firmly in mind. The letter offers suggestive insight to the world as 
Disney made sense of it. The paper contributes to understanding 
the use of rhetoric by top management in activities related to 
aspects of financial accountability and reporting. It also helps to 
understand better a significant public persona of the 20th century, 
Walt Disney. 
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Analysis of annual reports, including letters by CEOs to stock-
holders, has a long history in management and accounting litera-
tures. Discourse by CEOs is important not only because of the 
power that corporate leaders wield in their own organizations, 
but also because of their political and cultural influence generally. 
Since such discourse may be viewed as a form of sense making 
[Weick, 1995], its study also has value because the CEO may be 
talking or writing at least partly to himself or herself, and in so 
doing creating, justifying, and reacting to the world thus fash-
ioned. We think, talk, and write to help us learn and understand 
what we then know [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993; 
Weick, 1995]. CEOs are no different. 
The many papers which have examined CEOs' letters to share-
holders included in corporate annual reports have had a focus 
other than exploring the metaphors and ideologies at play within 
such discourse (e.g.; Bettman and Weitz [1983]; Salancik and 
Meindl [1984]; Hager and Scheiber [1990]; Jones and Shoemaker 
[1994]; Abrahamson and Amir [1996]; Thomas [1997]; Courtis 
[1998]; Hyland [1998]; Devinney and Kabanoff [1999]). This 
paper follows a path largely untrodden in previous studies of 
stockholders' letters in accounting annual reports. It explores, by 
means of a "close reading," meaning in the narrative of the stock-
holders' letter of the first public annual report of the global com-
pany which still bears Walt Disney's name. Such accountability 
narrative merits close reading since it is part of the "battery of 
belief-forming institutions" [Tinker, 1985, p. 82] top management 
uses to define the language by means of which its self-accounts are 
to be written. Our close reading is performed with an interest not 
only in "examin[ing] the way discourses are constructed in order 
to achieve certain effects" [Eagleton, 1983, p. 205], but also to help 
reveal more about the author. 
The close reading we conduct is similar to Slagell's [1991, p. 
155] "close textual analysis" of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugu-
ral address during the American Civil War, in which she "consid-
ers the speech in relation to its historical setting" (pp. 155-156). Of 
course, in contrast to an American president's inaugural address, 
CEOs' annual letters to stockholders are mundane, common dis-
courses of seemingly minor importance. It is perhaps because of 
their commonness and institutionalized, periodic, calendric role 
in the functioning of our socioeconomy that such common docu-
ments deserve scrutiny. Letters to stockholders, written by CEOs 
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and published in corporate annual reports, are too important a 
part of the ideological paraphernalia of our society to be ignored 
or brushed aside as mere rhetoric. 
The chosen text is the letter to stockholders included in the 
annual report of Walt Disney Productions, issued in respect of the 
financial year ended September 28, 1940, and signed by Walt 
Disney. Disney's company had been compelled to seek outside 
capital to finance the expansion of its studio. Our analysis uncov-
ers aspects of the public persona of the then very prominent Walt 
Disney, a person reputedly "the most significant figure in graphic 
arts since Leonardo" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131, citing 
British cartoonist David Low]. He, or his alter ego, is revealed, 
inter alia, as a skillful financial and business rhetorician whose dis-
course reveals ways of thinking that accord with the ideology of 
the market [Carrier, 1997]. Such microanalysis of an accountabili-
ty text prepared by top management is consistent with entreaties 
for accounting-related narratives in annual reports to be investi-
gated "to better understand the motives and attitudes of manage-
ment and the communication process" [Jones and Shoemaker, 
1994, p. 174], and, more generally, with polemics in recent 
accounting literature encouraging "greater use of narratives in 
accounting and management research" [Llewellyn, 1999, p. 233]. 
The particular Disney stockholders' letter we analyze deserves 
special study for three additional reasons: 
•First, it is the initial stockholders' letter of the Disney 
Company, a corporation that today has global importance in the 
entertainment and communications industries. 
•Second, the letter was a public and permanent docu-
ment signed and most likely substantially crafted by Walt Disney 
(perhaps with contributions from his brother Roy).1 Thus, it has 
potential to provide insight to Disney's public persona at the time 
and seems likely to add to historical understanding of this 
acknowledgedly charismatic, yet complex business and cultural 
leader [Boje, 1995; Bryman, 1995]. We cannot say with certainty 
(nor can anyone we expect) that Walt Disney physically drafted 
1Attributing authorship unequivocally to Walt Disney solely or substantially is 
difficult if not impossible. While acknowledging this lack of strong, unequivocal 
proof of authorship, we take some solace that it is the "metaphoric Walt," as men-
tioned in the next footnote, that may be of sustaining importance. As Schickel 
11968/1997, p. 44] wrote: "In the last analysis, Walt Disney's greatest creation was 
Walt Disney." There is no doubt that the "metaphoric Walt" signed and is account-
able for the letter. 
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the 1940 stockholders' letter. However, in view of his reputation 
for keeping "a sharp eye on financial arrangements" [Capodagli 
and Jackson, 1998, p. 185], his multi-skilling philosophy, his acute 
awareness of the "bottom line," and his obsession with careful 
attention to small detail [Capodagli and Jackson, 1998, pp. 7, 181-
185], it seems likely that he was strongly implicated. Watts [1997, 
p. 260], a Walt Disney biographer, referred to "Walt's comments" 
in his brief reference to the company's annual reports of the 
1940s. In addition, Schickel's [1968/97, p. 256] detailed descrip-
tions supporting Walt Disney's dominant role and "father figure" 
persona in regard to his company, provided strong, albeit circum-
stantial, evidence that Disney had at least some significant hand in 
the letter's crafting. 
• Third, since stockholders' letters in recent Disney annu-
al reports make explicit, favorable reference to "Walt" [Amernic, 
1998], a "metaphoric Walt" may influence current-day Disney 
CEOs.2 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides con-
text for the letter and its analysis. The third section examines 
rhetorical qualities of the letter, except for metaphor, which is ana-
lyzed in section four. A final section contains concluding com-
ments. 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE DISNEY STOCKHOLDERS' LETTER 
The Stock Issue—Features, Reasons, Consequences: In 1940, Walt 
Disney Productions, as the company was then known, was a rela-
tively small film production studio in terms of financial and tangi-
ble assets, but not in terms of reputation, expectations, and inno-
vation. It had just gone public by issuing 155,000 shares of $25 par 
value, 6% cumulative, convertible preferred stock (see Exhibit 1). 
As a consequence, the Disney brothers ' company became publicly 
accountable. Its first annual report, for the fiscal year ended 
September 28, 1940, was issued in December 1940. That report is 
the focus of this paper. Of particular interest is the letter to stock-
holders, a text not only proffered to the public domain but also 
personally associated with the company's chief executive. The let-
ter to stockholders was signed by Walt Disney and was included as 
the first main component of the report. 
2A reviewer has drawn attention to the prospect that a "metaphoric Walt" 
helps provide flexibility in justifying present business practices of the Disney cor-
poration. He could be used in much the same way as Sam Walton might be used as 
an ongoing mythic figure at Wal-Mart Inc. 
61
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2000
Amernic and Craig: Disney's Letter to Stockholders 53 
EXHIBIT 1 
Selected Financial and Other Information About 
Walt Disney Productions in 1940 
Reported net income or loss for fiscal year ended 
September 28. 1940* 
Total assets reported on balance sheet as of 
September 28. 1940* 
Stockholders equity reported on balance sheet as of 
September 28. 1940*? 
Number of employees * 
Number of feature animated films released in fiscal 
1940* 
Total reported production costs for feature animated 
films released in 1940* 
Number of shorts ("cartoons'") released in fiscal 
1940* 
Average production costs for a cartoon released in 
1940# 
A loss of $1,259,798 
$8,562,137, of which $4,926,557 represented costs 
associated with feature films and short subjects (in 
other words, "soft" assets) 
$5,787,646 
1179 (as of September 28. 1940) 
one (Pinocchio) 
$2,595,380 
ten 
$22,548 
*from 1940 annual report. 
#derived from information in 1940 annual report 
Disney was prompted to raise capital from the public, accord-
ing to the New York Times [February 22, 1940, p. 35, col. 7], by an 
immediate need to provide permanent capital for the company's 
huge expansion program then nearing completion—a $3 million, 
51-acre studio complex in Burbank, California. In 1940, Time mag-
azine [March 25, 1940, p. 77] put it thus: 
Last week, with its second full-length feature, 
Pinocchio, ready for a nation-wide Easter week 
opening, Walt Disney productions applied to the 
SEC for permission to sell 155,000 shares of $25 
par, 6% cumulative convertible preferred stock. 
Purpose of the $3,875,000 offering: to pay off 
bank loans incurred in building the company's 
new studio at Burbank, Calif., and to provide work-
ing capital for four more features now in produc-
tion: Bambi, Wind in the Willows, Peter Pan, 
Fantasia. 
Disney had a long history of reinvesting profits from his ani-
mated films and other revenue sources. He did so to meet ever-ris-
ing production costs and to help ensure even better films in the 
future [Hollister, 1940]. As early as 1934, Fortune magazine [1934, 
p. 91] described Disney as reinvesting profits "for the sole pur-
pose of making his films more beautiful, more elaborate, more 
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nearly perfect." But, by early 1940, earnings had taken an unex-
pected battering for three principal reasons: the lukewarm box 
office response to Pinocchio, Disney's difficulties in containing 
costs, and the effects of the European war. 
Bryman [1995, pp. 9-10] summarized the position confronting 
Disney: 
Largely as a result of Snow Whites success 
[released on December 21, 1937], Walt realized 
that feature film production had to become the 
Studio's main focus, and soon afterwards work 
began on Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi. In order 
to accomplish this level of production effort...the 
[Disney] brothers decided to build a new studio. 
In the summer of 1938, they placed a deposit for a 
new purpose-built studio in Burbank. In effect, 
the new studio building would consume the bulk 
of the profits from Snow White. The move was 
completed in May 1940, by which time the studio 
had about 1,100 employees. The Studio's financial 
position began to deteriorate [in 1939]. Both 
Fantasia and Pinocchio performed poorly at the 
box office and produced sizeable losses, the for-
mer especially so, since they had proved very cost-
ly to produce. Also, Disney's European market had 
all but dried up as a result of the war...the Studio 
was heavily in debt and was forced to issue [pre-
ferred stock] shares to the public in April 1940, a 
move to which the brothers had always been 
opposed (emphasis added). 
The reasons for the preferred stock issue merit some elabora-
tion. While the audiences responded very positively to Snow 
White ("The $1,500,000 borrowed to make Snow White was 
repaid within three months..." [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]), there was 
always the risk that after the initial successes, the movie-going 
public would consider such films just a fad and would quickly lose 
interest. Disney's next animated feature, Pinocchio, released in 
1940, fared poorly. It was a challenge to create and produce full-
length, animated films involving cartoon characters that audi-
ences would pay to see. The market for feature films of this type 
was new and unproven. 
Additionally, Disney was struggling to maintain profitability in 
an environment characterized by a rapidly changing technology 
in animation and movie making. He was confronted by market 
uncertainty and considerable production risks posed by the chal-
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lenges of new technology (i.e., coping with the special sound 
equipment requirements for Fantasia). It was a challenge as well 
to maintain control over costs while at the same time striving for 
better quality ("The average pay is higher than the average in any 
other Hollywood studio" [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]). In a sense, his 
problem was similar to that now confronting computer hardware 
and software companies. 
The European war3 also had a major impact on the studio by 
limiting the company's ability to release pictures in any of the 
countries at war. This constrained the market for basic cartoon 
shorts and, even more importantly for new features. Given the 
technological and cost-control risks associated with new, full-
length, animated films, losing the potential to spread some of the 
market-acceptance risk was a serious blow — audiences in foreign 
markets might have resulted in a future stream of revenues even if 
the domestic market eventually regarded these films as mere fads. 
Furthermore, currency regulations, as well as fluctuations in for-
eign exchange rates, reduced the company's revenues from pic-
tures already released in foreign countries. And even domestic cin-
ema goers might be less inclined to spend their disposable income 
on going to the theater, given the prospect of U.S. involvement in 
the war. 
So, at the time Walt Disney signed the 1940 letter to stock-
holders, Walt Disney Productions was in a precarious position. It 
had to learn to master new technology. It had a product with a 
potentially vast market, but that market was largely unproven in 
the longer term. The European war was beginning to have an 
impact and seemed destined to create further havoc with film dis-
tribution and markets, both worldwide and domestically. The inti-
mate control exercised by Disney over every facet of the business4 
was being strained by rapid expansion and the challenges men-
tioned above, as well as by the need to raise funds through a pub-
lic stock offering. Schickel [1968/1997, pp. 49, 247] described 
Disney's attitude within the context of this difficult time in the fol-
lowing way: 
3
 Although it had provided significant support to Britain and its allies, the U.S. 
did not enter World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
December 7, 1941. 
4According to Hollister [1940, p. 700]: "Walt is the spark plug of production. 
No story starts toward a picture until Walt has bought or invented it, shaped it, 
tried it out, and given it a push...Throughout the production pattern of every pic-
ture Walt threads in and out like a guiding outline...Walt knifes into the most 
minute step of the most microscopic element..." 
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...The precariousness of the family's livelihood 
undoubtedly shaped his own desire not merely to 
succeed but to do so in a particular way—namely, 
to avoid surrendering any part of his autonomy to 
outsiders and to hold his company's stock and its 
decision-making power as closely as he could. 
...Indeed, in 1938 he had every reason to believe 
that he could afford a money-losing experiment 
[that is, Fantasia]. But with Pinocchio unable to 
perform as expected abroad and with the poten-
tially profitable but difficult Bambi put aside in 
order to devote full effort to Fantasia, he was sud-
denly in perilous straights. Far more than should 
have depended on Fantasia. 
And the situation worsened even as the film 
approached completion. Early in 1940 the banks 
shut down the Disney credit line entirely, and in 
order to raise operating capital he was forced in 
April, 1940, to offer stock to the public for the first 
time—a step he feared would mean dilution of his 
control over the enterprise...it was a psychological 
blow that was perhaps harder for him to take than 
it would have been for other men. 
To exacerbate matters, the company had incurred a signif-
icant loss in 1940 (see Exhibit 1). Thus, it was an opportune time 
for Walt Disney to display the charismatic leadership for which he 
became famous. The thesis of this article is that he did so partly 
through skillful rhetoric employed in the 1940 letter to stockhold-
ers. To contextualize further the circumstances leading to the 
stock issue and the environmental circumstances in which 
Disney's letter to stockholders was composed, it is important to 
develop a better understanding of the history of the Disney com-
pany and the persona of Walt Disney, subjects to which we now 
turn. 
Company History: In 1924, Walter Elias Disney, a 23-year-old car-
toonist, opened a small animation studio in a storefront in Los 
Angeles with his older brother Roy. The business was known as 
the "Disney Bros. Studio," but when it moved into new premises 
near downtown Los Angeles in 1926, it became the "Walt Disney 
Studio." Disney's early ventures endured hardships typical of 
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many business startups.5 Walt Disney went bankrupt before his 
move from Kansas City to Los Angeles and his subsequent initial 
success in the late 1920s. He is reported to have said: "When I was 
21, I went broke for the first time. I slept in chair cushions in my 
studio in Kansas City, and ate cold beans out of the can" [Boje, 
1995, p. 1024]. 
The company achieved its first major success when its ani-
mated cartoon, Steamboat Willie, featuring the new Mickey Mouse 
character, was shown at the Colony Theater in New York on 
November 18, 1928. Although the company's cartoons were very 
popular, by the early 1930s the Walt Disney Studio was struggling 
to survive since, among other problems, animation costs contin-
ued to rise. But its fortunes were soon to improve. Lucrative mer-
chandising agreements were negotiated, granting permission for 
images of Disney characters, such as Mickey Mouse, to be used on 
manufactured items.6 With the release of the company's first fea-
ture animated film, Snow White, merchandising agreements were 
at the forefront of what was called "a new dimension in fashion 
merchandising" [Bristol, 1938, p. 13].7 The introduction of color to 
improve cartoon quality led to an Academy Award and commercial 
success for the studio's first color cartoon, Flowers and Trees. 
Other innovations in animation, such as providing cartoon char-
acters with unique, focused personalities (as in The Three Little 
Pigs and for characters such as Pluto, Donald Duck, and Goofy) 
appealed to Depression-era audiences. 
5Problems included decreasing profit margins on their products (cartoons) as 
they endeavored to make technical improvements to satisfy their market, as well as 
hardball tactics by their financial backers (who lured away several of Disney's ani-
mators). The material for this and several following paragraphs draws upon 
Bryman [1995], unless otherwise noted. 
6The New Internationalist [1998], the Walt Disney Company 1997 Fact Book, 
and de Cordova [1994] are drawn upon to disclose that, "In 1930 the first interna-
tional licensing contract for the sale of Mickey Mouse merchandise was 
signed... [and that] ...the first Mickey Mouse watch was sold by Ingersoll Watch 
Company in June, 1933" [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 19]. 
7Disney's approach to licensing his animated characters for commercial 
exploitation was highly successful very quickly: "...in 1932 sales of Disney charac-
ter articles had totaled $300,000, in 1937 they were $35,000,000" [Bristol, 1938, p. 
15]. That success has become institutionalized; in modern times there is a well 
established and curiously seamless fusion of cinematic art with consumerism: 
"Every Disney animated film comes bundled with a complete marketing strategy 
for merchandise, interactive games and a line of children's books" [New 
Internationalist, 1998, p. 28]. 
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By 1934, the company employed 187 staff. Walt Disney decid-
ed to expand into the feature film business since "it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to combine the growing costs of animation... 
with the inherently limited returns that could accrue from shorts" 
[Bryman, 1995, p. 9]. The company's first feature-length anima-
tion movie, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, which opened on 
December 21, 1937, was a great success, at first critically and then 
commercially.8 The company began other animated features 
(Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi), while continuing to produce 
cartoon shorts. It soon outgrew its studio facilities. Plans for a 
new, custom-designed studio were hatched in the summer of 
1938, and the company, now with about 1,100 employees and 
called "Walt Disney Productions," moved into its new studio in 
May 1940. The decision to focus much of the company's efforts on 
very expensive but potentially very profitable feature animated 
films, as well as the related need for new production facilities, 
prompted the company to raise funds from the public through a 
preferred stock issue in April 1940. It subsequently released its 
first published annual report in December of that year. 
Disney Persona: By 1940, Walt Disney was acclaimed widely as an 
international success. Indeed, even by the early 1930s, Disney had 
reached a position of eminence that matched the greatest of 
Hollywood stars. His admirers included Italian conductor 
Toscanini and Russian film director Eisenstein, among a glittering 
array of adoring fans [Costantino, 1991, p. 12]. Disney's Mickey 
Mouse character became "a national figure, an international 
attraction, and finally a cultural totem" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, 
p. 130]. Critics from New York to Leningrad were said to "gravely 
laud him" [Fortune, 1934, p. 89].9 In 1934, his comedies were 
exhibited in 88 countries, and he was said to be "an international 
hero, better known than Roosevelt or Hitler, a part of the folklore 
of the world" (p. 89). Watts [1997, p. 124] described the cultural 
influence of Disney in the 1930s in the following way: 
8One wonders whether modern-day audiences would have been so receptive 
to a female hero who was "young, virginal, pretty, sweet-natured and obedient" and 
unfazed by domestic drudgery through absolute belief that "a handsome owning-
class chap [would], someday soon, come and save her" [Maio, 1998, p. 12]. 
9A11 references in this section are taken from Fortune [ 1934], unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Universities...provided reinforcement for the 
notion of Disney animation as art. In 1933, the 
College Art Association helped arrange an exhibi-
tion of Disney drawings in New York. Five years 
later, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Southern 
California granted honorary degrees to Walt 
Disney... 
The lengthy and major profile of Disney and his film-making 
operations in Fortune magazine in 1934 portrayed him as a myth-
maker. His products were said to enthrall audiences throughout 
the world by bringing them to a "delicate balance between fanta-
sy and fact, poetry and comic reality." They were said to appeal to 
the simplest emotions and to give pleasure. They had "plasticity" — 
nothing in a Disney film was impossible (p. 88). The themes of his 
cartoons were such that "courage overcomes wickedness and fear; 
industry triumphs over dalliance; false ambition gives way to res-
ignation" (p. 88). In sum, they were short morality plays. They 
were the epitome also of what has become known as "disneyfica-
tion" — "sanitized, safe, entertaining and predictable" entertain-
ment [Ellwood, 1998, p. 8]. 
Disney has been described as a moody, deliberately "ordinary," 
informal man who, although having "rural gusto and naive fancy" 
(p. 90), nonetheless had an imagination renowned for its fantastic 
quality (p. 146). He was a stickler for high artistic standards; he 
made daring and innovative use of music, sound, and folk materi-
al; and he was reported to "mistrust the shoddiness and hypocrisy 
of the pseudo-artist" (p. 146). His personality was said to have 
been shaped by "a nostalgic yearning for romance or simple val-
ues" and to have been affected by a "frugal, authoritarian and 
moralistic" father [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. 
But as Boje [1995] has argued, Disney had a "darker side." The 
Dictionary of American Biography claimed that Disney became 
"self-satisfied, intractable, arrogant" and was "probably never the 
quite generous father of a gifted flock that he seemed on the sur-
face" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. "The discerning eye," it 
was said, could find in his programs "breaches of taste, philistine 
wisecracks, a milking of the nostalgic mood, slipshod cultural ref-
erences, a growing dependence on received folklore and other 
people's classics, and an increasingly slick technical achievement 
of rather tawdry effects" [Garrety and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. His 
character Mickey Mouse was said to have been flawed by a streak 
of sadism, and the film Fantasia was adjudged by some as a "pre-
68
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
60 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
tentious hodgepodge." He was alleged to be "both paternalistic 
and domineering...he brooked no dissent, rewarding loyalists wi th 
favors and punishing dissidents" [New Internationalist, 1998, p . 
8]. 
RHETORICAL QUALITIES OF THE 1940 
LETTER TO STOCKHOLDERS 
The Writer: In 1940, Walt Disney was not just another ordinary 
corporate CEO writing a stockholders' letter for the first annual 
report of a relatively small, new public company. As we have 
shown above, he was a cultural sensation. He had been wri t ten 
about rather extensively in the 1930s in major national publica-
tions such as Fortune, New Yorker, American Magazine, 
Scribners, New York Times Magazine, Time, etc. [Bryman, 1995]. 
He was also someone who guarded with zeal his prerogatives to 
lead and to control the results of his genius [Hollister, 1940]. As 
Bryman [1995, p. 10] claimed, he was "forced" to issue shares 
because of the company's debt. How might a cultural icon, whose 
creative genius had long been publicly acknowledged, contem-
plate the writing of a stockholders' letter as part of a compelled 
accountability flowing from the apparently unwanted, but finan-
cially necessary, public offering? This question is important in a 
rhetorical sense since "the speaker's life, insofar as it is public, 
forms a long prelude to his speech" [Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958, p. 320]. 
The Audience: Modern annual reports, including the stockhold-
ers' letter, often have many audiences with diverse and partly con-
flicting interests. These audiences include current and potential 
stockholders and debt holders, financial intermediaries, employ-
ees, unions, competitors and the public-at-large, among others. 
While it seems reasonable to surmise that Disney's 1940 letter was 
an important part of financial reporting intended for similar 
diverse constituencies, perhaps the first among equals was the 
new group of preferred stockholders. Disney was in a somewhat 
invidious position for he had just been provided a financial lifeline 
to sustain his company. He was confronted with the problem of 
crafting a document mainly intended for the company's new pre-
ferred stockholders. He needed to be alert to the potential they 
had to constrain his ownership and his pursuit of all things asso-
ciated with his icon status. He would need to acknowledge the var-
ious operating and market difficulties the company had faced and 
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the difficulties it might face in the future. Additionally, he would 
have to explain effectively how top management (that is, the 
Disney brothers) was firmly in control and leading the company 
towards future success. In clear and compelling terms, he would 
need to analyze the company's performance and prospects so as to 
encourage strong and unwavering adherence to Disney's leader-
ship of the newly public company. His letter would have to serve 
as a public vehicle for sense making [Weick 1995, p. 13] by pre-
ferred stockholders and others interested in the company, includ-
ing himself and his brother. 
Rhetorical Characteristics of the Initial Substantive Section: The 
1940 "Letter to Stockholders" is reproduced in Appendix 1. Its sec-
ond section, following immediately after the warm but respectful 
welcome, is headed "NEW STUDIO." It is reproduced below with 
each sentence labeled for reference: 
NEW STUDIO 
[Sentence 1] At the time of the sale of the 6% 
Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was 
construct ing and equipping its n e w studio. 
[Sentence 2] This studio was substantially com-
pleted and equipped and virtually all of the 
Company's product ion operations were trans-
ferred thereto by the end of May, 1940. [Sentence 
3] As a result of the increased facilities, the 
Company has been able to augment its production 
of completed footage by more than 100% and has 
succeeded in lowering the cost of production per 
foot substantially. [Sentence 4] Therefore, the 
Company will be able to carry out its new policy 
of releasing two or more feature subjects each 
year as well as a large number of short subjects. 
[Sentence 5] As a result of the reduction in costs, 
short subjects are now being produced at a figure 
which the management believes will result in prof-
itable releases even though sources of income in 
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer 
available. 
Sentence 1 links the preferred stock issue (that is, the resources 
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provided by the "Stockholders" to whom the entire letter is 
addressed) with the positive, forceful activities of "constructing 
and equipping." While the "ing" endings are a weak example of 
rhetorical use of repetition (homoioteleuton), the effect is made 
rhetorically stronger by culminating in the fulfillment of a major 
task ("completed," "transferred," "succeeded"). This is an extreme-
ly positive section of the letter, with good use of forceful action 
words and a strong sense of direction. Indeed, Sentence 4 begin-
ning "Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new 
policy..." assures that promises will be kept and that the company 
has a logical, rational plan unfolding as it should. It establishes the 
following close, sequential linkage: 
New financial resources from preferred stock issue 
New, larger studio 
Increased capacity and efficiency 
Lower unit costs 
Increase in number of features released and short subjects 
Expected profits 
This piling-up of arguments in support of expected profits, 
rhetorically a sort of diallage, which Lanham [1991, p. 51] 
explained as "bringing several arguments to establish a single 
point," creates a sense of moving forward with an active, in-con-
trol management in charge.10 
10Within this piling-up of arguments are other rhetorical devices. First, repeti-
tion of the phrase "As a result o f at the start of sentence three and sentence five 
interlaces two references to cost reduction. Such phrasal repetition verges on 
anaphora, whereby the same words "are repeated at the beginning of successive 
clauses..." [Lanham, 1991, p. 11]. Second, the use of action-oriented, decisive words 
and phrases such as "At the time of the sale;" "was constructing," "was substantial-
ly completed;" "were transferred;" "As a result of;" "has succeeded;" "Therefore;" 
"will be able," "now being produced;" and "will result in" is the textual equivalent 
of epitrochasmus; that is, "a swift movement from one statement to the next; rapid 
touching on many different points" [Lanham, 1991, p. 70]. 
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There is also a short, almost completely self-contained, five-
sentence, morality-tale narrative of the American success story in 
this passage. It seems fitting that Disney the storyteller would 
incorporate narrative into his CEO discourse in the stockholders' 
letter. After all, if important external constituencies, and internal 
ones as well, buy into top management's strategic narrative, such 
discourse has certainly served its purpose [Barry and Elmes, 
1997]. The uncertainty associated with the business is incorporat-
ed subtly, almost unobtrusively, by the use of words "substantially" 
and "believes" and the rather soft introduction of the threat to 
"sources of income in certain foreign countries now at war." 
The story narrated in this passage seems almost as fictional as 
a Disney cartoon, thereby making the rhetorical quality of the sec-
tion more interesting. The company had borrowed considerably 
to establish its new facilities and expand its work force. It had 
done so believing that more lucrative opportunities would flow 
from animated features rather than from short subjects. But cost 
control problems, some market resistance, and the European war 
had intervened. This had compelled the Disney brothers to do 
something they did not want to do — issue preferred stock to 
reduce part of the debt and provide them with some liquid funds. 
Given these events, it is contestable whether Disney was in con-
trol of his company to the extent that might be demanded. Thus, 
his use of rhetoric was adept and skillful impression management, 
directed to portraying what was arguably a mirage; that is, of 
Disney being decisive and in control of all dimensions of his com-
pany's affairs [Salancik and Meindl, 1984]. 
"EFFECTS OF THE WAR'' and "PRODUCT": The contrast between 
the second and third sections is dramatic. While the second sec-
tion was upbeat and optimistic, there unfolds in the third section 
a series of negative news about the impact of the war, again char-
acteristic of diallage. The first sentence of this section ["The effect 
of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been 
serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined" 
(emphasis added)], stands in stark contrast to the previous sec-
tion's final sentence in which the war was blamed almost as an 
afterthought for making "sources of income in certain foreign 
countries" "no longer available." Why the sharp, sudden alteration 
in message? Perhaps it had to do with Walt Disney's problems as a 
leader and an entrepreneur in 1940. He had an unpalatable story 
to tell in his company's first public annual report, especially about 
the almost catastrophic problems with Pinocchio. According to 
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the 1940 annual report, $1 million of the $2.6 million cost of pro-
ducing this animated feature was written off during the year 
because of the combined effects of market conditions and the 
excessive costs. (See Appendix 1 under the heading "PINOC-
CHIO.") Thus, first serving up some bad news about the impact of 
the war, the effect of which had already been marginalized to 
some degree at the end of the previous section, might be seen as 
a skillful use of "order" as a rhetorical device. 
But the rhetoric is even more skillful and subtle. Disney refers 
to "the" Company on 44 occasions in the letter. Only once, and in 
this section, does he refer to "your" Company. In doing so, he 
heightens the emphatic effect, helping to steer home the implica-
tions of the bad news to shareholders. His tone, for whatever rea-
son, is almost accusatory, as if the shareholders were answerable 
for the bad news. 
The letter begins with very good news about increasing pro-
duction, reducing costs, and anticipating profits. These successes 
were due to factors presumably controllable by management. The 
next section describes the potential impact of the war in very 
general terms — the war being, of course, beyond the control of 
management. The following section, headed "PRODUCT," 
describes the even more sombre news about Pinocchio and the 
possible bad news about Fantasia. The bad news about Pinocchio 
is first reported as due to "the conditions prevailing throughout 
the world" (see subsection headed "PINOCCHIO"), in other 
words, beyond management's control. Despite this, later in the 
same subsection, the letter mentions the company's growth ("the 
transition period through which the Company passed when it 
changed its policy of making one feature in two years...to a policy 
of producing from two to four features a year...") and the "discard-
ed work of untrained personnel," "the schooling and training of 
personnel," and "inadequate plant facilities" before moving into 
the new studio. 
The portion of the third section devoted to Fantasia reminds 
the reader that the company is an innovator, and that innovation 
sometimes requires changing strategies and profit expectations. 
The remainder of the fourth section provides a barrage of upbeat 
news about new animated features, cartoons in process, and other 
sources of revenue. 
Disney's Rhetorical Use of Accounting: Aho [ 1985] and Carruthers 
and Espeland [1991] have argued that accounting is powerfully 
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rhetorical. Disney displayed an innate understanding of this fea-
ture of accounting in his stockholders' letter. Under the heading 
"GENERAL," Disney attacks the strictures of accounting conven-
tion by invoking a statement made in the company's formal, legal 
prospectus inviting subscriptions in the preferred stock issue. The 
portion of the section reads as follows (sentences are numbered 
for reference purposes): 
[Sentence 1] In considering the profit and loss 
statement of the Company, it is worth while to 
repeat the following statement made in the 
prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred 
Stock: 
[Sentence 2] "The Company's principal income 
accrues according to the rapidity with which its 
features are exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, 
the relationship between dates of release and 
dates of accounting periods has in the past pro-
duced and will probably continue in the future to 
produce wide variations in earnings as they may 
from time to time be reported. [Sentence 3] This 
is made more pronounced by a program which 
contemplates the release of only one or two fea-
tures per year. [Sentence 4] In connection with 
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the 
Company adopted a policy of writing off the 
entire cost of the picture against the first revenues 
received, and the Company may in the future fol-
low this policy with respect to all of its feature pro-
ductions. [Sentence 5] Consequently, if any given 
accounting period closes at a time when revenues 
have failed to exceed the costs incurred in con-
nection with the production of a feature released 
during such period, it is possible that a loss may be 
reported in such period notwithstanding the fact 
that an actual profit may eventually be realized on 
such feature." 
In Sentence 1, Disney invokes the authority of the prospectus, 
a legal document that had been approved by the California author-
ities. This appeal to authority, or apomnemonysis [Lanham, 1991, 
p. 191], gives added weight to the text. Such a rhetorical move is 
quite consistent with the central role that appeal to authority, 
often embodied in GAAP, serves in modern accounting. The 
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prospectus excerpt is cited in sentences 2, 3, and 4 to tell of the 
company's virtuous accounting by which the entire cost of ani-
mated features is writ ten off against the first revenues received, a 
conservative accounting policy, at least in the short run. In sen-
tence 5, the excerpt suggests strongly that resulting accounting 
losses are an artifact of the interplay between this conservative 
accounting policy and the arbitrariness of the relationship 
between accounting periods and revenues. In effect, Disney sig-
nals to the letter's readers the company's sobriety of purpose by 
using a conservative method of accounting.11 But he then draws 
upon this excerpt from the preferred stock prospectus to urge 
readers not to take the resultant accounting too seriously. 
Rhetorically, he seems to want to have it both ways; e.g., conser-
vative accounting shows evidence of the social virtue of conser-
vatism, but accounting itself can be relied upon only to an extent. 
Can he have it both ways?12 Can Disney both draw upon the 
authority of accounting to influence readers and almost at the 
same time plead the arbitrariness of certain accounting conven-
tions, such as the accounting period convention? Accounting is 
such a rhetorically serviceable and elastic mode of representation 
and argument that it is not surprising that Disney, the creative sto-
ryteller, employs it thus. 
However, the conservative method of revenue recognition 
chosen by Disney had a decidedly unconservative side as well. 
Feature animated films whose costs had been fully recovered 
could be taken off the shelf and distributed again with 100% of the 
producer 's revenues during these re-releases going directly to the 
company's before-tax profits. This happened with Snow White in 
1940—that year's income statement in the annual report included 
revenues of $103,526 from the reissue of Snow White, but 
revealed no costs in 1940 since all production costs for the picture 
had been recovered in previous years. So the conservative 
accounting used by Disney had a temporal dimension—very con-
servative in early years in which feature film production activity 
was high and unconservative once such features were completed 
11Indeed, the financial statement footnotes in the 1940 annual report reveal 
the method of accounting to be conservative twice over. Not only were profits on 
an animated feature not admitted to the company's accounting system until all of a 
feature's costs of production had been recovered, but Disney did not account for 
any revenues at all until cash was received from a film's distributor. 
12A reviewer raised this dual nature of accounting argument in the stockhold-
ers' letter. 
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and went into re-release. Since 1940 was one of these "early years," 
this unconservative side remained unobtrusive during the crucial 
year of 1940. 
In the 1941 stockholders' letter, Walt Disney demonstrated fur-
ther his rhetorical capability to use accounting strategically. He 
constructed, or more likely had his accountants construct, a 
detailed accounting comparison between the company's 1941 and 
its 1940 results. He included this comparison near the beginning 
of the 1941 letter (see Appendix 2). He was using accounting 
information to show that in spite of a reported loss of $789,297 in 
1941, many features highlighted in this artfully constructed com-
parison suggested strongly that great progress had been made in 
1941 as compared with 1940. Constructing such an unusual 
accounting schedule and placing it near the front of his stock-
holders' letter, where it more or less dominated and conditioned 
perceptions of the rest of the letter and perhaps the rest of the 
entire 1941 annual report, was a skillful rhetorical move. The 
authority of the accounting information used, drawn from the 
audited financial statements, was apomnemonysis combined with 
"order" in persuasive harmony. 
The "Summary of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement," 
presented in the 1941 Stockholders' Letter, seems skillful rhetori-
cally in another sense as well. It presented a gross mass of num-
bers across 3 x 8 digit columns, 26 rows long. Clearly, the notions 
of accounting materiality and "rounding" had not been embraced 
by Disney or his accounting advisors, as the financial data were 
presented to the precise dollar and cent. Although this may have 
reflected Disney's reputation for "attention to detail," it may also 
have been a rhetorical ploy. This so-called "Summary" was a visual 
onslaught likely to test, and find wanting, all but the most deter-
mined, accounting-trained readers. Perhaps it was a visual 
metaphor used as a rhetorical device, a way for Disney to vent his 
frustration with the complexity and confounding nature of 
accounting methods and practices. For such a skillful graphic 
artist, one who was renowned for the most beautiful of screen 
images, the "Financial Summary" was out of character. Whereas 
Disney was a creative graphic artist, adept at fashioning com-
pelling and beautiful screen images, when it came to conscripting 
something as mundane as accounting data to craft the (financial) 
story he wished to tell, the end result was metaphorically a bar-
rage of numbers bereft of aesthetic appeal, but perhaps a classic 
rhetoric move. More simply however, this could have merely been 
brother Roy's influence. 
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The Rhetoric of an Accountability Document: It is not surprising 
to find that the 1940 letter to stockholders was well constructed 
rhetorically. After all, Walt Disney had by this time a universal rep-
utation as a master storyteller. So why would he not use this talent 
in telling his company's financial story during a period of crisis in 
a way that might be expected to garner positive reaction from his 
audience? Financial reporting, in both its qualitative and quantita-
tive aspects, is like all text, and discourse generally, unavoidably 
rhetorical. Disney was as skilled at giving a financial account as he 
was at giving an account of Mickey's latest adventure. 
Understanding the inherent rhetorical nature of such discourse is 
important to understanding the role such discourse plays in 
accountability. 
Indeed, in any accountability document (such as a set of audit-
ed financial statements, a stockholders' letter, a variance report, a 
corporate press release), there is a vast array of rhetorical choices 
available which the author might apply with greater or lesser 
degrees of awareness. Such choices, made even subconsciously by 
the author, influence the perceptions of the audience. Our analy-
sis of some rhetoric features of Disney's letter has merely touched 
the surface of possibilities; for example, we might have explored 
more deeply the argument schemes apparent in the letter 
[Warnick and Kline, 1992], examined ways in which the letter 
dealt rhetorically with its composite audiences [Myers, 1999], ana-
lyzed text structure, and metadiscourse [Hyland, 1998], etc. 
Having established, we submit, that the letter was crafted skillful-
ly in a rhetorical sense, we now focus our attention on the nexus 
between rhetoric and ideology. We read Disney's letter with 
metaphor uppermost in mind since it is largely through metaphor 
that we might begin to understand a text's "ideological agenda 
that is apt to be hidden from view" [Postman, 1993, p. 124]. 
METAPHOR IN THE 1940 LETTER 
Metaphor is a central aspect of rhetoric. Among recent con-
tributors to the extensive literature on metaphor, Eubanks [ 1999, 
p. 195] has made a case that: 
...metaphor is rhetorically constituted. No 
metaphor is spoken or written except in the con-
text of a sociohistorically bound communicative 
situation. Therefore, all metaphors are inflected by 
politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, 
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professional commitments, and personal attitudes 
— in short by the whole of our cultural and con-
ceptual repertoire. Because metaphors are inflect-
ed, we cannot explain how they work unless we 
consider concrete instances of metaphor, taking 
into account how inflections constrain the way 
metaphors are uttered and understood. 
Eubanks asserted that metaphors are "fundamentally respon-
sive," and thus cannot be understood by themselves (i.e., "atom-
ized"), but rather only in relation to "metaphoric and literal con-
cepts that are already in motion within a culture's (or subcul-
ture's) discourse." As a consequence: 
Because metaphors are concretely responsive and 
because competen t speakers and wri ters are 
aware, consciously and unconsciously, of the 
interplay of metaphors and concepts, the utter-
ance of a metaphor carries rhetorical benefits or 
costs...Speakers and writers build consensus and 
risk rhetorical capital when selecting and reen-
voicing metaphors. However, they manage that 
risk complexly by claiming, ascribing, and shifting 
the metaphors they utter [Eubanks, 1999, pp. 195-
196]. 
Metaphor theory has a long, rich, and unsettled history. Some 
contend that metaphor is simply flowery but unnecessary. But 
many scholars would agree with Postman [1996, p. 174] that "a 
metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception." 
Others suggest intriguingly that thought itself is fundamentally 
metaphorical [Gibbs, 1994], and that metaphorical language is 
merely the surface manifestation of an underlying cognitive map-
ping between two domains—a target domain and a source domain 
[Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993]. Considerable persuasive 
evidence, much of it summarized by Gibbs [1994], provides sup-
port for the view that metaphor is basic to thought, and that there 
are systematic relationships among metaphorical structures. For 
example, Lakoff [1993, pp. 222-224] wrote about a metaphorical 
mapping hierarchy whose highest level is the fundamental "event 
structure" metaphor. 
Scholars in a wide variety of fields have taken up the serious-
ness of metaphor. Harrington [1995] argued persuasively that 
German race ideology was made more virulent through 
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metaphoric processes; Dunn [1990] showed how the "root 
metaphor" of the new industrial relations has facilitated the erec-
tion of a new industrial relations paradigm; Miller and Fredericks 
[1990] argued that metaphors used in a major educational policy 
document revealed a particular ideological predisposition that 
foreclosed alternative recommendations; Daughton [1993] 
claimed that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's use of metaphor of a 
holy war contributed to the immediate impact and enduring influ-
ence of his first inaugural speech; and Postman [1996, p. 174] 
pleaded rhetorically and, of course, metaphorically to educators 
by asking: "Do I exaggerate in saying that a student cannot under-
stand what a subject is about without some understanding of the 
metaphors that are its foundation?" 
We suggest that the metaphor, "the company is a sentient 
being on a purposeful journey traversing an at-times hostile envi-
ronment," permeates the 1940 Disney stockholders' letter, and 
that this metaphor is consistent with the fundamental and perva-
sive event-structure metaphor hierarchy described by Lakoff 
[1993]. Evidence supporting this contention includes the follow-
ing metaphoric language from the section headed "NEW STU-
DIO": (1) "...the Company was constructing and equipping its new 
studio," (2) "...the Company's production operations...," (3) "...the 
Company has been able to augment its production...," (4) "...the 
Company will be able to carry out its new policy..." These may be 
argued to be instances of verbal reification, but they are also 
instances of attributing sentience and purposiveness to the 
Company. Such ways of talking and writing about companies are 
commonplace, and it is perhaps because they are commonplace 
that they are rhetorically important. 
There are numerous other instances of reification of the com-
pany as an active agent that has commercial "affairs" (e.g., "EFFECT 
OF THE WAR": "The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of 
your Company..."); that takes action (e.g., "PRODUCT": "...the 
Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc."); that enjoys ben-
efits (e.g., "PINOCCHIO": "...there have accrued to the credit of the 
Company..."); that creates saleable names and characters (e.g., 
"SHORT SUBJECTS"); that has expectations about the future (e.g., 
"GENERAL": "...the Company expects to have three new feature 
pictures in general release..."), etc. Perhaps the most important 
language manifestation of this metaphor is under the heading 
"PINOCCHIO" in which Disney writes: "...the transition period 
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of 
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making one feature in two years...to a policy of producing from 
two to four features a year." Here, we have a company that not only 
pursues the sentient activity of changing a policy, but also has to 
endure passage through a transition period on its journey. 
An obvious objection to this analysis might be that these are 
merely words, and besides, many managers talk and write about 
their company in similar ways. But that is the point; "managers 
work with words" [Jonsson, 1998, p. 411]. The modern theory of 
metaphor suggests strongly that words matter because they influ-
ence the way those uttering those words think and act. 
Calling a company "a sentient being on a purposeful journey 
traversing an at-times hostile environment" has several implica-
tions and entailments. The company, a sentient being, knows best 
through its means of cognition and decision making (i.e., its lead-
ership) about its goals and how to achieve them; about which path 
through the at-times hostile environment to take; and how to 
adapt when circumstances change. Therefore, acknowledging the 
interests of other stakeholders is limited and perhaps utilitarian. 
These other stakeholders are not part of the being itself (i.e., the 
company) unless they submit to the authority of the company as a 
sentient being—a strongly managerialist view. Further, any obsta-
cles in the path are adversaries and goals are non-negotiable.13 To 
see the consistency of these ideas in Disney's managerial dis-
course, we take a brief look at the 1941 stockholders' letter (see 
Appendix 2). 
In the section "LABOR RELATIONS" in the 1941 stockholders' 
letter, Disney describes the company's journey as "beset by labor 
troubles" and ventures the observation that this obstacle to pur-
poseful travel has occurred in 1941 "[f]or the first time in its his-
tory." This section describes Disney's view of the famous 1941 
strike, a view in sharp contrast to Disney's hostile, and perhaps at 
13A reviewer, rightly in our view, proffered objections to a version of this 
metaphor which we called "the company is a sentient being on a purposeful jour-
ney" as follows: "Could there be an explanation that is a little less grand? Basic com-
pany law tells us that limited liability companies enjoy separate legal form. It could 
simply be that what is seen here is a playing out of that, with the company being 
accorded its own identity in the text as a consequence of this commonplace 
usage..." While undoubtedly this is true, a reader of Disney's stockholders' letter 
would be prudent not to ignore the strong, pervasive strain of Midwestern inde-
pendence that several scholars have attributed to Walt Disney [Bryman, 1995; 
Schickel, 1968/1997; Watts, 1997] and which seems to have conditioned greatly his 
conception and attitudes towards his company, the product of his creative, emo-
tional, and physical labors. 
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times illegal, anti-union activity summarized in Boje [1995], 
Schickel [1968/1997], and Watts [1997]. If we think of a "compa-
ny as a sentient being on a purposeful journey," then what do we 
think of the people who attempt to unionize and impede the jour-
ney? Disney characterizes the 1941 cutbacks which led in part to 
the union activity and to a subsequent strike as a 
"program...designed to bring output in line with results reason-
ably to be anticipated from the distribution of the Company's pic-
tures under present world conditions." He portrayed it as a tech-
nical problem that required a reasonable technical solution. Thus, 
the union advocates and strikers, who Boje [1995, pp. 1014-1015] 
pointed out had several complaints about their inequitable treat-
ment by Disney, were the source of the "labor troubles" that 
"beset" the company. The impression is one of Big Labor and its 
goons ganging up on the company (the American Federation Of 
Labor is mentioned, as are "secondary boycotts" and "'hot cargo' 
activities"). The arbitration award is described as being "imposed" 
on the company (the word is used twice in the section). So the 
metaphor established in the 1940 stockholders' letter is carried 
over to the 1941 letter and is consistent in its entailments: unrea-
sonable employees joined a union and went on strike, preventing 
the company from implementing a reasonable program to help it 
on its journey. Then, despite "[r]epeated efforts by the Company 
to effect a settlement," government came in and arbitrated a set-
tlement, which imposed several bad things, further impeding the 
journey. However, everything "is now operating smoothly" in 
spite of these obstacles. 
Despite these comforting words, Disney was apparently in no 
mood to have future journeys disrupted by what he regarded as 
ideologically perverted union behavior. The 1941 strike is said to 
have caused him to become "a militant anti-communist" and, in 
the 1950s, "a [secret] special FBI agent charged with passing on 
information about supposed communist infiltration" of 
Hollywood [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. His embrace of a 
business structure of vertical integration in which, for example, 
his company controls not only the production of film and televi-
sion programs, but also controls their distribution and associated 
product licensing and retail merchandising sales, points to the 
adoption of the metaphor of the uninterrupted journey as a tan-
gible business goal. 
Carrier [1997, p. 51] described "a public language" of "the 
Market model" which he alleged: 
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...provides the vocabulary and conceptual equip-
ment that make it relatively easy to define certain 
sorts of things as problems and relatively hard to 
define other sorts of things that way. Just as it 
influences the sorts of problems that can be 
addressed, so it influences what is likely to appear 
as an acceptable, plausible solution. 
Like a lingua franca, such a version of the "Market" helps create "an 
external reality that [people] have to adopt if they are to commu-
nicate with others" [Carrier, 1997, p. 49]. Carrier was concerned 
with the idea of the "Free Market" in the 1990s, and how such a 
richly complex metaphor affects people's arguments, decisions, 
and public debates. He traced the most important historical roots 
of the "Market" to 18th and 19th century Britain. Importantly for 
purposes of this paper, he concluded that "...in popular con-
sciousness the idea flourishes best in the United States, with its 
long traditions of that secular, acquisitive individualism and con-
cern with equality of process rather than of outcome that form 
part of the Market" [Carrier, 1997, p. vii]. 
Disney's ideological notion of his company is metaphorical in 
the same sense as Carrier's notion of the "Market." Disney's com-
pany is related intimately to Carrier's "Market," for the company 
metaphorically pursues its life-journey largely by entering into 
transactions within the ambit of this metaphorical market. And 
since, as Carrier [1997] reminded us, such a metaphorical market 
is a "Free Market," anything that interferes with such metaphorical 
freedom is to be treated with non-metaphorical hostility (e.g., the 
national labor union with which Disney's striking employees 
allied themselves in 1941). Perhaps warfare was not restricted, 
metaphorically or otherwise, just to Europe in 1941. 
Eubanks' [1999, p. 195] contention that "all metaphors are 
inflected by politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, pro-
fessional commitments, and personal attitudes" seems apt here 
since the fiercely independent and self-made Disney probably 
could conceive of his company in no way other than the 
metaphoric representation described above. His discourse in the 
1940 and 1941 stockholders' letters set out his ideology and phi-
losophy of management and management control. Such discourse 
represented, in effect, the way he made sense of the world. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have used the themes of rhetoric and metaphor to exam-
ine the 1940 stockholders' letter of Walt Disney Productions, the 
first such accountability document signed by Walt Disney, and, to 
a lesser extent, the 1941 letter. These letters provide an account-
ing, a story, that Disney intended to craft within the confines of 
the tensions between his company's financial exigencies and his 
creative, iconic persona. Walt Disney was as skilled in designing 
financial reporting and accountability narrative and discourse as 
he was in creating animated cartoons and features. The letters 
seem crafted with the goal to forge allegiance with the new pre-
ferred stockholders firmly in mind in spite of his strong resent-
ment. And if we take seriously the current literature of cognitive 
metaphor, the letters also reveal features of Disney's thinking, 
especially about key social and economic institutions. In sum, 
although the narrative part of financial accounting examined here 
is rhetorically and linguistic complex, the analyses conducted 
expose the types of insights that help render management and the 
companies they lead more understandable. Disney as accountant 
was ever as complex as Disney the cultural icon. 
An ongoing and important task addressed by historians is that 
of revealing and analyzing the character, personality, and behavior 
of corporations and their CEOs. In pursuing that task, important 
insights about corporations and individuals have been sourced 
from many quarters. But rarely have historians delved into the 
narrative discourse of CEOs in annual reports when seeking to 
add to the arsenal of information they marshal in support of bio-
graphic profiles, corporate histories, or other historical text. This 
paper provides an example of how analysis of narrative discourse 
by CEOs in annual reports can add to and enrich understanding of 
leading corporations and their chief executives. 
The insights offered through adoption of a "close reading" of 
CEO text have been demonstrated clearly here. By focusing on the 
rhetorical, metaphorical, and ideological features of Walt Disney's 
1940 letter to stockholders, insight into the behavior and charac-
ter of Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation is provided. Our 
analysis reveals Walt Disney to be a skillful, yet subtle rhetorician, 
whose rhetorical capabilities encompass a deft capacity to manip-
ulate accounting data strategically. Disney was not only a master 
storyteller in the surreal surrounds of the cinema where he could 
exploit the glitz and glamor of visual and sound imagery. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, he is revealed as very adept also in a grey 
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and glamor-free domain with which few would remotely imagine 
associating him — financial reporting. Our analysis reveals Disney 
as a very clever storyteller in weaving rhetorical magic in the 
realm of the mundane — accountability narratives in an annual 
report. 
By exploring Disney's use of metaphor, we show how further 
perspectives can be developed and how this assists us in entering 
theoretical speculations about Disney's ideological motivations. 
Our analysis yields results which, in the main, are contrary to the 
popular, ambient image of Walt Disney; that is, as the wholesome, 
friendly "Uncle Walt." Somewhat perversely, we find evidence 
consistent with what we reported earlier as Walt Disney's "darker 
side." He is revealed as something of an enigma, the cultural icon 
who seemed almost as adept at crafting financial narrative in a 
hard-nosed business world as he was at fashioning animation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Letter to Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions 
Annual Report 
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney Productions: 
In April, 1940, Walt Disney Productions sought and obtained the participation of the public 
in its business through the sale of 155,000 shares of 6% Cumulative Convertible Preferred 
Stock, and the Board of Directors herewith submits its first annual report to the Company's 
new stockholders. 
Included herein are financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ended September 
28, 1940, accompanied by the report of the Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & 
Co. We invite your attention to the notes which are attached to and constitute an integral par t 
of the financial statements. 
Your management believes that it will be of interest to our 1,800 stockholders to supplement 
the information shown in the financial statements with the following additional facts pertain-
ing to the Company. 
NEW STUDIO 
At the time of the sale of the 6% Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was constructing 
and equipping its new studio. This studio was substantially completed and equipped and vir-
tually all of the Company's production operations were transferred thereto by the end of May, 
1940. As a result of the increased facilities, the Company has been able to augment its produc-
tion of completed footage by more than 100% and has succeeded in lowering the cost of pro-
duction per foot substantially. Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new policy 
of releasing two or more feature subjects each year as well as a large number of short subjects. 
As a result of the reduction in costs, short subjects are now being produced at a figure which 
the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in 
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer available. 
EFFECT OF THE WAR 
The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been serious and the 
full measure thereof cannot yet be determined. It has been impossible to effect an orderly 
release of the Company's pictures in any of the countries at war and in many countries it has 
been impossible to effect any release whatsoever. In fact, in most of the territories dominated 
by the Axis Powers, the release of American pictures has been forbidden. In addition, curren-
cy restrictions and regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, have served to 
reduce further the Company's income from such pictures as were already released in foreign 
countries. 
PRODUCT 
During the year, the Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., the organization cur-
rently distributing our pictures, one feature picture and ten short subjects and has in current 
production a number of other features and short subjects. Developments in connection with 
the Company's product are summarized as follows: 
PINOCCHIO: 
PINOCCHIO was first shown at the Center Theatre in New York on February 7, 1940, and 
at the Pantages and Hillstreet Theatres in Los Angeles on February 10, 1940. It was subse-
quently released for general exhibition on February 23, 1940. To the end of the Company's fis-
cal year, September 28, 1940, this picture had earned gross world film rentals of $ 1,673,956.54 
of which $1,627,331.79 represented film rentals from the United States and Canada. The 
Company has received from its distributors as its net share of the world film rentals, 
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$976,211.94. In addition, there have accrued to the credit of the Company, certain funds in 
Great Britain and Australasia amounting to £5818.7.5, which have been blocked by currency 
restrictions. 
The Company has prepared Spanish and Portuguese language versions of this picture 
which are currently being shown in all the countries of Central and South America, as well as 
in the Philippine Islands and Portugal. No income from the Spanish and Portuguese language 
versions of PINOCCHIO is reflected in the above-mentioned film rentals as the picture was 
released in those countries too late for any such revenue to be included in the year ended 
September 28, 1940. 
The total cost of producing PINOCCHIO was $2,595,379.66 and it is now anticipated that 
this amount will not be recouped under the conditions prevailing throughout the world. 
Accordingly, a charge of $1,000,000 has been made to provide for the excess of cost of this pic-
ture over the estimated total revenue. 
The picture PINOCCHIO was planned and production was started prior to the outbreak 
of the European war. Consequently, it was budgeted on a program contemplating income from 
all countries where SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS had been released. In addition, 
this production suffered from excessive cost which was a direct result of the transition period 
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of making one feature in two 
years (SNOW WHITE was released in January, 1938), to a policy of producing from two to four 
features a year as presently projected. These excessive costs cannot be segregated as they very 
largely represent discarded work of untrained personnel. PINOCCHIO was produced during a 
period of development and expansion. These factors which included the schooling and train-
ing of personnel to meet the increased production needs, together with inadequate plant facil-
ities at the old studios, contributed in no small measure to the high cost of this production. 
FANTASIA: 
FANTASIA was exhibited for the first time at the Broadway Theatre in New York on 
November 13, 1940. This picture is an innovation in the field of entertainment, featuring 
Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra in a program of music as interpreted by 
Walt Disney and the Company's staff of artists and technicians. FANTASIA is being presented 
by methods never before employed in the exhibition of motion pictures. The exhibition of this 
production requires special sound equipment and the Company has contracted to purchase 
sufficient equipment so that the picture can be distributed simultaneously in twelve theatres. 
It is now planned to distribute the picture by the "road show" method in the first-run cities of 
the United States, Canada and other large centers. The management believes this method of 
distribution will result in an eventual realization of revenue in excess of that which would be 
realized by ordinary methods of distribution. However, this method of distribution will require 
a longer period of time for the Company to recoup the cost of the picture. 
OTHER FEATURES: 
Three other feature length pictures currently in production are planned for release dur-
ing the fiscal year ending September 27, 1941. THE RELUCTANT DRAGON is a combination of 
animated cartoon and "live action" comedy, featuring the well-known humorist, Robert 
Benchley BAMBI is a dramatization, through the medium of the animated cartoon, of the well-
known book of the same name by Felix Salten. A distribution contract for both of the last-men-
tioned features has been entered into with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. The name and basic story 
of the picture, DUMBO, THE FLYING ELEPHANT were purchased by the Company and are 
being developed by our staff into a feature length cartoon. 
Among the features scheduled for release in 1942 are PETER PAN and WIND IN THE WIL-
LOWS. 
SHORT SUBJECTS: 
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940 the Company delivered to RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc. a total of ten short subjects and contemplates delivery of twenty short subjects 
during the fiscal year 1941. These pictures continue in high popular favor and should prove to 
be a profitable part of the Company's business inasmuch as the increased efficiency made pos-
sible by the new plant has materially reduced production costs. 
88
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
80 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
The Company has recently extended its releasing contract with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 
to cover a fourth series of eighteen short subjects. 
The Company presently has twenty-eight short subjects in various stages of production. 
OTHER ENDEAVORS 
Names and characters created by the Company and licensed for use on merchandise, etc. con-
tinue to have a wide-spread appeal. Royalties from this source, from books and music, and rev-
enue from comic strips and art sales, constitute a substantial portion of the income of the 
Company. 
GENERAL 
The inventory of pictures in process at the close of the fiscal year was the largest in the 
Company's history. The total cost of the feature length and short subjects in production was 
$3,650,256.67. These pictures represented a total film length of 44,490 feet. In addition there 
were 149 stories in our inventory on which we had spent $367,275.41. The system of budget 
control both as to cost and output was revised when the Company moved to the new studio, 
with the result that both feature pictures and short subjects are presently being completed on 
schedule and at their budgeted costs. 
Your management has reduced expenses and has taken aggressive steps toward lowering 
production costs by increasing efficiency and eliminating dispensable activities. 
In considering the profit and loss statement of the Company, it is worth while to repeat 
the following statement made in the prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred Stock: 
"The Company's principal income accrues according to the rapidity with which its features are 
exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, the relationship between dates of release and dates of 
accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to pro-
duce wide variations in earnings as they may from time to time be reported. This is made more 
pronounced by a program which contemplates the release of only one or two features per year. 
In connection with SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the Company adopted a policy 
of writing off the entire cost of the picture against the first revenues received, and the 
Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions. 
Consequently, if any given accounting period closes at a time when revenues have failed to 
exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released during such 
period, it is possible that a loss may be reported in such period notwithstanding the fact that 
an actual profit may eventually be realized on such feature." 
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940, the Company had only one new feature 
picture-PINOCCHIO-in release. 
The Company also re-issued SNOW WHITE in the United States and Canada in July, 1940. 
This was released as the WALT DISNEY FESTIVAL in conjunction with four Walt Disney short 
subjects and is currently doing a satisfactory business. 
During the next fiscal year ending September 27, 1941, the Company expects to have 
three new feature pictures in general release, in addition to its quota of new short subjects. 
These pictures should reflect the benefit accruing to the Company by reason of the training 
and skill acquired by the artists during the last three years. While the serious effect on the 
Company's business caused by the loss of foreign markets cannot be minimized, nevertheless 
your management now believes it has adjusted the Company's operations to a schedule of pro-
duction and costs designed to be independent of those markets. 
CAPITAL STOCK 
At a meeting of the directors held on February 24, 1940, the capital stock of the Company was 
reclassified into 755,000 shares, of which 600,000 shares were designated as Common Stock 
(with a par value of $5 a share), and 155,000 shares were designated as 6% Cumulative 
Convertible Preferred Stock (with a par value of $25 per share). 300,000 shares of Common 
Stock ($5 par value) were thereupon issued in exchange for 150,000 shares of Common Stock 
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($10 par value) previously outstanding, and 45,000 shares of Common Stock were issued as a 
15% stock dividend on the new amount of outstanding stock. 10,000 shares of Common Stock 
were issued to Walter E. Disney and Roy O. Disney in consideration of the cancellation of 
$200,000 indebtedness of the Company to them. 150,000 shares of preferred Stock were sold 
to the public through underwriters for net proceeds of $3,412,500 and 5,000 shares were sold 
to officers and employees for $125,000. 
An initial dividend of 37 l /2c was paid July 1, 1940, to the Preferred stockholders of 
record June 15, 1940, and a regular quarterly dividend of 37 l /2c was paid October 1, 1940, to 
Preferred stockholders of record September 16, 1940. The regular quarterly dividend of 37 
l /2c payable January 1, 1941, to Preferred stockholders of record December 16, 1940, was 
declared by the Board of Directors at a meeting held December 2, 1940. This dividend will be 
paid from the Company's initial surplus. No dividends were paid on the Common Stock. 
DIRECTORS 
During the year, Edward M. Francis resigned as a director of the Company and in his place the 
board elected Jonathan B. Lovelace as the representative of the Preferred stockholders in antic-
ipation of Paragraph 9 of Article 5 of the Articles of Incorporation, as amended, which pro-
vides that: 
"Holders of the Preferred Stock, voting separately as a class and entitled to one vote per share, 
shall be entitled at the first annual meeting of the Corporation after the close of the fiscal year 
ending September 28, 1940, and annually thereafter, to elect one Director of the Corporation 
to hold office for a term of one (1) year and until his successor shall have been elected.'' 
EMPLOYEES 
At September 28, 1940, the organization consisted of a total of 1179 employees. 
The Directors want to take this opportunity of thanking all members of the organization, 
whose loyalty and co-operation have contributed in such large measure to the continued 
progress of the Company. 
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
WALTER E. DISNEY, President. 
APPENDIX 2 
Letter to Stockholders for the 1941 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report 
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney Productions: 
We submit herewith as part of this annual report to stockholders financial statements of 
the Company for the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, accompanied by the report of the 
Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. We direct your attention to the notes 
which are attached to and constitute an integral part of the financial statements. 
FOREWORD 
In our annual report to stockholders issued in December, 1940, and covering the fiscal 
year ended September 28, 1940, we stated, "the effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of 
your Company has been serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined." It was 
evident that the loss of foreign markets necessitated a sharp lowering in production costs in 
order to assure a profit from the remaining markets. The Company immediately took steps 
toward that objective. Since the date of that report there has been a further deterioration in 
the foreign markets and the Company again found it necessary to reduce materially its operat-
ing expenses and personnel in order to consolidate its position. As this program was being 
placed in effect, a strike was called by a minority group of the Company's employees. This 
development, discussed later in this report under the heading "Labor Relations," resulted in a 
retardation of our production schedule and interfered with the delivery and exhibition of 
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product already completed. 
Following is a summary of income account and balance sheet items taken from the finan-
cial statements published on pages 8 to 10 of this report, compared with corresponding fig-
ures in last year's report: 
Fiscal year 
Income Account 
Income from short subjects less 
amortization 
Income from royalties, comic strips, 
art work, licenses, etc., less costs 
Income from "Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarfs" 
Total 
Administrative and selling expenses 
Balance 
Interest expense 
Profit (loss) before provision 
for losses on features 
Provision for excess cost of features 
over estimated net income 
Balance (loss) 
Balance Sheets 
Cash and receivables 
Inventories at cost: 
Pictures in process, etc. 
Unamortized picture costs 
Total current and working assets, 
before deducting reserves 
Deduct provision for excess of 
cost over estimated net income 
from feature pictures 
Current and working assets 
as per balance sheet 
Bank loans 
Other liabilities, reserve for taxes 
and deferred income 
Total liabilities 
Excess of current and working as-
sets (as stated) over all liabilities 
Deposits in foreign banks at current 
rates 
Land, buildings and equipment at 
cost less reserve for depreciation 
Copyrights, trademarks and patents 
less reserve for amortization 
Deferred charges 
Total net assets, as per balance 
sheet 
Funds not taken into books 
representing blocked currencies at 
current official rates, approximately 
$ 457,391.61 
185,253.97 
139,173.23 
$ 781,818.81 
420,127.32 
$ 361,691.49 
150,988.55 
$ 210,702.94 
1,000,000.00 
$ 131,668.88 
267,898.90 
103,526.10 
$ 503,093.88 
649,354.68 
$ (146,260.80) 
113,537.25 
$ (259,798.05) 
1,000,000.00 
September 
27, 1941 
$ 156,020.52 
2,882,713.43 
4,874,006.16 
September 
28, 1940 
$ 132,410.20 
4,093,119.94 
1,833,436.66 
$7,912,740.11 $6,058,966.80 
2,000,000.00 
$5,912,740.11 
$3,371,669.03 
907.273.30 
$4,278,942.33 
$1,633,797.78 
1,060.61 
3,005,161.18 
7,892.77 
234,186.31 
1,000,000.00 
$5,058,966.80 
$1,932,992.24 
841,499.11 
$2,774,491.35 
$2,284,475.45 
1,088.70 
3,263,170.31 
8,613.67 
230,297.68 
$4,882,098.75 $5,787,645.81 
345,000.00 22,000.00 
Increase 
(decrease) 
$325,722.73 
(82,644.93) 
35,647.13 
$ 278,724.93 
(229,227.36) 
$ 507,952.29 
37,451.30 
$ 470,500.99 
$(789,297.06) $(1,259,798.05) $ 470,500.99 
Increase 
(decrease) 
$ 23,610.32 
(1,210,406.51) 
3,040,569.50 
$1,853,773.31 
1,000,000.00 
$ 853,773.31 
$1,438,676.79 
65,774.19 
$1,504,450.98 
$ (650,677.67) 
(28.09) 
(258,009.13) 
(720.90) 
3,888.73 
$ (905,547.06) 
323,000.00 
The comparative figures taken from the income account show the progress made in 
reduction of costs. The Company shows a profit, after all charges but before provision for 
excess cost of feature pictures over estimated net income therefrom, of $210,702.94 as com-
1941 1940 
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pared with a loss of $259,798.05 in the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940. The income 
account does not reflect the reduction in costs of feature pictures as DUMBO was not released 
until after the close of the fiscal year. It does, however, reflect the working off of the invento-
ry of high cost shorts and restoration of a satisfactory profit in that division. Last year the 
Company provided a reserve of $1,000,000 to write off the excess cost of PINOCCHIO. The 
Company has estimated its expectancy of return from all of its feature product, and as a result 
has set up a provision against a possible loss in the amount of $ 1,000,000. 
The comparative figures taken from the Balance Sheet show that while pictures in 
process have decreased $1,210,406.51, the unamortized value of completed pictures has 
increased $3,040,569.50, giving a net increase in inventory (before reserve) of $1,830,162.99. 
This increase, which was largely financed by bank loans, is due primarily to the delay in the 
general release of FANTASIA, and to labor difficulties experienced at the time of release of THE 
RELUCTANT DRAGON. The Company now has two feature pictures ready for general release, 
DUMBO and FANTASIA. A third feature, BAMBI, is practically completed. With current opera-
tions reduced by 50% from last year, a steady reduction of the bank loan is anticipated. 
Blocked currencies are not included in the Company's accounts until received. In 
October, 1941, the British Government entered into an agreement with the motion picture 
companies whereby 50% of the blocked currencies previously impounded in Great Britain was 
released. One-half of this amount was immediately payable and one-half is payable in April, 
1942. The Company, since the date of this report, has received approximately $65,000 as part 
payment of its share of impounded funds. Australia and New Zealand have not yet released any 
of that portion of our revenue which those countries impounded. 
PRODUCT 
During the fiscal year under review the Company released its feature picture FANTASIA. 
Initially this picture was distributed directly by the Company through the medium of road 
shows using "Fantasound" rather than through normal distribution channels. The picture was 
presented in thirteen cities (New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, 
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Minneapolis, Washington and Baltimore) and 
while a few of the engagements were disappointing, the aggregate results indicated a picture 
with wide appeal. The length of the New York and Los Angeles runs broke all existing records 
since the advent of sound. 
Experience gained from the exhibition of FANTASIA in the above-mentioned cities 
demonstrated that a nation wide distribution of this picture with "Fantasound" was impracti-
cal. It was therefore decided to abandon "Fantasound" and generally release the picture 
through normal distribution channels. Our sound engineers succeeded in combining the var-
ious "Fantasound" tracks into one composite track, enabling the Company to present FANTA-
SIA in motion pictures everywhere. 
The company entered into an agreement with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. for the distribu-
tion of FANTASIA throughout the world. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been prepared 
for the South American market, and the picture has already been released in Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina. FANTASIA is also being 
currently released in England and Australasia. 
It is now planned to place FANTASIA in general distribution in the United States imme-
diately following DUMBO. In preparation for this general release, test runs were made in rep-
resentative small towns to guide in editing this picture. 
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON 
This picture was completed and delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on April 17, 1941. 
It was first put into general release on June 20, 1941. Revenues obtained from this picture were 
seriously affected by the strike, due to picketing at various theatres throughout the country. It 
has been released in Great Britain and Australasia. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been 
prepared for the release of the picture in South America. 
Although results to date have been disappointing, we are confident of the return to the 
Company of at least $500,000 and have provided in the inventory reserve for the balance of 
the cost. 
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DUMBO 
DUMBO was completed and delivered to our distributor September 11, 1941. Because of 
selling conditions in the industry the picture was not generally released until the middle of 
December. The picture was pre-shown in the Broadway Theatre, New York, beginning 
October 23rd, and has been well received. In the trade and press it is getting excellent 
exploitation and publicity. 
DUMBO is our first all-cartoon feature picture budgeted and produced subsequent to the 
outbreak of the European war and the loss of our foreign markets. The picture was produced 
at a cost well within present market possibilities and is of a quality that assures, in our opinion, 
a profitable return. 
SHORT SUBJECTS 
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, the Company delivered to RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc. a total of twenty-two short subjects. Our costs have been reduced to meet present 
market conditions and the pictures continue to be a profitable source of revenue. 
Under date of April 11, 1941, the Company extended its releasing contract with RKO to 
cover a fifth series of eighteen short subjects. 
The Company now has 22 short subjects in various stages of production. 
BAMBI 
The Company's feature picture BAMBI has been in work for over three years and is now 
practically completed. As now scheduled it will be delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on or 
about the first of February, 1942. Completion of this picture was delayed at least three months 
by the strike. It was the last of the feature pictures projected on the basis of the pre-war mar-
kets. Its cost will be substantially higher than DUMBO but will be approximately $1,000,000 
less than the cost of PINOCCHIO. It is the consensus of opinion of those who have seen the 
picture that it is the best the Company has ever produced for entertainment value and quality 
of production. 
FEATURES RELEASED IN PRIOR YEARS 
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, PINOCCHIO, which was first shown on 
February 7, 1940, returned a gross film rental of $554,730.74 of which the Company's share 
amounted to $387,100.12. This brought the total gross film rental on September 27, 1941, to 
$2,228,687.28 of which the Company's share was $1,363,312.06. The amount received in 1941 
would seem to assure recoupment of the balance of the unamortized negative cost of 
$233,439.64 after giving effect to the reserve set up last year. The Company's share of blocked 
currencies resulting from the showings of PINOCCHIO had a value at official rates of approx-
imately $240,000 at September 27, 1941. This amount is not included in the figures quoted 
above. 
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS which was first shown in December of 1937 
returned to the Company the sum of $139,173.23 in the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941. 
OTHER ENDEAVORS 
The licensing of names and characters created by the Company continues to have uni-
versal commercial appeal but revenue has fallen off during the year mainly because FANTASIA 
did not lend itself readily to such exploitation. Certain of our licensees also were beginning to 
feel the effect of defense priorities. However, royalties from this source and from books, music, 
comic strips and art sales continue to be substantial sources of income. 
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LABOR RELATIONS 
For the first time in its history the company was, during 1941, beset by labor troubles. 
Early in May the Studio launched a program of reducing operating expenses and personnel, 
designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution 
of the Company's pictures under present world conditions. As this policy was being initiated, 
a strike was called (on May 28, 1941) by Screen Cartoonists Union, Local No. 852, an affiliate 
of the International Brotherhood of Painters, Paperhangers and Decorators of America (A. F. 
of L.). A majority of our employees stayed at work and during the nine weeks of the strike the 
Company's production proceeded satisfactorily. However, due to secondary boycotts and "hot 
cargo'' activities on the part of sympathetic unions it became impossible to deliver and exhib-
it our product. 
Repeated efforts by the Company to effect a settlement were unavailing. Finally, a com-
missioner from the National Conciliator's Office intervened; arbitration was agreed upon and 
an award was eventually rendered. Among other things, the award imposed the following: a 
close shop; reinstatement of all strikers; and 100 hours' retroactive pay for strikers. In relation 
to our proposed reduction of personnel, the award also imposed a formula under which a cer-
tain percentage of strikers had to be retained pro rata to non-striking employees. However, it 
required the Union to take in as a body without prejudice and at a nominal initiation fee 
employees in its classification who had remained at work during the strike. 
After a period of four weeks of complete shutdown, necessitated by protracted negotia-
tions, the Company resumed operations on September 15, 1941. The Studio is now operating 
under the terms of the award which, unfortunately, is in many respects very ambiguous and is 
silent on several disputed issues. However, the plant is now operating smoothly. 
DIVIDENDS AND SINKING FUND REQUIREMENTS 
In a letter addressed to the stockholders under date of June 14, 1941, you were advised of 
the reason for the omission of the preferred stock sinking fund payment due April 1, 1941, in 
the amount of $50,000 and of the deferment of the quarterly preferred dividend due July 1, 
1941. The necessity for conserving working capital pending the orderly liquidation of the 
Company's inventory of completed feature pictures caused omission of the $100,000 pre-
ferred stock sinking fund payment due October 1, 1941, and deferment of the quarterly divi-
dend on the preferred stock due on that date. Consideration will be given to resumption of 
payments when and as a comfortable working capital position has been re-established, but no 
prediction can be made in this respect at this time. The dividends on the preferred stock being 
cumulative, all arrearages in such dividends as well as fixed sinking fund payments must be 
paid before any dividends may be paid on the common stock. 
GENERAL 
Our principal problem now is one of orderly and satisfactory liquidation of feature prod-
uct. Within the Studio production is going forward and costs are in keeping with present mar-
kets. The Company is operating with less than 50% of the personnel and pay roll of May, 1941. 
Our working capital position is strained because of the large amount of money tied up in fea-
ture negatives--DUMBO, FANTASIA and BAMBI. With proper liquidation of these three fea-
tures, it is believed the Company will reduce its bank loan to a nominal figure or liquidate it 
completely and restore its working capital position to a satisfactory level. DUMBO and BAMBI 
are feature pictures which will have none of the problems of distribution presented by FAN-
TASIA. Both are excellent pictures and should do satisfactory business. 
For the current year, the Company is continuing its production of short subjects and has 
three feature subjects available for production, of which one would ordinarily be completed 
during the 1942 fiscal year. However, your management is making its facilities and equipment 
available for Army, Navy and other Government films in connection with national defense. We 
are now working on short subjects in cooperation with our Government's plans to promote 
hemispheric solidarity and are also producing a series of short subjects for the U. S. Navy and 
five short subjects for the Canadian Government. New feature product is being curtailed in 
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favor of federal defense work. The volume of defense film work required of us will determine 
the extent of work done on feature subjects during the current year. 
In summary, we are still in an adjustment period brought about by world conditions and 
the consequent loss of markets, but we believe we have sustained the major shocks of this 
adjustment. Pictures being projected will be properly budgeted and produced for present 
restricted markets. Our experience with DUMBO and our short subjects gives us every confi-
dence in our ability to meet these conditions satisfactorily with respect both to cost and qual-
ity of our product. 
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Walter E. Disney, President 
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Abstract. George Edwards was a key figure in the creation of 
the modern institutional structure of accounting in Canada. He 
worked to implement a vision of accountancy as a profession 
rather than a business. This was reflected in his commitment to 
accounting education, to the restriction of entry to the CA pro-
fession to those who passed a test of competency, and to his 
desire to demonstrate the social and ethical value of account-
ing. He was president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Ontario, president of the Dominion Association of CAs, and 
president of the Society of Cost Accountants of Canada. He cre-
ated one of the major Canadian public accounting firms 
(Edwards, Morgan & Co.). His contributions were recognized 
through awards such as the Commander of the Order of the 
British Empire, an honorary degree from Queen's University, 
and life memberships in the Institutes of Chartered 
Accountants of Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. 
This biography examines his role in shaping the 
federal/provincial structure of the accounting profession, the 
development of university-based accounting education pro-
grams, the separation of the management and the financial 
accounting professions, the communications strategies of the 
profession, and his contributions to government and bank 
accounting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Biographical research provides an opportunity to explore the 
role of individuals in the development of accounting and account-
ing institutions [e.g.; Parker, 1994; Previts and Robinson, 1996; 
Slocum and Roberts, 1996]. It is individuals who create ideas and 
organizations [Wren, 1998]. It is often individuals, and their 
involvement in a range of seemingly unrelated activities, that pro-
vide the threads that hold together the fabric of historical experi-
ence. This is not to deny the role of broader social interests or 
structures in shaping historical outcomes. As Hooks [1953, p. xiii] 
observed, "every philosophy which recognizes that men can and 
do make their own history also concerns itself with the conditions 
under which it is made." Biographical research thus examines the 
interaction between the individual and the social structures that 
constrain and enable their actions [cf. Giddens, 1984; Macintosh 
and Scapens, 1990]. 
This biography traces the contribution of one individual, 
George Edwards, who had a significant impact on the Canadian 
accounting profession. Throughout his career, Edwards displayed 
a remarkable clarity and consistency of vision for the Chartered 
Accountancy (CA) profession. At his retirement dinner in 1926, 
W.H. West [1926, p. 213], president of the American Institute of 
Accountants, gave tribute to Edwards, saying: 
Mr. Edwards is known from one end of the 
Dominion to the other as a man who has con-
stantly striven for an ideal; that ideal being a uni-
fied profession established on a high plane, not 
only technically and intellectually, but morally as 
well. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Edwards viewed accountancy 
as a profession rather than a business. This was reflected in his 
commitment to accounting education, to restricting entry to the 
CA profession to those who had passed a test of competency, and 
to his desire to demonstrate the social value of accounting. He 
wanted the CA institutes to be the sole representative of public 
accountants in Canada. He worked tirelessly to protect CAs 
against the encroachment of competing professional bodies. He 
also tried to institutionalize the public service dimension of 
accounting through his own example and through the creation of 
codes of ethics. 
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Edwards served the Canadian accounting profession for more 
than 30 years. During this time he was president of the Institute of 
CAs of Ontario (four terms), pres ident of the Dominion 
Association of CAs (two terms), and founding president of the 
Canadian Society of Cost Accountants. He established a major 
national public accounting firm and used this firm to help build a 
national CA profession. His work earned him life memberships in 
the Insti tutes of CAs of Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan. He was the first managing editor of the Canadian 
Chartered Accountant (now CA Magazine) and was instrumental 
in establishing accounting education as a university program of 
instruction in Canada. Queen's University awarded him an hon-
orary degree in recognition of this service. During World War I, he 
served as accounting systems designer, comptroller, auditor, and 
liquidator for the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada and was 
named Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE). 
After the war, he served as auditor of Canada's national accounts, 
the first external auditor to serve in this role. He retired in 1926 
from professional politics but remained an active member of his 
firm until 1941. He died in 1947 at the age of 86. 
METHOD 
The examination of George Edwards' career in this biography 
provides a unique perspective on the history of the Canadian pro-
fession. He was a source of continuity among a series of key for-
mative events in the profession. His vision and values represent 
one of the many perspectives on accountancy during its early 
years. The success of his vision was, in part, a reflection of his 
indefatigable efforts against formidable opposition over 35 years. 
More importantly, the vision reflected the tenor of the times. It 
provided a rallying point for like-minded accountants and resulted 
in the creation of institutions consistent with broader social inter-
ests. George Edwards' biography allows us to identify the interac-
tion between his policy choices and the context within which 
they were enacted and, hence, to understand better the evolution 
of the Canadian profession. 
Biographical research has not developed a well-defined 
methodology [Jones, 1998]. The process involves selecting a sub-
ject, gathering data, analyzing, and reporting [Lomask, 1986]. 
Each of these steps involves choices that should be made explicit, 
but there are few guidelines for undertaking each stage. As 
Goodman and Kruger [1988, p. 315] noted: "It is easy to describe 
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the steps that the historian follows, it is significantly harder to 
understand the process that he or she undertakes." Beyond this, 
biographic research varies according to the perspective that the 
author brings to the task. For example, biographers have devel-
oped psychological profiles of their subjects [e.g., Harris-Seares, 
1997], focused on the cultural context of the subject [e.g., 
Reynolds, 1997], or provided a detailed linguistic analysis of the 
subject's writings [Erlich, 1996]. This section will provide an 
overview of the choices made in constructing this biography. 
The choice of George Edwards as a subject reflects the impor-
tance of the period from 1890 to 1925 in the development of the 
Canadian profession and the prominence of his role(s) through-
out this time. This 35-year period resulted in the formation of all 
of the accounting associations that now dominate the Canadian 
profession. It is also the period in which the audit market devel-
oped its current form. It is a period in which the structure of the 
profession was debated and institutionalized. For example, the 
relationship between provincial and federal accounting associa-
tions, the division of labor between management and financial 
accounting associations, and the institutional framework for 
accounting education programs were all decided during this peri-
od. In each of these cases, an examination of the archives will 
show the important role that Edwards played [cf. Richardson, 
1994]. To use Lomask's [1986, p. 10] word, George Edwards has 
significant historical "residue." 
The data available for this biography consist of both primary 
and secondary sources. Primary sources include Edwards' writ-
ings, reports of the committees on which he served, recorded tes-
timony before Senate hearings, and documents generated by him 
in various capacities (e.g., presidential addresses). Many of the key 
documents related to Edwards' contributions were published in 
the Canadian Chartered Accountant, a professional journal he 
founded for the CA profession. Data were also collected from 
marriage certificates, church records, business directories, and 
census records. Secondary sources include histories of the 
accounting associations and organizations with which he worked. 
In particular, the histories of the Imperial Munitions Board 
(including biographies of its chairman, Sir Joseph Flavelle) and 
the Institutes of CAs of Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta include 
materials relevant to Edwards. Given Edwards' prominence in the 
profession, his obituaries in both the daily press and professional 
publications also provided valuable data and leads for additional 
99
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2000
Richardson: Building Canadian Accountancy 91 
source material [Editorial, 1947; Obituary, 1947]. Unfortunately, 
no archive of Edwards' personal papers has been located.1 
The analysis process used in this biography is narrative, 
chronological, and thematic [Erlich, 1996, p. 79]. No attempt has 
been made to quantify Edwards' contribution to the profession. 
Based on the documents, a series of key events was identified and 
discussed in chronological order. The analysis and interpretation 
of data assume that Edwards drew insights from his experiences 
and applied them to new circumstances as they emerged. It is also 
assumed that key aspects of Edwards' values and priorities are 
reflected in patterns of behavior over time [Atwood and Stolorow, 
1984]. These emergent patterns are used retrospectively in this 
biography to help rationalize the choices that Edwards made dur-
ing his life. 
The structure of the paper follows the logic of analysis out-
lined above; i.e., it is chronological and thematic. The paper begins 
with a brief sketch of Edwards' personal life. This is followed by an 
overview of his business, primarily carried on under the name 
Edwards, Morgan & Co. There follow five sections dealing with 
the major issues in which Edwards was involved: (1) 
federal/provincial professional relations; (2) accounting educa-
tion; (3) the Imperial Munitions Board; (4) government and bank 
accounting; and, (5) the division of labor in the profession 
between financial and management accounting. The conclusion 
identifies the common elements in Edwards' contribution to the 
profession and areas wherein his goals were not achieved. 
GEORGE EDWARDS: PERSONAL 
Edwards was born in St. James Ward, Toronto on March 25, 
1861, six years before the creation of Canada as a sovereign nation. 
He was the fourth of five children born to William and Mary Anne 
Edwards.2 He died on February 12, 1947 in the aftermath of World 
War II (see his photograph in Exhibit 1). His formal education was 
limited. He attended the Toronto Collegiate Institute (now Jarvis 
Collegiate Institute) and had "private tutors." Toronto Collegiate 
Institute was the first "Grammar School" in Canada (founded in 
1807) and was intended to provide an academic education for stu-
dents continuing on to college. Bookkeeping was taught in these 
1Edwards' family was contacted during the preparation of this biography and 
was invited to comment on this paper. The interpretations expressed, however, 
have not been approved or otherwise by the Edwards family. 
2
 based on the 1871 Census of Canada 
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schools using the Irish National School texts [Bell, 1918; McKeen 
and Richardson, 1998]. Edwards gained a basic understanding of 
bookkeeping and business practice through these courses. 
George Edwards 
c.1947 
Edwards continued his accounting EXHIBIT 1 
training as an apprent ice wi th the 
account ing firms headed by E.R.C. 
Clarkson in Toronto, beginning at age 19 
(Turner, Clarkson & Co. until 1881, 
E.R.C. Clarkson thereafter). Upon receiv-
ing his CA designation in 1889, he left 
Clarkson's firm and started his own 
practice. Edwards and Clarkson (both 
E.R.C. and his son G.T. Clarkson) would 
repeatedly find themselves at odds over 
the next 25 years regarding the struc-
ture of the profession, the need for 
examinations as a basis for entry to the 
profession, and the ethics to be applied 
to practice. At its heart, this disagree-
ment was over whether accountancy 
was primarily a profession or a business. 
At his retirement dinner, Edwards mentioned Clarkson as a 
friend and thanked Clarkson for giving him his start as an 
accountant. Although Clarkson could not be there (he was 74 
years old and in poor health at the time), he wrote a letter of con-
gratulations [Clarkson, 1926, p. 214] that included this rather 
cryptic paragraph: 
There are few who have not more antipathies than 
are good for them — fellowship rubs these away; 
the game is here for members of this Institute to 
play manfully — it is a good and honest game — and 
they are the men to play it. These meetings indi-
cate that, behind, there is a deep tribal sense that 
they should stand together and play the game fair-
ly, and by consultation and argument pass on their 
knowledge to one another, encouraging by every 
means possible a full sense of the supreme obliga-
tion each one owes to his own conscience and his 
own pride. 
This paragraph subtly suggests that the tension between them had 
not been forgotten, but that Clarkson recognized that their 
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debates had cont r ibuted positively to the development of 
accountancy. 
George Edwards' family was well positioned in Toronto soci-
ety. His father, William, had emigrated from England in 1836. He 
was a manufacturer, deeply involved in the Toronto Mechanics' 
Institute, a forerunner of the public library system, and a member 
of the Toronto City Council [Morgan, 1898, p. 305]. By 1868, 
William Edwards had been appointed as secretary (deputy minis-
ter) of the Ontario Department of Public Works, a position he 
held until his retirement [Champion, 1899; Creighton, 1984, p. 
130]. He is also listed in various Toronto city directories as the sec-
retary and treasurer of the Board of Arts and Manufacturers 
(1865) and as accountant and librarian to the Board of Agriculture 
(1866). 
William Edwards was prominent in the Methodist communi-
ty of Toronto; both his eldest and youngest sons were Methodist 
ministers. The Edwards family initially attended the George St. 
Methodist church. This church was the wellspring of Methodism 
in Toronto, serving the city's merchant families. Champion [ 1899, 
p. 83] described the congregation as follows: 
No professional men, either physician or lawyer 
was found among its worshippers. It had several 
who were engaged in business but none whose 
business was large enough to be remarkable. It 
had a monopoly of the merchant tailors and mas-
ter shoemakers of the city. 
As William Edwards progressed in his career, he moved his family 
to a more prestigious neighborhood and joined Trinity Methodist 
church. William held several positions within the church, acting 
as a trustee and as a member of its temperance committee. The 
congregation at Trinity Methodist included "some of Toronto's 
merchant princes and successful businessmen" [Champion, 1899, 
p. 219]. These contacts would be important in George Edwards' 
career as an accountant. 
George Edwards also maintained close ties with the church. In 
1911, he bought the former Bala Falls Hotel in Bala, Ontario about 
100 miles north of Toronto. He built a cottage on the property 
which he named "Caerholme" [Petry, 1998, p. 40].3 George added 
a room to the cottage for the use of the Anglican bishop of 
3The property is now known as Edwards' Point. 
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Toronto. In 1920, he donated a portion of the land around his cot-
tage to the Anglican Church and a small, cedar shake chapel (St. 
Alban's) was built on the site. This church allowed the Anglican 
congregation to move from a nearby church shared by Anglicans, 
Methodists, and Presbyterians. His connection to the Methodist 
and Anglican churches provided guidance for his attempts to 
restructure the profession (see the discussion of the Dominion 
Association of CAs below) and gave him contacts with prominent 
business and political elites (see the discussion of Edwards' firm 
below). 
Edwards married Sarah Caroline Woods in 1884 at age 23. 
Together they had five sons (Arthur, Hugh, Oswald, Alfred, and 
John) and one daughter (Gertrude). Edwards has been described 
as "small and dapper" [Creighton, 1984, p. 130] and "ambitious, 
outspoken and just plain pig-headed" [Perspectives, 1985, p. 2]. 
He ran his accounting firm as a family business and, although suc-
cessful, he was reputed to have had difficulty maintaining senior 
staff whose surname was not Edwards [Creighton, 1984, p. 134]. 
Interestingly, on his marriage certificate Edwards listed his 
occupation as "woolen manufacturer." At his retirement dinner in 
1926, it was mentioned that he had obtained "a general mercantile 
experience" between 1880 and 1890 (his years with Clarkson). 
Clarkson had a significant bankruptcy practice and on occasion 
would take over the management of a failed firm rather than liq-
uidating the assets [Little, 1964, p. 18]. Clarkson also had several 
business interests of his own. Edwards spent nine years with 
Clarkson prior to receiving his CA designation at a time when a 
five-year apprenticeship was the norm. It is possible that Edwards 
was involved in one of Clarkson's businesses during this time. 
Edwards also recounted at his retirement dinner that Clarkson 
had paid him $2.50 per day rather than the going rate of $2 per 
day which, he recalled, was greatly appreciated given his family 
responsibilities. 
Although Edwards was not listed in any of the Who's Who in 
Canada for this period, his profile is consistent with the "account-
ing elite" [Richardson, 1989]. The accounting elite in Canada dur-
ing this per iod was primarily Ontario-born, Anglican, 
Conservative, male, and relatively less educated than the business 
elite of the day. Unlike the typical member of the accounting elite, 
Edwards was not active in municipal politics or as a company 
director.4 The lack of these commitments may have allowed him 
4based on the Canadian Directory of Directors for the period 
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the time to concentrate on professional issues. The fact that 
Edwards was not listed in these directories, while other members 
of his firm and family were, suggests that he consciously refused 
to be included. This apparent humility, a preference to work out 
of the limelight, is characteristic of his career. 
THE ACCOUNTING FIRM: EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO. 
George Edwards articled with E.R.C. Clarkson beginning in 
1880 at the age of 19. He stayed with Clarkson until he received his 
CA designation in 1889. At that time he formed a partnership with 
Alexander Hart-Smith and began to practice in Toronto. Hart-
Smith died in 1903 and Hart-Smith's stepson, William Pomeroy 
Morgan, entered into partnership with Edwards. The new firm 
was known as Edwards, Morgan & Co. (see Exhibit 2). 
All of Edwards' five sons eventually joined the firm: Arthur 
Harper Edwards (CA, 1902), Hugh Percival Edwards (CA, 1913), 
Oswald Noel Edwards (CA, 1917), Alfred Geoffrey Edwards (CA, 
1917), and John Macham Edwards (CA, 1920). Several of his sons 
would follow in their father's footsteps in serving the profession. 
Arthur became a founding member of the Institute of CAs of 
Manitoba and served as a president of the Institute of CAs of 
British Columbia. Hugh (Percy) served for many years on the 
Institute of CAs of Ontario (ICAO) council and as president. 
Oswald is also notable, but for contrary reasons. Although he 
became an accountant, he was apparently not happy with the role. 
He was able to express this antipathy on one occasion when he 
was asked to set an examination on cost accounting for the ICAO. 
The examination was so difficult that no one achieved a passing 
grade, and Oswald was never asked to take on such duties again 
[Creighton, 1984]. The Edwards, Morgan & Co. firm continued 
past Edwards' death until it finally disappeared through a merger 
with Deloitte and Touche in 1957. 
Edwards' daughter (Gertrude), it should be noted, is neither 
among the alumni of the firm nor is her name or Edwards' wife's 
name ever ment ioned in any professional documents . At 
Edwards' retirement dinner, Mrs. Edwards was presented with a 
brooch to commemorate the event. This is probably not surpris-
ing given Edwards' views on women in the profession. As presi-
dent of the ICAO in 1896, Edwards debated the wisdom of admit-
ting women to membership. He offered the opinion that "women 
could not hold their own in executive ability, especially in 
accounting" and that "the prestige of the profession would suffer 
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by admission of ladies to membership" [Creighton, 1984, p. 47]. 
Edwards' views held the day, and the Institute voted against allow-
ing women entry to the profession [McKeen and Richardson, 
1998]. Edwards' attitude was common for his generation and is 
consistent with his educational experience at the Toronto 
Collegiate Institute where women were relegated to one class-
room in the basement [Jarvis Collegiate Institute, 1999]. 
EXHIBIT 2 
An Advertisement for Edwards, Morgan & Co. 
EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO. 
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS 
TORONTO MONTREAL WINNIPEG 
A discrete advertisement from The Monetary Times, 1930 
The Edwards, Morgan firm expanded across Canada, benefit-
ing from the "greatest economic boom in [Canada's] history" 
between 1900 and 1913 [Bothwell et al., 1987, p. 55]. Edwards 
opened offices in the financial centers of Toronto and Montreal 
and subsequently followed the railway-and-settlement boom 
across the prairies with offices in Timmins, Winnipeg (operating 
as Edwards, Ronald & Co.), Calgary, and Vancouver. Creighton 
[1984] suggested that Edwards, Morgan & Co. was the first multi-
office firm in Canada and second only to the Clarkson Gordon 
firm in prestige among Canadian accounting firms. The latter 
claim may be somewhat exaggerated. Richardson [1999] identi-
fied Edwards, Morgan as the eighth largest audit firm in Canada in 
terms of the number of audits conducted during the period 1902-
1941. During this period, the firm averaged a market share of 
about 2.75% of all clients. Edwards, Morgan's client list did not 
include any of the larger firms in Canada. For example, Edwards 
did not audit any of the banks, railway companies, or public utili-
ties that dominate the list of Canada's largest companies. 
The firm's clients included the Borden Company (dairy), 
Canada Bread Company Limited (bakery), Canada Permanent 
Mortgage Company (mortgages), Coast Copper Company (copper 
mining), the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of 
Canada Limited (copper, zinc, and lead mining), Dunlop Tire and 
Rubber Goods Company (tire manufacturing), Holinger 
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Consolidated Gold Mines (mining), National Trust Company 
(trust/banking), Photo Engravers & Electrotypers Limited (photo-
graphic equipment/services), Russell Industries Limited (automo-
biles), Joseph E. Seagram (distiller), Hiram Walker-Gooderham & 
Worts Limited (distiller), George Weston Limited (baker), and 
Wright-Hargreaves Mines (mining).5 The firm also audited the 
accounts of the Dominion of Canada for three years (see the sec-
tion on government accounting below). Edwards' participation in 
the Methodist church community of Toronto provided links to 
many of his clients. Some of the leading figures in the Canadian 
(and, in particular, the Toronto) business community were 
Methodists including Ames, Cox, Eaton, Gooderham, Gundy, 
Flavelle, Massey, Weston, and Wood [Champion, 1899, p. 285; 
Sanderson, 1910, p. 394; Bliss, 1987, pp. 346-349]. These were the 
"merchant princes and successful businessmen" of the parish of 
Trinity Methodist church [Champion, 1899, p. 219]. Edwards 
included many of this group among his clients, particularly 
Weston, Cox, Gooderham, and Flavelle. Cox and Gooderham 
deserve particular mention due to the extended group of compa-
nies they controlled. 
Cox controlled a web of financial institutions centered on the 
Bank of Commerce and including Dominion Securities, a stock 
brokerage run by Ames (his son-in-law), National Trust (with 
Joseph Flavelle as president), Canada Life Insurance Company, 
and several other smaller insurance companies [Naylor, 1975a, b] . 
Cox was also the lead member of a syndicate that bought the 
Canadian assets of the Dunlop Tire and Rubber Company of 
America to create the Dunlop Tire and Rubber Company of 
Canada. Edwards was connected to this group through his audit of 
National Trust and Dunlop Rubber. Joseph Flavelle, president of 
Cox's National Trust, was instrumental in providing Edwards' 
entree into government accounting (see below). 
The Gooderham family developed its business based on grain 
milling. This venture soon diversified into distilling to take advan-
tage of excess grain production. Ultimately, the family controlled 
a group of companies including the Hiram Walker-Gooderham 
5This list of clients was compiled from Houston's The Annual Financial 
Review (various editions 1902-1941), supplemented by Henderson [1984, pp. 29, 
44]. The editor of this volume invited companies to submit financial statements to 
him which he condensed and published. This list is, therefore, unlikely to be com-
plete, but it provides a sample of the types of firms Edwards, Morgan audited. 
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Worts Distillery, the Canada Permanent Mortgage Company, 
Manufacturers Life Assurance, Manufacturers Accident Insurance, 
and the Bank of Toronto [Bliss, 1987]. Edwards was connected to 
this group through his audits of the Hiram Walker-Gooderham 
Worts Distillery and the Canada Permanent Mortgage Company. 
The Edwards, Morgan firm played an important role in 
establishing the CA profession across Canada. For example, 
the first meeting of the Institute of CAs of Alberta was held in 
the offices of Edwards, Morgan in Calgary in 1911 
[Perspectives, 1985, p. 1]. Arthur Edwards, George's eldest son, 
was one of six charter members of the Alberta Institute. In 
Manitoba, the Institute of CAs of Manitoba (ICAM) had been 
created in 1886, but the Institute was dormant and held no meet-
ings between 1888 and 1902 [Hoole, 1963]. The ICAM was 
reawakened by Edwards in 1902 through members of his firm 
(then Edwards & Hart-Smith) which had been recently established 
in Winnipeg [Neville, 1986, p. 9]. Edwards needed the support of 
the ICAM in his battle, described below, with the Dominion 
Association of CAs (DACA). W.S. Ronald, a member of Edwards' 
firm in Winnipeg, became president of the ICAM in 1903. 
Edwards became an out-of-province member that year and repre-
sented Manitoba at the DACA in 1922 [Hoole, 1963, p. 7]. 
Edwards' firm provided him with a network of contacts across 
Canada and the financial resources that allowed him to devote 
considerable time to the profession. The remainder of the biogra-
phy deals with specific issues or events that were important in 
Edwards' professional life. Each of these events provided an 
opportunity for Edwards to enact his vision of the profession. In 
particular, these events show how Edwards worked to create a uni-
fied profession based on high standards of technical and moral 
practice. His vision, however, was not unopposed, so that these 
events also show Edwards to be an adept political strategist. 
FEDERAL / PROVINCIAL RELATIONS 
Canada is a federation with a central government and 13 mem-
ber states (ten provinces and three territories as of 1999). The 
division of powers between these levels of government was laid 
out in the British North America Act of 1867 (now the Canada 
Constitution Act). The Act is ambiguous on certain matters and, as 
a result, there are continuing debates over matters of jurisdiction 
between the provinces and the federal government. For example, 
both levels of government have powers to incorporate companies. 
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This constitutional structure sets the scene for one of George 
Edwards' major battles and victories. 
The first institutes of CAs were established through provincial 
legislation and accepted into membership all those who had 
passed the prescribed examinations regardless of their current 
occupation. Contrary to this model, John Mackay sought to create 
an association of CAs more narrowly restricted to those in public 
practice but with membership based on experience rather than 
examination. Mackay was a practicing auditor in Ontario at this 
time. One of his clients was National Trust where he served with 
George Edwards as co-auditor. Mackay sought federal incorpora-
tion of this association in 1901 but was unsuccessful. The follow-
ing year with help from the Association of Accountants of 
Montreal and two prominent Ontario accountants, Clarkson 
(Edwards' former employer) and Cross, both of w h o m had 
resigned from the ICAO over a professional misconduct case 
[Richardson, 1990], the DACA was created. 
Edwards saw the DACA as a rival to the provincial institutes, 
and he attempted to close down the federal body. He opposed the 
federal incorporation of the DACA successfully in 1901 on the 
strength of his political lobbying. The 1902 application for incor-
poration of the DACA had more institutional support, most 
notably from the Association of Accountants of Montreal, and he 
was unable to prevent incorporation on that occasion. As a result 
he had to change tactics and in 1903, he arrived at the DACA annu-
al meeting with 76 applications for membership and proxy votes 
from Ontario and Manitoba. He attempted to use these proxies to 
outvote the existing 17 members. The chair of the meeting did not 
allow this move. In 1908, he sought legislation in Ontario that 
would limit the use of the CA designation in Ontario to members 
of the ICAO. Although the province passed the legislation, the 
DACA petitioned the federal government which disallowed the 
Ontario legislation as ultra vires (beyond Ontario's jurisdiction). 
In effect, the Ontario legislation had declared that the federal leg-
islation authorizing a national CA designation was invalid in 
Ontario. This position was not allowed to stand. 
Finally, under the mediation of Harry Price, president of the 
Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors of England, at 
the 1908 conference of the American Association of Public 
Accountants in Atlantic City, the groups met and peace was nego-
tiated. The DACA became a federal body for the provincial insti-
tutes with no powers over designations, education, or standards. 
108
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
100 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
George Edwards had won and in the process had created the 
structure now followed by all accounting associations in Canada. 
The DACA was given the mandate to (1) secure the incorpo-
ration of provincial societies in provinces of the dominion where 
none existed; (2) assist provincial societies in securing uniform 
legislation for the better protection and regulation of local pro-
fessional interests; (3) secure the adoption by provincial societies 
of uniform standards of examination and membership; (4) 
arrange for reciprocal privileges between provincial societies for 
the benefit of their members; (5) consider the question of ethics; 
(6) secure harmony of action on all matters affecting the common 
interest and generally to act in an advisory capacity to provincial 
societies [Edwards, 1915, p. 340]. 
Two aspects of this mandate are particularly noteworthy First, 
Edwards succeeded in institutionalizing (in item 3) his vision of 
limiting entry to the profession by examination, contrary to the 
preferences of the original founders of the DACA. This was a key 
victory for those who saw accountancy as a profession rather than 
simply as a business. It established the principle that the skills of 
the accountant were to be gained through education rather than 
just through practical experience. Second, the mandate given to 
the DACA reflected Edwards' view that accounting associations in 
Canada should be comprehensive and noncompetitive (items 1 
and 4). There would be a CA association in each province so that 
all public accountants would be represented, but members of one 
provincial association would be guaranteed membership in all 
others, thereby eliminating competition between provincial asso-
ciations. 
Edwards was a vice-president of the DACA in 1910 and became 
its president in 1911 and again in 1913. He announced the aim of 
the DACA through the slogan "one name, one standard, one aim" 
[Edwards, 1912, p. 86]. This slogan, Edwards volunteered, was a 
paraphrase of the slogan of "one of our influential church organi-
zations," referring to the attempt of the Presbyterian, Methodist, 
and Congregational churches to merge. Semple [1992, p. 416] 
described the underlying belief of the unification movement to be 
that "all Christians throughout the world belonged to the same 
family, shared the same values and worked for a common end." It 
is reasonable to speculate that Edwards' ties to the Methodist 
church, through his brothers and father as well as conversations 
with the archbishop at his cottage, would have provided him with 
insider knowledge of the unification process. Incidentally, the 
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process was successful, and the United Church of Canada was cre-
ated in 1925. Edwards endorsed the aims of the church unification 
movement as a goal for the accounting profession. 
Edwards' experience with the DACA made him aware of the 
potential for rival designations/associations in Canada. His inter-
action with Harry Price is also likely to have made him aware of 
the situation in the U.K. where six professional associations com-
peted for public recognition of their members. At the DACA annu-
al meeting of 1912, he warned: 
The permanency of the name by which compe-
tency in a public accountant will be designated 
cannot be doubted. More largely as a result of coin-
cidence of thought, however, than of any careful 
planning or design on our part the name of 
Chartered Accountant is the name which has 
come to occupy a commanding place in Canada. It 
is not good enough to be content to accept this 
good fortune complacently and assume that this 
condition must perforce be permanent. The histo-
ry of an older commercial center than ours warns 
us that there may be dangerous rivalries in the 
near future to the supremacy of the Chartered 
Accountant in Canada if we fail to profit by obser-
vation [reported in President's Address, 1921, p. 
142]. 
Edwards would continue throughout his career to monitor 
and manage the emergence of competing accounting associations. 
This role is most notable in the creation of the Society of Cost 
Accountants of Canada, but he was also involved in negotiations to 
limit the charter of the Certified General Accountants of Canada 
to prevent them from competing directly with CAs (see below). 
He continued on the DACA Council as a representative of the 
ICAO until his retirement in 1926. During this time he served on 
the "General Purposes" Committee (essentially an executive com-
mittee), the Uniformity of Standards Committee, and the 
Magazine Committee. The latter committee is particularly impor-
tant. Edwards became the first managing editor of the Canadian 
Chartered Accountant (CCA) in 1911. This role gave him a vehicle 
to communicate the social value of accountancy to a broader audi-
ence. 
Edwards worked consistently to develop the CCA as a com-
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munications mechanism within the profession and, more impor-
tantly, with outside parties. In the first volume of the CCA, a 
report from the "journal committee," chaired by Edwards, report-
ed: 
Enough has been said to justify the prediction that 
our circulation in the near future amongst busi-
ness men and educators will far outweigh the sup-
port the publication will receive from our own 
members and those who compose our student 
societies, thereby substantially enhancing the 
value of the journal as a select advertising medi-
um. 
He constantly pushed to increase the frequency of publication of 
the journal [e.g., Report of the Magazine Committee, CCA, Vol. 14, 
1924, p. 166]. When the Society of Cost Accountants of Canada 
was created in 1920, he used the opportunity to expand the CCA 
to a bimonthly publication (from quarterly) with the promise to 
include more cost accounting material in its pages. It became a 
monthly publication in 1932. 
Edwards thought that the journal should be a commercial 
enterprise that would accept advertisements and possibly be 
turned over to a commercial publisher. This would allow the CAs 
to extend their influence and visibility by reaching a larger audi-
ence. The DACA did hire an editor to remove the burden from 
members but banned advertisements from the journal for a peri-
od in the 1930s. Ultimately, however, Edwards' vision of the jour-
nal as an important medium of communication beyond the CA 
profession did come about. 
ACCOUNTING EDUCATION 
George Edwards was first elected to the Council of the ICAO 
in 1890 and served as its president in 1895, 1896, 1897, and 1903. 
He served on the Council and on key committees continuously 
until his retirement in 1926. A central concern throughout his 
time on the Council was the education provided to CA candidates 
and the quality of examinations used to control entrance to the 
profession. Between 1903 and 1926, he was chairman of the ICAO 
Board of Instruction. This Board had responsibility for negotiating 
with proprietary schools (e.g., Shaw's Correspondence Schools) 
to arrange programs of instruction for CA students. Edwards was 
unsatisfied with the quality of the instruction being provided by 
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these organizations [Edwards, 1921b] even though these schools 
were often run by CAs. After World War I, he entered into negoti-
ations with Queen's University to provide courses. 
The connection between CAs and universities was already in 
process when Edwards began his negotiations with Queen's 
University in 1919. The dean of McGill University in Montreal had 
contacted the Association of Accountants of Montreal in 1912 sug-
gesting that some type of educational program could be arranged 
although nothing was ever implemented [Collard, 1980, p. 108]. 
The Institute of CAs of Saskatchewan entered into an agreement 
with the University of Saskatchewan to offer an accountancy 
degree in 1913 [Canadian Chartered Accountant, 1913, p. 50], and 
its first graduate was reported in 1914. The Institute of CAs of 
Alberta concluded an agreement with the University of Alberta to 
share responsibility for education and examinations in 1914. 
World War I interrupted this momentum. 
Queen's University had been involved in distance education 
for the Canadian Bankers Association since 1914 [Gibson, 1983, p. 
37]. The addition of accounting courses was a small leap for the 
University, but associating the University with accounting courses 
would add considerable legitimacy to CA training. From the 
University's perspective, Smails [1951, p. 7] suggested that Skelton, 
the head of the Department of Political Studies, was using corre-
spondence courses to create the backbone of a commerce pro-
gram [see also Daub and Buchan, 1999]. 
Edwards [1921a] set out eight policies that formed the basis 
for the ICAO's negotiation with Queen's University: (1) the pro-
gram should be delivered by correspondence so that it was acces-
sible to all CA candidates; (2) the course of study would be based 
on commercial textbooks rather than material prepared by the 
ICAO; (3) the texts would be Canadian or British in recognition of 
the differences between their legal and economic systems and 
those of the U.S. in spite of the greater availability of American 
textbooks; (4) the program would be offered within defined peri-
ods to allow for common examinations for all students; (5) the 
course of instruction would be "postgraduate" and build on a base 
level of literacy and numeracy; (6) the program would be limited 
to candidates for the CA designation; (7) the program of study 
would be required of all candidates for the designation; (8) there 
would be no optional subjects. 
These policies reflect two continuing themes in Edwards' 
work. First, by centralizing accounting education in one program, 
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Edwards could more easily ensure that all CAs achieved a mini-
mum level of competence. This was essential in order to guaran-
tee that the CA designation would be worthy of public trust. It 
would also facilitate reciprocity of membership among the differ-
ent provincial institutes of CAs. Second, by restricting the pro-
gram to CA candidates and by retaining control over the curricu-
lum, Edwards tried to limit access to the appropriate knowledge 
to those who would become members of the ICAO rather than 
some competing accounting association. The design of the pro-
gram thus contributed to a standardization of CA licensure and 
the exclusion of others from public accountancy. 
Edwards' policy also had an unintended positive side effect. 
The CA program was to use Canadian or British accounting text-
books (policy #3 above), but few existed at that time. Once the 
demand for the Queen's program among CA candidates was estab-
lished, the faculty teaching in the program began preparing their 
own course materials. The ready-made market of the CA program 
reduced the risk to publishers of producing a Canadian book in a 
field dominated by texts from the larger U.S. market. As a result, 
the Queen's University faculty would produce some of the first 
university-level financial accounting, cost accounting, and audit-
ing textbooks published in Canada [e.g; Ashley, 1931; Smails, 1930, 
1933; Smails and Walker, 1926; Walker, 1933]. 
The Queen's correspondence program was eventually adopt-
ed by all of the provincial societies. The program continued until 
1967 by which time the CAs had implemented a university degree 
requirement (the implementation of the degree requirement var-
ied from 1964 to 1968 depending on the province). Candidates for 
the CA designation were expected to take the required subjects as 
part of their degree program under the new regulations. Edwards 
would have approved of this evolution in accounting education. 
THE IMPERIAL MUNITIONS BOARD 
During World War I, three of George's sons served in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force in Europe. George also served the 
war effort as comptroller and auditor for the Imperial Munitions 
Board (IMB) in Canada. This dual role is a violation of modern 
independence rules and was recognized as unusual at the time: 
In addition to Mr. Edwards being the only officer 
in charge of its accounts, he was also Auditor for 
the Ministry of Munitions, a curious but very inter-
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esting anomaly. This fact however shows what 
confidence the British Treasury placed in him 
[Carnegie, 1925, p. 225]. 
It is interesting to consider whether or not this situation was 
a breach of the accounting ethics of the day. Immediately prior to 
the war, Edwards, as president of the DACA, had prepared a paper 
on accounting ethics and had distributed this paper to the provin-
cial associations (no copy of it has been located). Other articles on 
accounting ethics around this period emphasize relationships 
among practitioners rather than issues of broader public interest 
[e.g., Bunnel, 1910]. After the war, Edwards continued his efforts 
to formalize the ethical duties of CAs. He was a member of the 
DACA committee that produced the association's first code of 
ethics in 1925. This code continued to emphasize etiquette in col-
legial relations but did include one clause concerning conflict-of-
interest. This clause required the accountant to "inform a client or 
employer" of circumstances that could impair the accountant's 
judgment or objectivity [Crowell, 1925]. Edwards' work with the 
IMB would have met this minimal requirement. 
The IMB was a replacement for the Shell Committee (a politi-
cal committee of the Canadian government) and was intended to 
remove the procurement of munitions for the war effort from 
political considerations [Rider, 1974, p. 67]. The IMB was an agen-
cy of the British government although it operated primarily in 
Canada. Its head was Joseph Flavelle, a Canadian entrepreneur 
with interests in meatpacking and finance. The chairman was 
empowered to act unilaterally and could use the rest of the Board 
for advice but not for decision making. Flavelle was thus empow-
ered to run the IMB as a business rather than as a government 
agency. 
George Edwards joined the Board at the personal request of 
Sir Joseph Flavelle. Flavelle was president of National Trust, which 
was audited by Edwards,. Morgan. Edwards devoted full time to the 
IMB between 1914 and 1918. The staff of the accounting depart-
ment during this period numbered 1,200, and the IMB oversaw 
"1,200 Million dollars" worth of contracts [Edwards, 1925]. The 
British Treasury, through intermediaries in New York City, initial-
ly provided the funding for this operation. Edwards also estab-
lished the accounting procedures in New York. From 1915 
onwards, the operations were financed by loans from the 
Canadian government, Canadian banks, and the Canadian Pacific 
Railway. At the end of the war, George was given the additional 
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role of liquidator of the IMB's assets [Carnegie, 1925, p. 225]. 
Edwards' particular achievements with the IMB were the 
implementation of an inventory tracking system for materials 
flowing between different contractors and the introduction of 
continual auditing [Bliss, 1978, p. 307]. The auditing system put 
the IMB on a 24-hour cycle from noon to noon. Each night the 
records of the IMB were audited, allowing audited financial 
records to be available the next morning for review. These two 
systems were credited with reducing asset loss and improving effi-
ciency in the entire supply system. Prior to Edwards' intervention, 
shells produced for government contracts had been subject to sig-
nificant cost overruns [Bliss, 1978, p. 368]. 
As a result of this service, Edward was awarded the CBE: 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire. King George V 
created the Order of the British Empire in 1917 specifically to 
reward civilians and servicemen in support positions (as opposed 
to field positions). No records are available to trace the process by 
which Edwards was nominated, but it is likely to have been 
through Sir Joseph Flavelle and his connections with the British 
government. 
Edwards' work with the IMB required him to work closely 
with the Canadian Ministry of Finance. The Canadian government 
and Canadian banks (with some government coaxing) provided a 
large portion of the funds with which the IMB would operate. 
This connection resulted in Edwards being called upon to under-
take a number of projects for the Ministry of Finance after the war. 
The more notable projects were investigating the failure of 
Merchants Bank (1922) and the Home Bank (1923), providing 
advice to the Department of Finance on the audit provisions of 
the Bank Act (1923, 1924), and providing evidence before the 
Senate Committee on Banking (1923). These experiences allowed 
Edwards to have a significant impact on government and bank 
auditing in Canada.6 
GOVERNMENT AND BANK ACCOUNTING 
Edwards was an early proponent of improved government 
accounting. He began lobbying the Ontario government on legis-
lation concerning municipal accounts in 1895. He succeeded in 
having the Ontario Municipal Act (OMA) amended in 1897 to 
6See Beckhart [1929] and Edwards' testimony reported in the Proceedings of 
the Standing Committee on Banking and Business, 1923, pp. 746-771. 
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require that municipal auditors be Fellows of the Institute of CAs 
(FCA) or some other organization of expert accountants. The FCA 
was awarded by examination at that time, while the CA was given 
by a vote of members. This was the first legislation to specify a par-
ticular accounting association to fill a statutory role [Creighton, 
1984, p. 131]. Creighton also suggested that Edwards' success as a 
lobbyist may have had much to do with his father's long-standing 
civil service role. 
The existence of two sets of criteria in the OMA regarding 
appropriate auditors is neither an accident nor a failure of 
Edwards' lobbying ability. Edwards recognized that limiting this 
role to CAs would have required the CAs to accept into member-
ship all auditors currently auditing municipalities. Edwards want-
ed to maintain the exclusivity of the designation. He reasoned that 
the public would appreciate the integrity of the CA designation 
and that, over time, clients would avoid unaffiliated public 
accountants [see Edwards, 1915, pp. 342-343]. Edwards again suc-
cessfully lobbied against naming CAs as the only qualified auditors 
in the Trust Companies Act (1919) and the Bank Act (1923). 
Edwards was able to put his concerns about the state of gov-
ernment accounting into action when he was appointed the audi-
tor of the national accounts in 1921, 1922, and 1925 (see Exhibit 
3)7 The national accounts are the responsibility of the Auditor 
General, a position created in 1878 to ensure that government 
expenditures were in accordance with legislative approvals. The 
role gradually expanded to include a concern with the overall 
financial management of government [Sinclair, 1979]. 
Between 1918 and 1924, the office of the Auditor General was 
virtually dormant. During 1918, John Fraser, the incumbent 
Auditor General, was on sick leave, eventually dying in office in 
1919. E.D. Sutherland was then appointed as acting Auditor 
General, but he too developed health problems and was on leave 
from 1922 until his resignation in 1923. The post remained empty 
for a year until Georges Gonthier was appointed in 1924 [Ward, 
1962, p. 162]. As a result of this series of events, the Auditor 
General's office had operated without strong leadership for six 
years. 
Edwards was thus brought into an environment where "both 
the opposition and the government [and particularly the 
7The appointment in 1921 was "without remuneration" [Saunders, Sessional 
Paper No. 2, 11 George V, A. 1921, p. vii]. The terms of appointment are not record-
ed for the other years. 
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Department of Finance] lost faith in the auditing process" [Ward, 
1962, p. 163]. Although outside firms had been hired on several 
occasions during the 1920s for special projects, this was the first 
time that an external auditor had been used for the national 
accounts. The use of outside consultants hired by the government 
was protested by the Auditor General [Sinclair, 1979]. He claimed 
that under the act creating the position, the Auditor General was 
independent of the sitting government and reported directly to 
the Parliament. The government then had no place in arranging 
for outside experts to interfere with the operations of the Auditor 
General. 
In spite of the internal opposition to Edwards' role in the 
preparation of the national accounts, he was able to have an 
impact on their presentation. One of Edwards' key contributions 
was to reformat the national accounts to conform to current prac-
tice in business and banking in particular [Saunders, 1921, p. vii]. 
The original terms of reference of the audit were limited to verifi-
cation of the conformity of the public accounts with the govern-
ment's books. Edwards, Morgan & Co. was also engaged in 1922 to 
review the government's assets and the procedures in place in dif-
ferent departments for safeguarding revenues. 
EXHIBIT 3 
Audit Certificates for the Dominion of Canada 
We have examined the Balance Sheet of the Dominion of Canada 
(shewn herewith) as of March 31st, 1920, also the Expenditure and 
Revenue Account for thie fiscal year ended on the said date, and have 
verified the same by reference to the Dominion Ledgers. We certify 
that the above-mentioned statements accurately set forth the matters 
therein referred to, and are as shewn by the said books. 
EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO., 
Chartered Accountants. 
Ottawa, December 1st, 1920. 
We have examined the Balance Sheet of the Dominion of Canada 
as at March 31, 1924, and we certify that the Balance Sheet conforms 
to the Balance Sheets of previous years in not including in the Net 
Debt of the Dominion, issues of the Canadian National Railway 
Company and Companies included in its System, which carry the 
Guarantee of the Dominion of Canada. Such Guaranteed Issues are 
shown year by year as Indirect Liabilities. 
GEO. EDWARDS, 
Of the firm of Edwards, Morgan & Co. 
W. GARTH THOMSON, 
Of the firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Ottawa, Canada, 27th January, 1S)25. 
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In 1925, Edwards again audited the national accounts but this 
time with a co-auditor (no audit statements appear for 1923 or 
1924). The change from a single auditor to co-auditors is consis-
tent with Edwards' lobbying on the revisions to the Bank Act of 
1923. Given that Edwards used financial reporting in the banking 
industry as a model for reformatting the national accounts, it is 
likely that he also imported the new audit requirements from the 
Bank Act into this assignment. The co-auditor in 1925 was Peat 
Marwick Mitchell, a firm with an established reputation in bank 
audits [Cowperthwaite, 1986]. 
Beckhart [1929, p. 439] gave Edwards credit for the changes 
in the audit provisions of the 1923 Bank Act. Specifically, the act 
required that auditors must be experienced members of an asso-
ciation of accountants, that the audit be conducted by two people 
of different firms, and that the auditors should not simultaneous-
ly provide other services to the bank while acting as its auditor. 
Edwards' views were in opposition to those of the Canadian 
Bankers' Association which favored the status quo. G. Clarkson, 
son of Edwards' former employer and teacher, also gave testimony 
at the hearings. He and Edwards were at odds over the need for 
bank auditors to refrain from providing any other services to their 
banking clients [Beckhart, 1929, p. 439]. Clarkson claimed that 
there was so little profit in the audit that his firm would have to 
withdraw from bank audits if they were denied the opportunity to 
provide other services. He estimated at the time that 4% of his 
business was comprised of bank audits, while 25% of his business 
was other work on behalf of the banks.8 Clarkson lived up to this 
promise and withdrew from bank audits after the act was enacted 
[Little, 1964, p. 26]. 
In testimony regarding the Bank Act, Edwards was asked if he 
had ever served as a bank auditor. He answered, "no." His exper-
tise in banking stemmed from his work preparing a report for the 
Minister of Finance on the failure of the Merchant Bank. This 
engagement, in turn, grew out of his work as auditor of the gov-
ernment accounts. He also argued that his expertise in this matter 
was "the result of long study of relationships subsisting between 
members of my profession and their clients, and the standards of 
competency and conduct in a professional sense, which entitles 
them, as a class, to public confidence" [Canada, 1923, p. 764]. He 
8Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Banking and Business 
[1923, p. 765]. 
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argued that independence of the auditor from bank management 
was a necessary condition for shareholders to have confidence in 
bank financial statements. He also thought that mandatory auditor 
rotation would allow management to change auditors periodical-
ly wi thout undermining depositor confidence in the bank. 
Auditor rotation would also ensure that overfamiliarity between 
the auditor and management would not impair auditor indepen-
dence. Although these provisions were opposed by the Canadian 
Bankers' Association and other prominent auditors, Edwards' 
credibility with the Ministry of Finance and government proved 
decisive in allowing his vision of the auditor's role to be enacted. 
Edwards also investigated the Home Bank failure in 1923. He 
gave evidence on his finding to the Royal Commission that inves-
tigated the failure in 1924 [McKeown, 1924, pp. 491-522, 539-551]. 
Clarkson also provided evidence to the Royal Commission as liq-
uidator of the failed bank. One of Edwards' key findings in this 
case was that the Home Bank was the only bank at that time not 
audited by a CA. He used this circumstance to impress upon gov-
e rnmen t and bank officials the value of CAs in society 
[Richardson and Lew, 1992]. Interestingly, George Gonthier, w h o 
was appointed Auditor General in 1924, was the first CA to hold 
the position [Ward, 1962]. 
THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN ACCOUNTING 
In his presidential address to the DACA, Edwards [1912] spoke 
of the Boer War and England's "mistake" in allowing Dutch 
colonies to develop in South Africa. He drew members ' attention 
to "the truth that allies are better than neutrals, for some day 
neutrals may become a menace." Further he predicted, by analogy, 
"that those of our Canadian Societies which have been tolerant or 
neglectful of the growth of independent professional elements in 
their very midst will presently reap the harvest in the form 
of organized antagonism to our hopes and plans for a united 
accountancy profession in Canada." His vision of a unified 
accounting profession, however, was challenged by the diversity 
of the work locations and tasks that accountants undertake. 
Edwards' resolve to eliminate organized opposition was soon 
put to the test with the application of the Certified General 
Accountants Association of Canada (CGA) for a federal charter in 
1913. The CGA originated in 1908 as a technical self-study group 
of Canadian Pacific Railway accountants. Gradually this group 
grew, and members began to seek a way to publicly acknowledge 
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their accomplishments. Initially they sought a charter that would 
allow them to grant a designation similar to the CAs but without 
the requirement of an apprenticeship in public practice. Edwards 
intervened but withdrew the opposition of the CAs in return for 
informal assurances that the CGA would limit itself to the interests 
of "employed accountants" (i.e., both financial and managerial 
accountants but not those in public practice) and would not grant 
a designation. Edwards had thus negotiated for the CGA to be neu-
tral with respect to his ambitions in public accounting. By 1920, 
however, the membership of the CGA had grown to include pub-
lic accountants, while a provincial charter had been obtained in 
Quebec that permitted the group to hold examinations and grant 
a designation. Edwards regarded this as an abrogation of the orig-
inal agreement [Edwards, 1921b]. The neutrals had become a 
menace in Edwards' eyes. 
The division of labor between public and salaried accountants 
(essentially a division between the preparation and the audit of 
financial statements) was not the only source of challenge to 
Edwards' vision of a unified profession. There was also a growing 
bod of accountants concerned with costing and managerial uses 
of accounting information. In the U.K. (1919) and the U.S. (1919), 
associations of cost accountants were formed independently of 
the established accounting associations with ambiguous jurisdic-
tional boundaries. In Canada, the CGA was the obvious association 
to represent cost accountants since its membership already 
included many accountants practicing as cost or management 
accountants. 
Edwards' experience with the IMB had made him aware of the 
variability of costs across manufacturers and the poor state of cost 
control in many instances. Edwards was concerned both with the 
need to improve the effectiveness of cost accounting practice and 
to prevent the creation of another accounting association to com-
pete with the CAs [cf. Edwards, 1921b]. The examination and 
apprenticeship requirements that the CAs had carefully crafted to 
control entry to public accounting could not be changed to allow 
the entry of cost accountants into CA institutes. But, at the same 
time, Edwards could not allow the CGA to benefit from this 
emerging branch of accountancy by gaining more members and a 
stronger mandate. The solution Co these concerns was the cre-
ation of an association on terms acceptable to the CAs. 
In 1920, the president of the DACA called on the provincial CA 
institutes to create a new association for the benefit of cost 
accountants. The eight incorporators of the Society of Cost 
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Accountants of Canada were the eight provincial presidents of the 
institutes of CAs chaired by Dilworth, a partner with the firm 
Clarkson, Gordon, Dilworth and Nash.9 At the inaugural Board of 
Trustees meeting, George Edwards emerged as the first chair of 
the Society [Canadian Chartered Accountant, 1920, pp. 31-34, 116-
119]. It is likely given his sudden appearance in this capacity that 
it had been George Edwards, working behind the scenes at the 
ICAO and the DACA, who had orchestrated the creation of the 
Society. 
This organization would be federally incorporated but, as 
Edwards had shown through his battles with the DACA, would not 
have the power to hold examinations or establish a designation. 
The organization would be a mechanism to allow cost accountants 
to share information and improve their craft, but it would not 
become a rival to the CA designation. Soon after Edwards stepped 
down from the presidency in 1924, however, the Society started to 
debate offering "certificates of competency." The Society began 
holding examinations in 1927 [Allan, 1982, p. 21] and, after incor-
porat ing provincially, created the Registered Industrial 
Accountant designation in 1941 (this designation became 
Certified Management Accountant in 1976). 
Edwards' work with the Society of Cost Accountants of 
Canada was the last major project he would undertake before 
retiring from involvement in professional affairs in 1926 at the age 
of 65. The last five years of his professional life were marked by 
honors for his achievements. These included an honorary doctor-
ate from Queen's University (1922) and life memberships in the 
Institute of CAs of Manitoba (1926) and the Institute of CAs of 
Alberta (1927). In 1926, a dinner was held at the University of 
Toronto to mark his retirement. Over 200 prominent members of 
the accounting and business communities of Canada and the U.S. 
attended. To commemorate the event, a painting of Edwards was 
commissioned and now hangs in the library of the Institute of CAs 
of Ontario. 
CONCLUSION 
Of my ability to adequately serve and promote the 
interests and welfare of the Chartered Accountants 
in Canada I have had serious misgivings; of my 
9Although there are now ten provinces, a CA association was not created in 
Prince Edward Island until 1921, and Newfoundland did not become a Canadian 
province until 1949. 
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deep concern for those interests and my devotion 
to your cause I have never had a moment's doubt. I 
hope that your verdict may be that some progress 
has been made [Edwards, 1912, p. 81]. 
George Edwards served the Canadian accounting profession 
for 36 years from his first election to the ICAO Council in 1890 
until his retirement from professional politics in 1926. He was a 
strategist and a tactician. He had a vision of accountancy as a pro-
fession rather than simply as a business, mandating a single 
standard of practice reflected in educational programs, systems of 
examination, and codes of ethics. He worked to establish the CA 
profession as the sole representative of public accountants in 
Canada with a responsibility for maintaining the standards of 
practice and the usefulness of its members to society. He was vig-
orous in protecting this vision from others and in creating the 
infrastructure necessary to support it. His name is prominent at 
the initiation of key changes in the profession but, after the struc-
ture had been put in place, he operated in the background. For 
example, after his stints as president of various associations in 
which he was involved, he frequently served on key committees, 
working to ensure the implementation of initiatives he had put in 
place. 
His legacy includes the federal/provincial structure of the 
accounting profession in Canada, university-based accounting 
education, a professional journal, the division of labor between 
management and financial accounting associations, and a vision of 
the place of CAs in Canadian society. Although there is no ques-
tion of Edwards' influence on the profession, several aspects of his 
vision were unsuccessful. He was unable to prevent the creation 
of alternative accounting associations in Canada. At the time of his 
death, the CPA (Certified Public Accountant), APA (Accredited 
Public Accountant), RIA (Registered Industrial Accountant) and 
CGA (Certified General Accountant) were established designa-
tions in Canada. He also lived to see the entry of women into the 
profession, albeit after his retirement from professional politics. 
In 1929, the Privy Council ruled that the word "person" in 
Canadian law referred equally to men and women. This ruling 
opened all opportunities created by statute to both sexes. The pro-
fessions that enjoy statutory protection of their designations and 
practice rights were henceforth unable to prevent women from 
entering the profession. Edwards saw both of these events as 
undermining the status of the profession. 
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In 1926, at age 65, George Edwards retired and ceased all activ-
ity within the profession. It is hard to imagine how someone so 
intimately involved in the development of the profession could 
end his connection so abruptly. It suggests that Edwards saw his 
work in the profession simply as part of his job, not a calling or a 
crusade, but simply something that had to be done and done well. 
At age 65 it could be that George simply wanted to enjoy his suc-
cess and spend more time with his powerboats (a passion of his). 
Or perhaps it is as George Edwards said at his retirement dinner in 
1926: "Our profession is now upon an assured foundation and it is 
long since it needed any help of mine to ensure its steady 
progress." 
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Abstract. Leafing through early accounting journals from the 
last two decades of the 19th century, accounting historians and 
enthusiasts piece together the history of accountancy in the 
U.S., yet pay little attention to the editors of these journals who 
at times almost single-handedly willed their existence, clearing 
the road for modern accounting journals. Anson O. Kittredge, 
w h o was probably the most outstanding and influential editor 
of the 19th century, was also an author, teacher, CPA examiner, 
innovator, practitioner, and organizer. 
Accountancy should not forget Selden R. Hopkins 
its first editor or Anson O. Kittredge his greater 
successor [Webster, 1940, p. 11]. 
The last quarter of the 19th century in America marked the 
beginning of a period of substantial economic change, providing 
an environment conducive to the establishment of the new pro-
fession of public accountancy. The development of the vast rail-
road system accelerated the nation's transition from an agricul-
tural to an industrial economy and resulted in rapidly growing 
urban centers. The industrialization brought about a complex, 
new business world with its separation of the owners from the 
managers of capital, resulting in the rise of a professional man-
agerial class. The unsatiated demand for capital brought much 
British investment and, in tandem, British-trained accountants to 
the U.S. The economic changes of the period necessitated the 
transition of the accounting profession from bookkeepers to pro-
fessional accountants. 
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There were many U.S. accounting pioneers who helped the 
accounting profession develop during this transition period.1 
Anson O. Kittredge, editor, author, teacher, CPA examiner, and 
practitioner, was one of the main players who contributed to the 
development and advancement of the accounting profession in 
the last quarter of the 19th century. Kittredge, who served as the 
editor of some of the first accounting and bookkeeping journals in 
the U.S., also published numerous articles on accounting theory 
and practice. He was one of the first accountants to describe the 
importance of accounting for inventory quantities and prices in 
manufacturing firms and is credited with the development of the 
first card-ledger system. (He may have been the first "systems" per-
son in accounting.) Kittredge was instrumental in the organiza-
tion of the New York Institute of Accountants and Bookkeepers 
[Romeo and Kyj, 1998, p. 35] and played a major role in organiz-
ing the American Institute of Bank Clerks [Dayton Daily Journal, 
1903]. Throughout his work as an editor, he emphasized the 
"American accounting system," recognizing the differences 
between the American and British ways of performing accounting 
that were necessary in the rapidly growing U.S. economy. He was 
one of the lead accountants in the promotion of the "science of 
accounts." 
The goal of this paper is to establish the contributions of 
Kittredge to the accounting profession and to the early account-
ing and business journals he edited. After a brief introduction to 
his early background, Kittredge's written contributions to 
accounting theory, practice, and education as an editor, author, 
and practitioner will be addressed. Second, Kittredge's contribu-
tion to cost accounting, specifically his analysis on the classifica-
tion and application of factory overhead, will be presented. 
An analysis of Kittredge's contribution to accountancy was 
derived by examining the book he wrote with J. F. Brown, The 
Self-Proving Accounting System (1897), and the accounting jour-
nals he edited: The Office (July 1886 to May 1891), Business (June 
1891 to October 1896), and Accountics (April 1897 to September 
1900), as well as a journal for which he may have been a silent edi-
tor, Commerce, Accounts and Finance (January 1901 to May 
1903).2 Norman Webster's archives at the AICPA library were also 
1A short list of other noted accountants in the 19th century includes Charles 
E. Sprague [Mann,1931], Charles W. Haskins [Jordan, 1923], Selden Hopkins 
[Webster, 1940], and S.S. Packard [Manao, 1996]. 
2This opinion was expressed by Webster [1954, p. 109]. 127
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examined.3 After a brief introduction, this paper will concentrate 
on Kittredge's role in accounting. 
EARLY BACKGROUND 
Kittredge was born on February 19, 1848 in Dayton, Ohio. 
Until the age of 13, he attended public grade school, after which 
he received most of his instruction from tutoring sessions by local 
clergymen. After training at Miami Commercial College (Ohio), 
he was employed at 18 as a bookkeeper in the Greer & King 
Foundry General Store [Dayton Daily Journal, 1903]. This proved 
a valuable experience for the future writer who was to publish a 
series of articles on foundry bookkeeping systems. While work-
ing at Greer & King, he developed what is regarded as the first 
card-ledger system. His adult life can be divided into three distinct 
areas, in all of which he achieved considerable success: the sheet-
metal industry, the accounting profession, and the banking indus-
try. 
Kittredge left the stove foundry to start a sheet-metal business, 
which was ultimately incorporated as the Kittredge, Cornice, and 
Ornament Works. There he patented many sheet-metal machines. 
Between 1874-1878, Kittredge published his first journal, The 
Sheet Metal Builder, which he later sold to publisher David 
Williams. In 1878, he left Ohio and settled in New York City, 
where he became editor of The Metal Worker and Carpentry and 
Building. During this period of his life, he wrote The Metal 
Worker Pattern Book, which became the standard among sheet-
metal workers for many years [Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 
1903, p. 10]. His experience as an editor for the metal-industry 
journals provided him with a strong background for establishing 
and editing journals in accounting. His first article on accounting, 
regarding foundry bookkeeping, was read before the National 
Association of Stove Manufacturers on July 22, 1880, and pub-
lished in the October 26 and November 9 issues of The Book-
Keeper. 
3Webster published numerous historical articles on accountancy, The Ten 
Year Book of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, and the 
seminal work, The American Association of Public Accountants 1886-1906. He 
served for many years as chairman of the Committee on History for the American 
Institute of Accountants (predecessor of the AICPA) and as a member of the 
NYSSCPAs Committee on History. His archives on accounting history were given 
to the American Institute of Accountants Foundation. Webster was known as the 
"Historian of American Accountancy" [Committee on History, 1957]. 128
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From the early 1880s until the time of his death, Kittredge 
directed most of his energies to the accounting and finance pro-
fessions, starting as a founding member of the Institute of 
Accountants (IA) in 1882. At the time of his death on March 23, 
1903, Kittredge was pres ident of the Account, Audit and 
Assurance Company of New York City and secretary of the 
American Institute of Bank Clerks [Commerce, Accounts and 
Finance, 1903, p. 9]. 
EDITORIAL WORK AND PUBLICATIONS 
During the later part of the 19th century, a sizeable port ion of 
business education was provided by periodicals. The early 
accounting journals edited by Kittredge paved the way for 
accounting journalism in the 20th century. Webster [1940, p. 11], 
the noted accounting historian, evaluated Selden R. Hopkins and 
Anson O. Kittredge, the two pioneering accounting editors of the 
19th century, and found Kittredge the greater of the two 
[Webster, 1940, p. 11]. Kittredge's contribution as an editor and 
author started early in his life with editorial work in several trade 
journals, among them The Iron Age, The Metal Worker, Sheet 
Metal Builder, and Carpentry and Business. 
As mentioned previously, Kittredge's first article in an 
accounting journal appeared in The Book-Keeper, a periodical to 
which he continued to contribute over its life. He began his own 
publication, The Office, in June 1886. Five years later, The Office 
was purchased by David Williams, and its name was changed to 
Business. In 1893, Kittredge incorpora ted the Kittredge 
Company Publishers, which reacquired Business from Williams. 
However, the Kittredge Company was underfunded, and 
Kittredge was forced to sell the journal back to its former owner 
[The Bookkeeper, 1896, p. 7]. Due to personal conflicts, Kittredge 
resigned as editor of Business and a short time later became the 
editor of Accountics.4 
The Office's treatment of accounting was based on the "sci-
ence of accounts as a branch of mathematics," which was the phi-
losophy of the IA of which Kittredge was a founding member. 
Although The Office emphasized no affiliation, it had a special sec-
tion for the IA. In latter issues, however, this section was expand-
4
 Kittredge explained that he withdrew from Business because he disap-
proved of the course the magazine was taking. A conflict which may have contributed 129
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Published by Gr ve, 2000
Romeo and Kyj: Kittredge, Early Accounting Pioneer 121 
ed to include other accounting organizations as they became 
established.5 
Business was a continuation of The Office under a new name. 
The rationale for using the name Business was that, what tran-
spires in the office is more than accounting or bookkeeping and 
can best be summed up in the word "business" [Kittredge, 1891]. 
Therefore, Kittredge's editorials in Business from June 1891 to 
October 1896 included numerous topics: praise of hard work, 
objections to the metric system, the usefulness of the Bureau of 
Business Information and Services to businessmen, the need for 
trade journals, criticism of American roads, immigration, the 
importance of bank examiners, the causes of the financial reces-
sion of 1893, women in business, shortcomings of the public 
school systems, the banking system in the U.S., politics and the 
business climate, the need for a national accounting convention 
and a national organization, the effect of war upon business pros-
perity, the need for business education, and the need for a single 
gold standard. 
Accountics was a monthly magazine published from 1897 to 
1900, devoted to the science of accounting.6 It was also the first 
official journal of an accounting organization in this country (the 
IA). Its initial issue in April 1897 stated as one of its objectives to 
"impress upon the business public the fact that accounting is the 
vital element of business, and that for this reason it is entitled to a 
degree of recognition and to a breadth of use that has never yet 
been accorded to it" [Kittredge, 1897a, p. 16]. Being the official 
publication of the IA, Accountics was devoted almost exclusively 
to accounting and was used as a vehicle of communication and 
to the severing of relations between Kittredge and Williams was the publication by 
Williams of the second edition of the Metal Worker Pattern Book. Kittredge was 
the author of the first edition. When Williams issued the second edition, he listed 
the author as George W. Kittredge, a cousin of Anson, who had initially made some 
of the mathematical drawings. Kittredge and his family were very upset by this as 
recollected in his daughter's letter to Webster [Kittredge, 1941]. 
5The Institute of Accountants and Bookkeepers, founded in New York City in 
1882, was one of the earliest recorded efforts to establish the accounting profes-
sion in the U. S. The name was officially changed in 1886 to the IA. See Miranti 
[1990] and Romeo and Kyj [1998] for more information on the IA. 
6Charles Sprague, the major porponent of the science of accounts, defined 
"accountics" as "the science which treats of accounts and the art of keeping, veri-
fying, examining and classifying them" [Kittredge, 1897a, p. 19]. 130
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instruction for accountants.7 Accountics set out to bring to the 
forefront much that is distinctly American in accounting practice 
[Kittredge, 1897a, p. 18]. Starting in 1897, Kittredge also edited 
Lawyer and Creditman [Webster, 1940, p. 11]. 
Throughout his editorials and articles, Kittredge emphasized 
the phrase American accounting." American accounting was a 
system that had developed as a result of the swiftly growing con-
ditions of American business. Consequently, significant differ-
ences existed between American and British accounting prac-
tices. American railroads used different locomotives and different 
administration practices than the British [Kittredge, 1898a]. 
British accounting practices had to meet the requirements of the 
Company Acts, whereas accounting practices in America could be 
specifically adapted to American conditions and requirements. 
Kittredge also understood the need for independent audits, which 
were required in Great Britain, and presented editorials and arti-
cles on the value of an independent audit. As early as 1888, he 
reprinted in The Office [Kittredge, 1888, p. 35] a lecture on the 
importance of auditing and auditing procedures presented by F. 
W. Pixley before the Chartered Accountants' Students' Society of 
London. Kittredge's journals included articles on specific issues 
in accounting, among them a series on cost accounting in differ-
ent industries, conversion of partnership books, changing from 
single to double entry, and the history of accountancy. During the 
last few years of writing in Commerce, Accounts and Finance, he 
emphasized the proper classification of accounts, preparation of 
the balance sheet, and profit and loss statements for various types 
of businesses [Kittredge, 1901a, 1901b, pp. 1, 8, 1901d]. In the 
same journal, Kittredge discussed the differences between a book-
keeper and an accountant [Kittredge, 1901c]. 
Science of Accounts: Throughout his 14 years as editor, 
Kittredge's journals included numerous educational articles on 
the science of accounts. McMillan [1998, pp. 25-28] acknowl-
edged Kittredge to be one of the leading forces advocating the sci-
ence of accounts in the U.S. and documented evidence on 
Kittredge's view of accounting as a real science in his 1896 arti-
7The section entitled "Office Juniors" had a specific purpose—to educate 
young bookkeepers. Topics included questions from CPA examinations, receipts, 
fraud, trial balances, ledgers, goodwill, the metric system, rules of (debit and cred-
it, position of applications, etc. [Accountics, July 1897 -January 1898]. 131
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cles. A few years later in an article written in the February 1900 
issue of Accountics, Kittredge [1900a, p. 35] differentiated book-
keeping and accounting in terms of art and science: 
Again, as a conclusion following upon a careful 
survey of the field, I am led to believe that, as a 
rule, we have far too much bookkeeping and 
altogether too little accounting in our offices. 
Bookkeeping is the art, the method, the 
embodiment of the plan, the practice. In con-
tradistinction, accounting is the science, the anal-
ysis, the classification, the scheme or plan in the 
abstract. 
The proponents of this new school of thought, mostly elite mem-
bers of the IA, believed accounting to be a real science. This 
school of thought contributed to a greater understanding of 
accounting and was incorporated into the new accounting pro-
grams that developed in the U.S. in the early 20th century, starting 
with the New York University School of Commerce, Accounts, and 
Finance in 1900. Miranti [ 1990, p. 73] discussed how British pro-
fessional values did not displace the "science of accounts" as a nor-
mative model for professionals in the U. S. until after the deaths of 
Charles Haskins and Anson Kittredge in 1903. 
Books and Articles: Kittredge may have been one of the first to 
emphasize accounting systems. His book, The Self-Proving 
Accounting System, coauthored with J.F. Brown, introduced the 
idea of using balance sheet ledgers to record transactions. This 
system was an early type of perpetual accounting system, which 
allowed balance sheets to be readily available to management at all 
times. Previous to this publication, a balance sheet would have to 
be prepared from scratch, a process which was difficult to com-
plete effectively and efficiently. Use of the ledger to prepare 
financial statements allowed businesses to continue with normal, 
everyday operations instead of closing down the business to 
determine the assets, liabilities, and profits during a given period 
of time [Kittredge and Brown, 1897]. No book or system in the 
U.S. had advocated this method previously. It combined book-
keeping and business administration with mechanical features 
invented by the authors. The entries were posted directly to the 
ledger, which consisted of wide and narrow pages so that an ongo-
ing balance sheet was created through the postings. The system 
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used a chart of accounts with major headings included on the bal-
ance sheet, as well as cost accounts. 
The pamphlet Branch House Auditing [Kittredge, 1897b], an 
expansion of an article with the same title that appeared in 
Accountics, examined the reporting system employed at the Pope 
Manufacturing Company to control its departments by using 
weekly and monthly reports of transactions from branch offices 
to the home office. It reinforced the importance that Kittredge 
placed on in-house auditing and independent auditing. He also 
wrote A System of Cost Records for Foundry Work [Kittredge, 
circa 1886] which demonstrated the type of accounting systems 
employed in manufacturing firms. During his days as the editor of 
Accountics, Kittredge [1898d] put together a booklet of formulas 
entitled Accounting Specifications and Formulas, which was free 
to the readership of the journal. 
At the time of his death in 1903, Kittredge appears to have 
been involved in writing a series of five books advertised in the 
journal Commerce, Accounts and Finance: Tools of Business, 
Elements of Bookkeeping, Balance Sheet Accounting, Auditing, 
and Business Organization and Administration. The books were 
supposed to have been produced under the direction of the 
Publication Committee of Commerce, Accounts and Finance. The 
committee included nine individuals, among them Kittredge, 
although he was not listed as chair. In Kittredge's obituary in the 
April issue, the following explanation was given: 
Owing to the sudden death of Mr. A. O. Kittredge, 
who had in personal charge the preparation of the 
manuscript for the five books...the publishers are 
obliged to announce that the production of the 
books will now be indefinitely pos tponed 
[Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 1903, p. 10]. 
These books were never published, a fact which leads one to con-
clude that Kittredge was to have been the primary author. 
Many of Kittredge's articles indicated an insight into account-
ing many years ahead of his time. For example, in an 1892 article 
on newspaper accounting, Kittredge [1892] suggested using a lia-
bility account for subscriptions received but not yet earned: 
That subscription received should be credited to 
an account belonging to liabilities, so far as classi-
fications in the books of the establishment are 
concerned, and that month by month there should 
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be taken from this account an amount corre-
sponding to the fraction which has been sent of 
the papers which have been paid for. 
However, Kittredge realized the difficulty of implementing a plan 
for each individual subscriber as outlined above and suggested 
allocating the amounts to revenue and liabilities on the basis of a 
more pragmatic aggregate total: 
Instead of dividing the individual subscriptions as 
they come to hand into 12 equal parts, crediting 
each separate part to the account of the monthly 
number to which it belongs, we may by a kind of 
calculation reach an amount in a single sum to be 
taken from the amount of subscriptions collected 
or charged.... 
A list of Kittredge's articles in business periodicals, accounting 
articles in nonbusiness periodicals, and books is included in 
Appendix A. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COST AND SYSTEMS ACCOUNTING 
Historians have not acknowledged Kittredge's contribution to 
cost accounting.8 His experience in the sheet-metal business gave 
him valuable insight into cost accounting. Based on this experi-
ence and his observations as a practicing accountant and editor, 
Kittredge developed his position over a period of time from 1880 
to 1903. His evolution in cost classification can be seen in his writ-
ings over the years. 
Initially, Kittredge, like most of the accountants of his time, 
did not clearly classify costs, but he did understand the necessity 
of including all costs in accounts. In the November 9, 1880 issue 
8Garner [1954], Wells [1978], and Sowell [1973] all mentioned the British 
team of Garcke and Fells who described practices of allocating overhead costs in 
1887. Garner and Wells claimed that these practices were not followed consis-
tently by English and American writers. However, they did not reference any 19th 
century American periodicals as part of their bibliographies. They were probably 
not aware of contributions of American accountants other than those Americans 
who wrote about cost accounting in books or made presentations to the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers. This is the reason why Garner found that devel-
opments in manufacturing accounting were mostly proposed by engineers. Thus, 
he was not aware of the contributions to manufacturing accounting by Kittredge, 
who was trained as a bookkeeper. 134
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of The Book-keeper in an article on foundry bookkeeping, 
Kittredge [1880, p. 130] wrote, "Everything that concerns the cost 
of the manufactured goods belongs in these columns [journal 
columns in the books of stove manufacturing]." He continued that 
"for the sake of analysis it may be desirable to keep an account 
with pig iron, coal, labor advertising, interest, discount, taxes, 
insurance, office expenses, etc." Kittredge kept these accounts 
separate and distinct for more complete classifications: 
They are all represented on the journal, however, 
by these sets of columns. The footings of the cost 
items are posted to a general account of the same 
name in the general ledger in the same manner as 
the footings of the 'accounting receivable' column 
already described. The total cost to date of the 
manufactured product is always represented by 
the balance in this account, while an analysis of 
the cost may be obtained by an examination of the 
nominal accounts comprehended by it under 
whatever names they may be kept. 
Kittredge initially lumped together all the indirect costs, 
including selling and administrative, to determine the cost of the 
goods produced. 
A few years later in 1886, Kittredge published a series of arti-
cles in The Office by Henry Metcalfe delivered before the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the IA concerning 
the recording and allocation of materials and labor in a manufac-
turing company. Metcalfe [1886, p. 64] recommended the alloca-
tion of indirect costs as explained in the following paragraph: 
All the expenses which the head of a department 
cannot assign to a special job, and the material that 
he cannot account by inventory, remain of neces-
sity charged to his department, and so constitute a 
general expense account representing with his 
share of power, rent, insurance, depreciation, 
taxes, etc., the cost of the facilities for the perfor-
mance of work in his department since the last 
inventory, say a year ago. The total expense 
account for a department divided by the number 
of days' labor done in that department during the 
same period, gives the cost of facilities per day's 
labor therein; this quotient is called the cost factor 
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of that department. The yearly cost factor, cor-
rected by experience and applied to jobs done in 
the ensuring year, gives their most probable share 
of the facilities they enjoy, and added to the net 
cost of the labor and material they consume, gives 
their most probable actual cost, balancing again in 
advance the account for operating expenses. 
Metcalfe emphasized the concept of indirect expenses as 
divided into variable and fixed in his book, The Cost of 
Manufactures [1885], but he did not mention sales expenses and 
other general expenses of the firm. Garner [1954, p. 123] 
explained that, since Metcalfe usually wrote about accounting for 
government workshops, there was no need for expenses connect-
ed with sales. Metcalfe [1886, p. 30] himself stated that he was 
unfamiliar with the commercial side of business. 
Kittredge learned from and expanded on Metcalfe's work. 
Writing at approximately the same time, he advocated the inclu-
sion of only indirect manufacturing costs in the general expense 
account included in the costs of goods sold. Kittredge described 
a system of cost accounting used by Hopson & Chapin 
Manufacturing of New London, Connecticut [Kittredge, 1886b]. 
He detailed the accumulation and recording of costs as materials 
pass from station to station on tickets, with job cards for labor, and 
stressed the need to take into account rent (return on capital), 
cost of power, superintendence, fixed charges, pattern work, and 
an allowance for lubricating oil and sand on a daily consumption 
basis to determine product cost. Fixed expenses were considered 
arbitrary in character, prorated based on the number of days and 
applied on a daily basis. Kittredge advocated this to be more use-
ful for comparison of costs on a daily, monthly, or yearly basis. 
Advertising or office expenses were not mentioned as part of the 
cost of the product. 
In the 1897 book, The Self-Proving Accounting System, 
Kittredge's understanding of cost classification had evolved to the 
point that he specified the distinction between cost of goods sold 
and the expenses of doing business. Both the cost of goods sold 
account and the expenses of doing business would then be closed 
to the loss and gain account [Kittredge and Brown, 1897, pp. 44-
45]: 
Very little thought will be required to show that 
the expenses of doing business are entirely dis-
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tinct from the cost of goods, and a little additional 
reflection will show that whatever affects the cost 
of merchandise in itself should be debited to the 
Buying Account [inventory account]. 
In chapter two of the book, "Classification of Accounts," he 
defined the "manufacturing account" as one that was to be debit-
ed with all costs incurred in the production of goods. The func-
tion of the manufacturing account was to keep track of the costs 
of goods produced and to turn them over at cost to the "buying 
account" upon completion. When items were sold, the buying 
account would be credited and the "selling account" debited with 
"goods sold at cost prices" (cost of goods sold). 
The fifth chapter, entitled "Manufacturing," contains the 
underlying principles of the manufacturing account and how the 
records should be managed.9 Kittredge stressed that accounts 
should be set up to show costs and not to look for profits that 
result from sales. The account should show the costs of manufac-
turing and be useful for a comparison of production costs with 
the price of purchasing the same good from the outside. He pre-
sented a manufacturing account, the equivalent of today's work-in-
process, to accumulate costs until the product was finished. Upon 
completion the costs were moved out to the buying account (fin-
ished goods) from which goods were sold. The balance in the 
manufacturing account should represent the "goods in process of 
construction" and not yet charged off [Kittredge and Brown, 1897, 
p. 761. 
In explaining the manufacturing account, Kittredge advocat-
ed four subdivision accounts - materials, labor, general expense 
with "superintendence, rent, power and other general expenses 
which have to be spread over the product in determining the 
cost," and depreciation. He presented the use of a percentage 
plan of a predetermined rate to allocate general factory expenses 
(overhead). Kittredge considered the foundation on which the 
percentage was based (cost driver) to be of considerable impor-
tance and advocated the use of one that did not vary in price from 
year to year. Therefore, he advocated the use of labor costs as they 
were more constant than material costs [Kittredge and Brown, 
1897, pp. 78-79; Kittredge, 1899, pp. 63-65]: 
9In several places that specifically related to cost accounting, Kittredge 
referred to "leaving to another volume a complete exposition." Another volume on 
cost accounting was never published, perhaps due to Kittredge's unexpected and 
untimely death. 137
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It is the generally accepted opinion of accountants 
everywhere that labor being the least variable of 
all the elements of entering into the cost of prod-
uct, is the best foundation on which to spread gen-
eral expenses [Kittredge, 1899, p. 63]. 
To the general expense account, or "dead account" as 
Kittredge referred to it at times, he debited rent, power, insurance, 
watchmen's salaries, superintendence, time clerk, and all other 
items of expense "that cannot be properly apportioned among the 
orders." These were then allocated on a percent basis [Kittredge 
and Brown, 1897, pp. 79-80]: 
The percentage of dead expenses determined by 
the figures above presented during the past year 
was 20 per cent - that is, the dead expenses cost 
one-fifth as much as the amount of the pay-roll. We 
therefore add arbitrarily to the items of cost 
shown by order No. 99, an amount equal to one-
fifth, or 20 per cent, of the amount of labor which 
is shown to have gone into the order, or $20. 
The under or overapplication was to be debited or credited to 
a loss and gain account (p. 81). A separate depreciation account 
for plant and machinery was kept from which depreciation was 
allocated in the same manner as general expenses. 
Kittredge also realized the problems that existed with the old 
merchandise account, which was apparently used for two sets of 
values in manufacturing firms. He addressed this issue in his 1897 
book with Brown and in several of his articles that followed. In an 
October 1898 article in Accountics, entitled "The Merchandise 
Accounts," Kittredge [1898b] pointed out the problem with the 
old merchandise account:10 
Its balance is an amount which represents goods 
on hand, minus the profit made on what has been 
sold; or an amount consisting of the sum of the 
goods on hand, plus the loss that has been made 
on what has been sold. ...What bookkeeper, with 
such a hodge-podge of an account before him, is 
able to tell from the amount appearing as the bal-
ance in the merchandise Account in the monthly 
"The article was a reprint of an address before the Business Educators' 
Section of the National Educational Association, Washington, July 1898. 
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trial balance what it really represents? 
...As our books are usually opened and conducted, 
there is no account with stock and stores, but all is 
dumped into merchandise Account,... 
In a presentation to the Cincinnati Manufacturers' Club in 
December 1898, concerning the evolution of cost accounting as 
well as its underlying principles [Kittredge, 1899, p. 4], he again 
mentioned the problem of integrating cost accounts with finan-
cial accounts: 
So great is this difficulty that in many cases busi-
ness men appear to entertain the idea that cost 
accounts are something separate and distinct from 
the regular accounts of the business, that cost 
accounts are something which cannot be made a 
part of the regular accounting system, but instead 
are a separate and distinct effort, something nec-
essary to be done by reason of the information 
afforded, but something in which those who have 
charge of the general accounts of the enterprise 
have no particular concern. 
I am disposed to take a different view of the case. 
I am disposed to believe that the general system of 
the accounts of any business should include every-
thing that had to be recorded concerning that 
business, whether it occurs in the factory, in the 
salesroom, in a branch house, or in the main 
office. 
As a solution, Kittredge proposed the integration of cost 
accounts with financial accounts and the separation of all the 
accounts of any business into two grand divisions—the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss statement [Kittredge and Brown, 
1897, pp. 25-27; Kittredge, 1898b, 1899]. 
The second major point made in Accountics is the importance 
of net income. In a time period when the balance sheet was the 
most important statement, Kittredge [1899, p. 5] also emphasized 
the importance of net income: 
When the revenue is considerably less than the 
expenses there is trouble ahead ...As long as the 
profits of the business are greater than the 
expenses very few care particularly about the rela-
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tive standing of assets and liabilities. 
In his book and in several articles, Kittredge displayed a com-
plete chart of accounts, which, except for a few differences in ter-
minology (e.g., he used the term "active" instead of "current"), 
could have easily been used by a 20th century manufacturing con-
cern. He is one of the accountants who brought accounting into 
the 20th century as noted by the following passage in the same 
article: 
The day has long since gone by when any dark 
corner was good enough for the bookkeeper; 
when any cheap book that could be picked up at 
the corner stationer's was good enough for the 
accounts; when the ledgers of one business were 
exactly like the ledgers of every other business, 
and when bookkeeping was bookkeeping, irre-
spective of the line of industry [Kittredge, 1899, 
pp. 64-65]. 
Reporting on Kittredge's address on "Accounting for Cotton 
Mills" before the New York Chapter of the Institute, the trade mag-
azine Furniture Trade Review [Kittredge, 1900c] wrote: 
We reproduce the address in substance because 
the system of accounting described therein is 
applicable not only to cotton manufacturing but 
to the making of carpets, upholstery goods, and in 
fact, all manufacturing business. The general sys-
tem of accounting referred to in the address is one 
that has recently been put into operation by two 
very prominent cotton mill corporations in the 
northern part of the country and by another in the 
South. This system has been adapted to the 
requirements of various other industries, and is in 
use in many of the largest establishments through-
out the nation, from bicycle factories to engine 
works, and from publishing concerns to depart-
ment stores. 
No wonder Frank E. Webner, the author of many cost books, 
including Factory Costs (1911), noted the influence of Kittredge 
on his work in a letter to Webster, dated August 28, 1940. He 
wrote, "Anson was quite my patron saint and the real inspiration 
of my book Factory Costs." 
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Farquahar MacRae [1941], who was a friend of Kittredge, one 
of the last surviving members of the IA, and a past president of the 
organization, mentioned that: 
He [Kittredge] was the first accountant that at that 
time insisted that keeping track of quantities and 
prices of inventories was as important as keeping 
the cash account; and when he went into business 
as a public practitioner, it was to specialize in cost 
accounting. 
Apparently, Kittredge not only understood that cost accumu-
lation and allocation were extremely important in running a prof-
itable business, but he was one of the leaders in cost accounting 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
EDUCATION 
Business education was one of Kittredge's favorite topics. 
Initially he was an advocate for an apprenticeship similar to the 
English system [Kittredge, 1887a]. During the years 1895 and 
1896, he was critical of business schools in his editorials, suggest-
ing that they provided nothing more than drills in penmanship, 
shorthand, and bookkeeping and that they did not adequately 
prepare students for the real world: 
Young men can train for all the business trades at 
the present time, but nowhere, apparently, is busi-
ness in the sense of direction and management of 
operations and profit-making taught. Actual expe-
rience, expensive though it is, is the only plan of 
instruction [Kittredge, 1896]. 
According to Kittredge, commercial college instructors them-
selves did not have the practical experience to instruct their stu-
dents properly. If college professors were "placed in offices to 
discharge the routine duties of any of the various branches of busi-
ness they pretend to teach, they would acquit themselves with 
scarcely more credit than their greenest graduates" [Kittredge, 
1895]. In the same article, Kittredge reported that teachers were 
not usually selected from the accounting profession at large but 
from students at the time of graduation. Therefore, since they had 
no practical experience, they only taught their pupils textbook 
material, not practical, "real world" accounting. 
Commercial colleges could overcome these problems by hir-
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ing "practical, everyday" accountants to teach classes. Until this 
happened, Kittredge felt that the accounting profession would 
never achieve the level of success it deserved [Kittredge, 1895]. 
Later, he stated that, "the business world owes much to the com-
mercial colleges—far more than it usually acknowledges" 
[Kittredge, 1898c, p. 175]. 
In the same article, in order to emphasize the importance of a 
practical education, he discussed some differences in bookkeep-
ing "as she is wrote and bookkeeping as she is teached (p. 175)." 
Apparently, there was confusion in some texts related to the use 
of the trial balance and its substitution for the balance sheet. 
Kittredge's [1890c, p. 176] position was as follows: 
The only use to which a trial balance should be put 
is to determine the equilibrium of debits and cred-
its in the accounts which are tested by it. The trial 
balance was never intended to be a business state-
ment. Its use as an indicator of the progress of a 
business has grown out of the fact that no other 
statement has been available. 
Kittredge [1898c, p. 176] also stated that the profit and loss state-
ment had not been covered adequately or correctly in courses of 
instruction as indicated by the following statement: 
A profit and loss statement necessarily precedes 
the preparation of a balance sheet. It also is some-
thing that has not been explained in treatises and 
courses of instruction, (so far, at least, as I have 
been able to ascertain by very careful inquiry.) In 
the way a practicing accounting would consider 
appropriate and necessary. 
These ideas on a practical education appear to have been 
incorporated in the establishment of the first successful account-
ing program in the U.S.,11 the New York University School of 
Commerce, Accounts and Finance in 1900, an institution in which 
Kittredge became the first professor of accounting theory and 
11A professional school for accountants, the New York School of Accounts, was 
chartered in New York State in the fall of 1892 under the auspices of the American 
Association of Public Accountants. The purpose of the college was to provide 
"practical instruction in the knowledge, and science of modern accountancy and 
finance." The school lasted only one year, from September 1893 to July 1894 
[Webster, 1954, p. 185]. 142
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practice.12 In addition, he also lectured occasionally at the 
Columbia School of Business, Cornell, the Stevens Institute of 
Technology, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
[Kittredge, 1940]. 
Ironically, Kittredge did not necessarily practice what he 
preached, for in letters to Norman Webster in 1940 and 1947, both 
Leslie J. Tompkins and Orrin R. Judd recollected that Kittredge 
was criticized about teaching too much theory and too little prac-
tice. He apparently was not particularly popular in the classroom 
or among the students, giving the impression of knowing more 
about the subject than he was willing to communicate. 
PROFESSIONAL 
Kittredge was one of 23 charter members of the IA. He was 
also one of 14 who were members of the Executive Council elect-
ed to manage its affairs during its first year. Besides spending var-
ious terms as a member of the Executive Council, Kittredge 
remained active in the Institute for many years, as evidenced by 
the following array of technical papers he presented at meetings: 
1884-188613 The System of Cost Accounts Now In Use by the 
Hopson and Chapin Manufacturing Co. of New 
London, CT. 
Oct. 1890 The Story of an English Syndicate 
Dec. 1891 How Shall We Educate for Business? 
Apr. 1895 Humanizing Influences of Business 
Dec. 1896 Bookkeeping for the Installment Business 
Apr. 1897 The Ledger—Its Forms and Adaptions 
Jul. 1898 Organization 
Nov. 1899 A Scientific Analysis of Business Accounts 
Mar. 1900 Accounting for Cotton Mills. 
He was one of the first members elected as a fellow of the IA, 
along with Edward T. Cockey, Charles Dutton, Joseph Hardcastle, 
H.S. Ogden, S.S. Packard, Charles Taller, and Charles E. Sprague on 
12Kittredge, along with the following faculty members, was in charge of the 
accounting courses: Charles W. Haskins, Dean; Charles E. Sprague, Professor, 
Theory of Accounts; Ferdinand W. Lafrentz, Professor of Auditing; Henry R. M. 
Cook, Professor of Practical Accounting; Leon Brummer, Professor of Practical 
Accounting [Lockwood, 1938, p. 142]. 
13These presentations cannot be found in any library in the U.S.; thus, the 
exact dates are not known for this article. 143
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March 15, 1887.14 As early as 1886, he had been an advocate for a 
national organization of accountants [Kittredge, 1886a, pp. 57-
58]. 
Kittredge became Certified Public Accountant No. 121 by 
waiver in New York in 1899. He became a member of the New 
York State Society of CPAs in March 1898, as well as a member of 
its Board of Directors for the years 1900 to 1903. In his obituaries 
in both Commerce, Accounts and Finance and the Dayton Daily 
Journal, Kittredge was given credit for contributing to the passage 
of the first CPA law in 1896. "It was largely owing to Mr. 
Kittredge's efforts that the law was passed making the Regents' 
Degree of CPA. in New York State, now so greatly sought after by 
accountants" [Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 1903, p. 16]. 
The Dayton Daily Journal [1903] stated that, "he was also promi-
nent in the movement which resulted in the New York law pro-
viding for certified public accountants..."15 
As a member of the IA and the NYSSCPAs, Kittredge was on 
the Examining Board for the New York State CPA examination for 
the year July 1899 to June 1900, and he served on a committee 
which promoted the organization of the School of Commerce, 
Accounts and Finance of New York University. Kittredge taught 
there in 1900 and 1901, and he was listed in its catalogues for the 
academic years 1901-1902 and 1902-1903. Throughout his career 
as an editor, he also practiced as an accountant. At the time of his 
death, he was the president of the public accounting firm, 
Account, Audit & Assurance Company.16 
In early 1900, Kittredge was requested by the American 
14During 1887, the IA had committed itself to a scheme of degrees. The mem-
bership was divided into three classes: "Associates," described as the junior order; 
"Members," described as the rank and file; and "Fellows," described as those w h o 
were chosen for their outstanding achievements and their eminent abilities. This 
was the highest class in the IA [Kittredge, 1887b]. 
15However, this opinion is in conflict with George Wilkinson and Norman 
Webster, who both wrote extensively on the passage of the first CPA exam 
[Wilkinson, 1903, 1928a, 1928b; Webster, 1954]. Wilkinson did not mention 
Kittredge in his articles. In his 1928 article, he attributed the passage to Henry 
Harney, president of the IA, and members of the AAPA. Webster [ 1954], in writing 
on the first 20 years of the AAPA, attributed the passage of the New York CPA Law 
to Melvil Dewey, secretary of the New York State Regents; Richard F. Stevens, pres-
ident of the AAPA; Richard M. Chapman and Francis Gottsberger, member and 
chair respectively of the American Association's Committee on Legislation and 
Affairs; and Charles E. Sprague, member of the IA. Apparently, neither author cred-
ited Kittredge with contributing significantly to the passage of the first CPA law in 
1896. 144
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Bankers' Association to prepare suggestions on the subject of a 
national bank-clerks' association.17 His report was submitted to 
the Committee on Education of the American Bankers 
Association. It is interesting to note that the work of the British 
Bankers' Institute was described in the report, but this model was 
not used because of the differences between the U.S. and the U.K. 
One of Kittredge's objectives for the Institute of Bank Clerks (IBC) 
was to have lectures at all chapter meetings, as had been the case 
with the IA which he had helped establish 20 years earlier. It was 
obvious that Kittredge's experiences in accounting were very 
helpful in establishing the IBC. 
CONCLUSION 
There were many individuals who helped shape the early 
accounting profession in the U.S. during its infancy in the late 
19th century. Among his contemporar ies , few can match 
Kittredge's contributions as an editor, author, teacher, innovator, 
practitioner, organizer, and CPA examiner. As one who recog-
nized the importance of cost accounting in manufacturing firms 
and developed a card-ledger system, he may be one of our first 
accounting systems persons. It is important to consider the con-
tributions of American accountants writing in periodicals in the 
U.S. during the late 19th century for a more complete historical 
understanding of the development of cost accounting. 
For at least two years, June 1886 to July 1888, the periodicals 
Kittredge edited were the only accounting journals in the U.S. Yet, 
he took an interdisciplinary approach and included other busi-
ness disciplines, such as marketing (especially advertising) and 
business law, in his journals to provide not only a technical but a 
general business education to his readership. His journals served 
as educational materials for both experienced accountants and 
aspiring young accountants. With articles written by highly 
l6The company was an advocate of what Kittredge called the "Going Profit 
and Loss Statement and a Perpetual Balance Sheet System." It consisted of vising 
a Boston or skeleton ledger, then used exclusively by banks, with charge and cred-
it tickets used as vouchers for entries. The company published a book explaining 
this system [Kittredge, 1900b]. 
17
 Kittredge was active in the American Institute of Banking (originally called 
the American Institute of Bank Clerks), which was established in 1900 by the 
American Bankers' Association. This was the first effort to raise the standard of 
character and efficiency among bank clerks. Kittredge was secretary of this 
organization from its conception and published the official journal of the 
Institute, The Bulletin [Bulletin of the American Institute of Bank Clerks, 1903]. 145
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respected and recognized accountants, as well as question and 
answer sections, these periodicals served as communication vehi-
cles and information outlets for the profession. They also pro-
moted the science of accounts advocated by the IA. 
Kittredge was highly active in organizing the IA, the premier 
accounting organization of the 1880s and 1890s. As an editor, he 
promoted many other accounting organizations through his jour-
nals. He was instrumental in the development and success of the 
American Bankers' Association. Kittredge was influential in pro-
moting the theory and practice of accounting as well as the 
accounting organizations that helped pave the way for the mod-
ern profession. In short, he was a 20th century accountant, even 
though most of his life was lived in the 19th century. 
Webster was probably correct when he expressed the belief 
that, as time passes, newspapers and journals become better 
known than their editors. The work becomes greater than the 
individual who created it [Webster, 1940, p. 11]. Leafing through 
early accounting journals from the last two decades of the 19th 
century, accounting historians and enthusiasts are able to piece 
together the history of accountancy in the U.S. Yet, precious little 
attention is paid to the editors of these journals who, at times, 
almost single-handedly willed their very existence. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Articles and Books Written by Anson O. Kittredge18 
The Book-Keeper 
Date of 
Publication 
Oct. 26, 1880 
Nov. 9, 1880 
Date of 
Publication 
Nov. 1886 
Dec. 1886 
Aug. 1888 
Sept. 1888 
Oct. 1888 
Nov. 1888 
Nov. 1890 
Date of 
Publication 
Oct. 1891 
Oct. 1892 
Nov. 1892 
J a n . 1893 
Mar. 1893 
Aug. 1893 
Title Brief Annotation 
"Foundry Book-keeping" 
"Foundry Book-keeping" 
Title 
The Office 
"System of Cost Records: FW" 
"System of Cost Records: FW" 
"How Shall Office Be Warmed" 
"How Shall Office Be Warmed" 
"How Shall Office Be Warmed" 
"How Shall Office Be Warmed" 
"Story of English Syndicate" 
Business 
Title 
"Bookkeeping Without Books" 
"Newspaper Accounting"* 
"Newspaper Accounting" 
"Newspaper Accounting" 
"Newspaper Accounting" 
"Business Management" 
Description of system where there is 
no copying or transcribing, and nomi-
nal accounts are grouped together 
Illustration of journal forms to aid in 
the process of posting transactions 
Brief Annotation 
accounting systems for a manufactur-
ing Company; discussion is primarily 
on time tickets for workers 
accounting systems for a 
manufacturing Company; discussion is 
primarily accounting for material and 
labor cost 
ideas to improve working conditions 
in an office 
ideas to improve working conditions 
in an office 
ideas to improve working conditions 
in an office 
ideas to improve working conditions 
in an office 
ideas, formation, and ramifications of 
the English Syndicate, an agency 
which acts as a promoter between 
parties conducting business 
Brief Annotation 
system of bookkeeping using remov-
able indexes instead of books 
introduction to a series of articles deal-
ing with newspaper accounting 
accounting for advance subscription 
payments 
accounting for newspaper subscrip-
tion lists 
viewing advertising contracts 
discussion on importance of executive 
ability and the advantages of a well-
organized office 
18Articles listed with and asterisk (*) are included in American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 1921, p. 968. 
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Nov. 1893 
Jun . 1895 
J u l . 1 8 9 5 
Nov. 1895 
"Trade Papers From Editor's 
Point of View" 
"Columnar Journal" 
"Columnar Journal" * 
"Bookkeeping Adaptations"* 
J u l . 1896 "Business Office as Training School" 
Ju l . 1896 "Is Bookkeeping Progressive" 
Ju l . 1896 "Toledo and Her Chamber of Commerce" 
Aug. 1896 "Business Environments" 
influence of the editor in trade jour-
nals and the growing importance of 
the technical side of the journals 
advantages of the columnar principle 
and separate cash books 
illustration of the columnar principle 
definition, objectives, and differences of 
different types of bookkeeping systems 
inadequacies of real-world training in 
business schools and how office experi-
ence is one of the best trainers 
analysis of accounting as a science 
discussion of Credit-men's Association 
and municipal reform efforts 
discussion of the importance of main-
taining a positive business environment 
Accountics 
Date of 
Publication 
May 1897 
Jun. 1897 
Aug. 1897 
Oct. 1897 
Nov. 1897 
Dec. 1897 
Feb.1898 
Oct. 1898 
Oct. 1898 
Dec. 1898 
Jan.1899 
Feb. 1899 
Mar. 1899 
Apr. 1899 
Jul. 1899 
Apr. 1899 
Nov. 1899 
Dec. 1899 
Feb. 1900 
Feb. 1900 
Mar. 1900 
May 1900 
Jun. 1900 
Apr. 1900 
Title Brief Annotation 
"The Ledger" 
"The Ledger" 
"The Ledger" 
"Branch House Auditing" 
"Branch House Auditing" 
"Balance Sheet Ledger" 
"Improvements in the Boston Ledger" 
"Merchandise Account" 
"Uniform Bookkeeping" 
"Modern Accounting" 
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping" 
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping' 
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping' 
"Some of the Accounting Literature of the 
Netherlands" 
"National Association of Credit Men" 
"National Association of Credit Men" 
"Credit Men's Affairs" 
"Credit Men's Affairs" 
"Application of Advanced Methods" 
"What Credit Men are Doing" 
"Application of Advanced Methods" 
"What Credit Men are Doing" 
"What Credit Men are Doing" 
"Application of Advanced Methods" 
origin and definition of the word ledger 
reasons for much of the change in 
accounting methods 
differences in ledgers in various industries 
auditing system employed at the Pope 
Manufacturing Company 
auditing system employed at the Pope 
Manufacturing Company 
discussion of thickened leaves in the 
balance sheet ledger 
description of a horizontal account ledger 
which allows for carrying balances foward 
advantages of using more than one 
merchandise or trading accounts 
advantages of introducing a system of 
uniform bookkeeping 
Kittredge's beliefs towards business 
schools 
' perpetual balance sheets and income 
statements 
" depreciation accounts, trusts, partner-
ships and capital 
" principle underlying cost account ing-
general factory expenses 
review of Dutch and French accounting 
literature 
Association news 
Association news 
notes on various Credit Men's 
Associations 
notes on various Credit Men's 
Associations 
difference between an accounting sys-
tem and a bookkeeping system 
Association news 
examination of the merchandise 
account and its closing 
Association news 
Association news 
division of expense items into factory 
and commercial expenses 
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May 1900 
Jun. 1900 
Date of 
Publication 
"Application of Advanced Methods" 
"Application of Advanced Methods" 
differences between accounting and 
bookkeeping objectives, and the inter-
pretation of cost accounts 
accounting systems used in cotton 
mills 
Commerce, Accounts and Finance 
Title Brief Annotation 
Jan. 19, 1901 "University Lectures —Theory of 
Mercantile Accounts" 
Jan. 26, 1901 "University Lectures—Theory of 
Mercantile Accounts" 
Apr. 27, 1901 "Cotton Mill Accounting"* 
May 1901 "University Lectures—Theory of 
Mercantile Accounts" 
Jun. 1901 "Credits and Collections" 
Ju l . 1901 "Business Organization and Administration" 
Oct. 1901 "Business Organization and Administration" 
Dec. 1901 "The Balance Sheet"* 
Dec. 1901 "Street Railway Accounting"* 
Mar. 1902 "Ledger Rulings"* 
May 1902 "Business Organization and Administration" 
Aug. 1902 "Reason Why"* 
Sept. 1902 "Utility of Reserve Accounts"* 
Oct. 1902 "Items in Suspense and Reserves" 
Jan. 1903 "The Investigation and Audit of Trust 
Companies" 
definitions of a balance sheet, profit 
and loss statement 
classifications of accounts into the 
balance sheet 
preparation of balance sheet and 
income statement, as well as proper 
classifications of accounts for a cotton 
mill 
problems with the coverage of financial 
statements 
discussion of the Cleveland Convention 
of the National Association of Credit 
Men 
classification of businessmen into 
those who manage and those who 
carry out orders 
philosophical differences between 
bookkeeping and accounting 
discussion on reserve accounts, cash dis-
counts, and standard system for material 
and supplies 
definition and types of ledgers 
discussion on important of a company's 
administration 
explanation for changes made to 
reorganize the accounting system of 
a company 
use of a suspense account for pre-
paid insurance and depreciation 
discussion of reserves on balance 
sheets 
origin and types of trust companies, and 
the importance of its balance sheets 
Articles in Other Periodicals 
Name of Journal 
Accountant 
Street Railroad Journal 
Street Railway Journal 
Street Railway Journal 
Metal Worker 
Date of 
Publication 
Nov. 21, 1896 
Feb. 1896 
Dec. 1898 
Feb. 1898 
1885 
Title 
"Accounting in the States"* 
"Open Questions Before the 
Committee on a Standard System of 
Street Railway Account"* 
"Theory of Reserve and Suspense 
Accounts"* 
"Open Questions before the 
Committee on a Standard System of 
Street Railway Accounting" 
"A System of Cost Records for 
Foundry Work" 
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Books Written by Kittredge on Accounting 
Kittredge, A. O. and Brown, J.F. (1897), The Self-Proving Accounting System (New York and 
Toronto). 
Kittredge, A.O. (circa 1886), A System of Cost Records for Foundry Work (New York: Kittredge 
Co.). 
The following books were listed in Bentley, H.C., Bibliography of 
Works on Accounting by American Authors, Vol. 1: 1796-1900. 
Kittredge, A. O., Balance-Sheet Accounting, New York 
Title deposited, 1897 
Kittredge, A. O., Branch House Auditing, New York 
Title deposted 1897 
Two copies deposited, 1898 
Kittredge, A. O., Credits and Accountancy, New York 
Title deposited, 1897 
Kittredge, A. O., Up-to-date Business Methods and the Balance Sheet 
System of Accounts, New York 
Title deposited, 1897 
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS 
2001 VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD 
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established an annu-
al manuscript award to encourage young academic scholars to pursue 
historical research. An historical manuscript on any aspect of the field of 
accounting, broadly defined, is appropriate for submission. 
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES 
FOR SUBMISSIONS 
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appointment 
and who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven years previous 
to the date of submission, is eligible to be considered for this award. 
Coauthored manuscripts will be considered (if at least one coauthor 
received his /her masters /doctorate wi th in the last seven years). 
Manuscripts must conform to the style requirements of the Accounting 
Historians Journal. Previously published manuscripts or manuscripts 
under review are not eligible for consideration. 
Six copies of each manuscript should be submitted by June 15, 2001 
to the chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee: 
Professor Richard K. Fleischman 
Department of Accountancy 
John Carroll University 
University Heights, OH 44118 
USA 
A cover letter, indicating the author's mailing address, date mas-
ters/doctoral degree awarded, and a statement that the manuscript has 
not been published or is not currently being considered for publication 
should be included in the submission packet 
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD 
The Vangermeersch Award Committee will evaluate submitted 
manuscripts on a blind review basis. The author will receive a $1,000 
(U.S.) stipend and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achievement 
in historical research. In the case of coauthored manuscripts, the junior 
faculty member(s) will receive(share) the cash award and all authors will 
receive a plaque. The winning manuscript will be published in the 
Accounting Historians Journal after an appropriate review. The award 
will be given annually unless the manuscript award committee deter-
mines that no submission has been received that warrants recognition as 
an outstanding manuscript. The award will be presented at the Academy's 
2001 annual business meeting. 
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THE ROLE OF DEPRECIATION AND THE 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT IN TAX POLICY 
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
DURING THE 20TH CENTURY 
Abstract. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the 
investment tax credit and depreciation have been some of the 
most modified provisions. This paper traces the history of 
major changes in depreciation and the investment tax credit 
along with the tax policy justifications given at the time the 
changes were made. In addition, the influence of tax depreci-
ation on financial reporting is also discussed. An historical 
perspective of these two major provisions in tax should be 
helpful to policymakers and researchers attempting to assess 
the effectiveness of these policies. 
INTRODUCTION 
All machinery is on an irresistible march to the 
junk heap, and its progress, while it may be 
delayed, cannot be prevented by repairs. This 
obvious economic fact is of momentous import to 
accounting, although full recognition has not 
been given to it in general practice... It implies 
that, in valuing all fixed assets, account must be 
taken of the lapse of time, and even in the case of 
machinery giving no evidence either of use or mis-
use, the bare fact that it is a year nearer its 
inevitable goal is an item of which technical 
account must be taken [Hatfield, 1927, p. 130]. 
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A depreciation deduction has been a part of modern U.S. 
income tax since its inception. It is at the nexus of several tax pol-
icy objectives that at times compete against and at other times 
complement one another. Since its debut with the corporate 
excise tax in 1909, the law regarding depreciation has been 
amended at least once in every decade. The tax policy motiva-
tions for these changes are attributed to any of the following: 
proper income measurement, raising revenue, encouraging capi-
tal formation, or ensuring a neutral tax system. Since so many tax 
policy goals can be ostensibly served by the deduction, it is not 
surprising that the law has changed so many times during the 
20th century. 
An historical perspective on the role of depreciation would 
not be complete without including a discussion of a related provi-
sion, the investment tax credit (ITC). The primary purpose of ITC 
is to spur capital formation. When capital formation is an impor-
tant tax policy goal, there are often changes to depreciation, ITC, 
or both. The potential for depreciation and ITC to alter capital for-
mation has drawn the attention of a wide variety of academicians. 
Despite years of study, the results from empirical research are far 
from conclusive.1 Notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evi-
dence about their effectiveness, tax policymakers have used 
depreciation and ITC as a means to alter investment spending. 
The purpose of this paper is to document the changes in depreci-
ation and ITC, the tax policy motivations behind these changes, 
and the context for the changes that have occurred since the mod-
ern U.S. income tax began. By understanding the context for past 
legislation, both researchers and policymakers can better under-
stand past, current, and potential changes. 
The history of the role of depreciation in the income tax can 
be defined into five time periods: 1909-1953, 1954-1961, 1962-
1980, 1981-1985, and 1986 to the present. The legislation of 1954, 
1962, 1981, and 1986 represented major shifts with regard to tax 
policy and its relationship to depreciation or ITC. The discussion 
below documents the changes and the tax policy motivations for 
each change that occurred during each time period. In addition, 
economic and other relevant factors are also addressed. 
1See Chirinko [1986, 1993] for critical analyses of empirical research related 
to investment spending. 
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THE EARLY YEARS: 1909-1953 
An allowance for depreciation has been included as a deduc-
tion for determining taxable income since the inception of mod-
ern corporate and individual income taxes.2 The corporate excise 
tax enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1909 permitted "a reason-
able allowance for depreciation of property, if any." The Revenue 
Act of 1913 permitted "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, 
wear and tear of property arising out of its use in a business." The 
early rationale for the depreciation deduction is contained in the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue's Regulation 74, Article 202 in which 
it posited that the necessity for a depreciation deduction arises 
from the fact that certain business property is subject to exhaus-
tion. Depreciation's role was primarily that of income determina-
tion. With its inclusion of depreciation in the income tax base, 
the government was actually taking a bold step that differed from 
much of financial reporting practice of the day.3 In commenting 
about financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th 
century, Hatfield [1927, p. 140] offered the following summary: 
Present practice unfortunately does not always 
correspond to current principle. Corporations 
are still apt to look upon the charge for deprecia-
tion as being an act of grace rather than of neces-
sity, and the allowance is frequently less in the lean 
than in the prosperous years. But the improve-
ment since . . . 1908 has been very marked. At that 
time any recognition of depreciation was relative-
ly uncommon in the accounts of American corpo-
rations, and the relatively few companies that 
showed depreciation in prosperous years grew 
2The U.S. first enacted an income tax in 1861 to fund the Civil War. This tax 
did not m e n t i o n deprec ia t ion . Deprec ia t ion was specifically exc luded as a 
deduction for the 1894 income tax which was ruled unconstitutional. Thus, a 
depreciation deduction was not provided for in the calculation of taxable income 
prior to 1909. The corporation excise tax enacted in 1909 was a tax on corporate 
income. The inception of the modern-day individual income tax began with the 
ratification of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on February 25, 1913, 
and the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913 on March 1, 1913. 
3Grant and Norton [1949, p. 249] noted that, "it is significant that the first 
recognition of annual expense of depreciation for tax purposes occurred in the 
same year in which depreciation was first recognized by the Supreme Court 
[Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U.S. 1 (1909)] as an element in the 
regulation of public utility rates." 
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faint-hearted when business was poor. But an 
examination of the balance sheets during the try-
ing period after the Great War shows that many of 
them made charges for depreciation even though 
that resulted in a net deficit. This closer adher-
ence to correct accounting principles was doubt-
less stimulated by the provisions of the income-tax 
law. 
Saliers [ 1923] offered a similar summary, noting that firms refused 
to allow for depreciation expense early in the 20th century. In his 
view, corporations in 1922 were still varying their depreciation 
deductions with their earnings. By 1932, Paton [1932, p. 578] 
noted: 
Depreciation accounting has by no means attained 
an ideal state, but there is now almost universal 
agreement as to the general significance of depre-
ciation and the importance of recognizing the 
phenomenon in some appropriate manner. The 
cost of plant assets which have a limited useful life 
must evidently be taken into consideration, in 
some other way if not in the form of systematic 
accruals, if costs of production are to be accurate-
ly calculated, periodic income determined on a 
sound basis, and the integrity of investment main-
tained. The income tax regulations have no doubt 
been more potent in bringing about this condition 
than the admonitions of accountants or the argu-
ments of academicians. 
Thus, it appears that early efforts to define taxable income by 
including depreciation had an impact on financial reporting prac-
tice in the early part of the 20th century. Apparently, however, 
financial managers exercised a considerable degree of discretion 
with regard to the amount of depreciation, if any, that was 
expensed on their income statements for financial reporting. For 
the first third of the 20th century, they also had a great degree of 
latitude with regard to how much depreciation they deducted for 
income tax purposes. 
In 1920, the Treasury first issued Bulletin F, leaving the deter-
mination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer based on 
his judgment and experience, with final approval by the 
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Commissioner. Thus, taxpayers had a considerable degree of free-
dom in determining their depreciation deductions. During the 
1924-1931 time period, depreciation allowances increased sub-
stantially. 
By 1931, claimed depreciation deductions exceeded corporate 
taxable income [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1934]. In 1931, the Treasury issued a revised Bulletin F. It 
attached a preliminary study that gave "probable useful lives" for 
over 2,700 different kinds of industrial assets. Determining a 
depreciation deduction remained at the taxpayer's discretion, 
however. The deduction would not be disallowed unless the gov-
ernment could demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence" 
that the deduction was "unreasonable." By 1934, the House Ways 
and Means Committee considered substantial across-the-board 25 
percent reductions in depreciation allowances for the 1934 to 
1936 time period. It estimated that the government would receive 
an additional $85 million in tax revenue per year from the recom-
mended changes. 
The Treasury Department, however, opposed an arbitrary 
reduction. It believed that the matter could best be resolved by 
administrative rather than legislative action. Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau proposed that the Treasury require taxpayers to fur-
nish supporting schedules, require depreciation to be limited to 
an asset's useful life, and switch the burden of proof for a reason-
able deduction to the taxpayer. Rather than mandating deprecia-
tion deductions through legislation, the choice was made to han-
dle it administratively through guidelines drafted by the Treasury. 
In 1934, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision 
4422, 1934 CB 58 (TD 4422). TD 4422 outlined the Treasury's 
change in policy as Secretary Morgenthau had proposed. TD 4422 
required taxpayers to furnish a schedule showing their calculation 
of depreciat ion expense to substantiate their deduct ions . 
Taxpayers were allowed to allocate the cost of an asset over its use-
ful life using the straight-line or units-of-production method. 
Until 1934, the burden of proof fell on the Internal Revenue exam-
iner to demonstrate that a taxpayer had misstated income by 
improperly calculating his depreciation expense by clear and con-
vincing evidence. This policy was changed in 1934, shifting the 
burden of proof from the government to the taxpayer. 
In 1942, the Treasury Department issued a second revision of 
Bulletin F. Bulletin F recommended useful lives for over 5,000 
assets. The Treasury's estimates of useful lives, however, were 
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based on surveys conducted during the Great Depression of the 
1930s when businesses tended to replace their obsolete assets less 
frequently. Thus, the useful life estimates listed in Bulletin F's revi-
sion were generally longer than an asset's actual useful life and 
longer than in the 1931 version of Bulletin F. This disparity result-
ed in tax depreciation deductions being less than what was con-
sidered economic depreciation. This policy continued until 1954. 
During this time a taxpayer could also use the "facts and cir-
cumstances" method, whereby assets were assigned useful lives 
based on the taxpayer or industry's general experience. However, 
if the taxpayer chose to define an asset's depreciable life using 
Bulletin F rather than the "facts and circumstances" method, he 
avoided controversy in an audit. Thus, many assets were depreci-
ated using either the straight-line or units-of-production method 
over the assets' useful lives as defined in Bulletin F. It was not until 
1954 that the tax laws were revised to bring tax depreciation 
more in line with what was considered economic depreciation. 
A SHIFT IN TAX POLICY PERSPECTIVE: 1954-1961 
Until 1954, Congress viewed depreciation solely as a deduc-
tion necessary for proper income determination. The deduction 
was an allowance which reflected the "exhaustion, wear and tear 
of property used in a trade or business" [IRC §167(a)]. The 
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however, 
marked a major shift in depreciation's role in tax policy. For the 
first time Congress considered using tax depreciation as an eco-
nomic incentive for stimulating investment. It also marked the 
first time Congress, rather than the Treasury, decided the allow-
able means for calculating the deduction. 
The tax law change in 1954 allowed businesses to use any 
method of depreciation as long as it was both consistently applied 
and did not exceed twice the straight-line rate of depreciation. 
Congress believed that the pre-1954 depreciation system acted as 
a barrier to investment. It also believed that the pre-1954 "tax 
depreciation methods might depress business capital expendi-
tures below the level needed to keep the economy operating at 
high levels of output and employment" [U.S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 22]. Thus, the 1954 tax 
changes were designed to provide incentives for investment. 
At the same time, however, Congress was also concerned 
about the effect these changes would have on income determina-
tion. The new methods of depreciation would: 
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...concentrate deductions in the early years of ser-
vice and [would result] in a timing of allowances 
more in accord with the actual pattern of loss of 
economic usefulness. With the rate limited to 
twice the corresponding straight-line rate and 
based on a realistic estimate of useful life, the pro-
posed system [would conform] to sound account-
ing principles [U.S. Congress, House, Committee 
on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 23]. 
Thus, Congress wanted to stimulate investment while remaining 
within economic and accounting principles. With the 1954 law, 
Congress sanctioned the use of the double-declining balance 
method. This was the first time Congress opted to decide what 
depreciation methods should be allowed. Up until this time, 
depreciation was handled administratively through the Treasury 
Department. 
In 1958, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 intro-
duced first-year depreciation for the first time. This allowed small 
businesses to deduct up to 20% of the cost of tangible personal 
property.4 The purpose of this provision was to assist small busi-
ness by increasing the amount of funds available to them via a 
reduction in tax liability [Congressional Record, 1958, pp. 17,085, 
17,090]. A variation of this election, known as the immediate 
expense election, remains today5 
THE 1960s AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
Investment Tax Credit Enacted (1962): The Revenue Act of 1962 
(RA62) represents a landmark in terms of tax incentives for invest-
ment. ITC was first introduced in RA62.6 President Kennedy 
advocated enacting the credit to stimulate capital formation. He 
believed higher levels of capital formation would raise productiv-
ity, keep people employed, and alleviate a serious balance of pay-
4 T h e maximum eligible cost was $10,000 for unmarried taxpayers ($20,000 
for married taxpayers) for a maximum deduction of $2,000 and $4,000 respec-
tively. 
5 T h e deduction is no longer a percentage of allowable cost, but is an election 
to deduct the full cost of property up to $20,000 in the year 2000 (increasing to 
$25,000 for the years 2003 and thereafter). 
6A credit, as opposed to a deduction, is a dollar for dollar reduction of a tax-
payer's tax liability. The first ITC was 7% of the cost of personalty in the year of 
acquisition. 160
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ments problem [U.S. Congress, House, 1961, p. 3]. Congress 
echoed his sentiments by stating that the objective of the credit 
was "to encourage modernization and expansion of the Nation's 
productive facilities and thereby improve the economic potential 
of the country, with resultant increase in job opportunities and 
betterment of our competitive position in the world economy" 
[U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11]. 
Stimulating investment was to be accomplished through two 
major tax revisions. These were the Treasury's revision of depre-
ciation guidelines and ITC. Congress believed that realistic depre-
ciation rules did not provide sufficient incentive to spur econom-
ic growth. An additional incentive in the form of an ITC would 
stimulate investment in two ways. First, it would reduce the net 
cost of acquiring depreciable assets. Second, it would increase the 
cash flow available for investment7 [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11]. 
Congress also considered the possibility of using more accel-
erated methods of depreciation in lieu of a credit. This idea was 
discarded, however. Congress believed the credit was "preferable 
to higher depreciation charges because the latter tends to distort 
income accounting" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1962, p. 12]. It seems clear that Congress did not wish to 
deviate materially from accounting and economic concepts of 
income in order to stimulate investment. 
ITC Suspension (1966-1967): In 1966, the U.S. faced problems 
with inflation. Therefore, President Johnson initiated a compre-
hensive plan which called for reducing government expenditures 
for low-priority programs and temporarily suspending tax incen-
tives for investment [U.S. Congress, House, 1966, pp. 4-7]. 
Congress noted that the bill was: 
...part of an overall program designed to moderate 
the pace of the economy to a level more compati-
ble with the rate of increase in our physical capac-
ity to produce, to begin the return to price stabili-
ty and to relieve distortions among various sectors 
of the economy which arise from widely different 
7The reasoning behind this argument is that a firm would have a pool of avail-
able funds for investment. The 7% credit for new investment would augment this 
pool so that more investment could be made. 
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rates of growth. By removing certain tax incen-
tives for investment in machinery, equipment and 
buildings, the bill will ease inflationary pressures 
in those sectors where demands for output are 
straining present productive capacity The action 
also will have the effect of reducing pressures 
tending to raise interest rates and will promote an 
increased flow of credit into the home mortgage 
market. Moreover, the bill can be expected to pro-
duce a short-run improvement in the Nation's bal-
ance-of-payments position as demand for output is 
brought into balance with the existing capacity to 
p roduce the output [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1966, p. 4]. 
Thus, ITC and accelerated depreciation on real property were 
temporarily suspended from October 10, 1966 to December 31, 
1967. 
The suspension ended up being short-lived. On June 13, 1967, 
President Johnson signed H.R. 6950 [P.L. 90-26], lifting the sus-
pension effective March 10, 1967. At the time ITC was reinstated, 
interest rates were dropping and housing starts were up. It 
appeared as if the economy was rebounding and the suspension 
no longer necessary 
ITC Abolished (1969-1971): In 1969, problems with inflation 
reappeared. Once again, Congress believed that ITC directly con-
tributed to inflationary pressures and wide fluctuations in invest-
ment. Eliminating the credit would help reduce inflation and help 
keep the rate of change in investment on a more steady path [U.S. 
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 178]. 
Although Congress considered suspending the credit as it had 
done a few years earlier, the idea was rejected on two grounds. 
First and foremost, Congress believed that during the prior sus-
pension period (1966-1967), businesses had simply postponed 
their acquisitions until after the suspension was lifted. In the 
view of Congress, it was "undesirable to repeat that experience" 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 
179]. Second, suspension and subsequent restoration of the cred-
it were administratively difficult. 
Therefore, Congress voted to repeal ITC. At the time the cred-
it was repealed, Congress had no plans for bringing it back any 
time in the future. In fact, it believed that: 162
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...It [might] well be that the normal incentives of 
potentially greater profits in the context of a sta-
ble growth, full employment economy will pro-
vide the investment needed without resorting to 
special devices to stimulate investment which, on 
occasion, appear to give rise to investment booms 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1969, p. 180]. 
DEPRECIATION FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO 
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971 
Revenue Procedure 62-21: Although the depreciation rules did 
not change as frequently during the 1960s as those associated 
with ITC, depreciation did not escape controversy. In 1962, the 
next major change with regard to depreciation occurred. That 
year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure 
62-21, 1962-2 CB 418 (Revenue Procedure 62-21). Bulletin F had 
defined useful lives on an asset-by-asset basis. Revenue Procedure 
62-21 took a different approach by grouping assets by industry of 
use. The guideline lives were based on statistical data and assess-
ment of technological t rends for each industry in the U.S. 
[Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 463]. The new guideline lives 
placed a greater emphasis on the economic life of an asset rather 
than its physical life [Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 464]. As a 
result, write-off periods for assets could be reduced 30 to 40%. A 
taxpayer could only use the new guideline lives, however, if they 
were consistent with the actual retirements and replacement 
practices of his business. This could be demonstrated by a reserve 
ratio test.8 
The reserve ratio test was used to form ranges of depreciable 
lives based on a taxpayer's actual usage. Taxpayers could only con-
t inue to use the generous guideline lives unde r Revenue 
Procedure 62-21 if they conformed to actual service lives as deter-
mined by the reserve ratio test. This test effectively obligated tax-
payers to retire property within the guideline life periods in order 
to continue to use guideline lives. 
Although the IRS initially expected that the guideline lives 
8The reserve ratio was calculated by dividing accumulated depreciation by the 
gross (undepreciated) basis of an asset within a class. This ratio was then used to 
form a range for depreciable lives no greater than 20% or no less than 10% of a 
benchmark life based on actual usage of the firm's assets. 163
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under Revenue Procedure 62-21 [p. 464] would alleviate contro-
versy, implementation of the reserve ratio test proved controver-
sial. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 CB 503 (Announcement 71-76) 
criticized the reserve ratio test on the basis that one could not 
determine if guideline lives had been violated until an asset was 
disposed [Announcement 71-76, pp. 503, 511]. In addition, a sur-
vey indicated that 87% of IRS agents found the test unworkable 
and impractical [Announcement 71-76, p. 512]. The reserve ratio 
test was abandoned with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 
1971. 
Along with the controversy surrounding the IRS's implemen-
tation of Revenue Procedure 62-21 during the 1960s, Congress 
also made a few innovations to tax law associated with deprecia-
tion. With the Revenue Act of 1962, Section 1245 depreciation 
recapture was introduced for the first time. This provision con-
verts the character of a gain from the sale of personalty that is 
attributable to prior depreciation into ordinary income. Congress 
wished to prevent using depreciation to convert ordinary income 
into capital gains [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
1962]. The Revenue Act of 1964 extended depreciation recapture 
to buildings with Section 1250 recapture, subsequently made 
more stringent with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
The Revenue Act of 1971: In the early 1970s, the U.S. faced high 
unemployment, inflation, and little growth in GNP and invest-
ment. The business tax incentives that were enacted in 1971 were 
designed to be "large enough to stimulate the economy and yet 
not so large that they [would] create a new wave of inflationary 
pressure" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1971, p. 
7]. The major business tax incentives were a revision of the 
depreciation rules and a reinstatement of ITC. 
The Revenue Act of 1971 introduced the Class Life Asset 
Depreciation Range System (ADR). ADR provided new guidelines 
for defining an asset's useful life. These guidelines effectively 
replaced the Revenue Procedure 62-21 guidelines that had been 
used until that time. Like Revenue Procedure 62-21, an asset's use-
ful life was defined by its industry of use rather than by type of 
asset.9 The number of asset classes, however, was increased from 
75 to 132. 
9The Treasury Department was given authority to prescribe depreciable lives 
based on anticipated industry norms [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways 
and Means, 1971]. 164
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ADR provided an additional feature not present in Revenue 
Procedure 62-21. Taxpayers were able to select an asset's useful 
life from a range of lives. The range was 20% less than to 20% 
greater than those provided by Revenue Procedure 62-21. The 
Revenue Act of 1971 still allowed taxpayers to define useful lives 
using the "facts and circumstances" method. Congress expected, 
however, that the ranges of lives provided by ADR would make 
administering the depreciation rules simpler. They believed that 
ADR would reduce the number of disputes which were likely to 
arise because of the particular facts and circumstances of the tax-
payer's situation [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
1971, p. 48]. 
ITC also reappeared under the guise of a jobs development 
investment credit.10 The credit was reinstated for several reasons. 
First, the credit was expected to improve the economy by creating 
additional jobs through increased expenditures in machinery and 
equipment. Second, Congress expected the credit to reduce 
inflation this time because "an increased flow of goods into the 
market is the best long run assurance we can have of keeping 
prices down." Third, new investment in productive facilities 
would help make them more efficient. Therefore, the U.S. would 
be more competitive in foreign markets and the balance of pay-
ments would be improved [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 
Ways and Means, 1971, pp. 5-6]. 
TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 
In 1975, the U.S. faced its highest levels of unemployment 
since 1941. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was designed to 
restore economic growth and to move toward full employment. A 
key component of the Act was a temporary increase in ITC. 
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased ITC from 7% to 10% 
for qualified property acquired before January 1, 1977. Congress 
expected the tax revisions "would help revive the economy and 
increase employment without adding significantly to inflationary 
pressures." Once again, Congress believed that the increase in the 
tax credit would create more jobs, increase productivity, reduce 
inflation, and improve the U.S. balance of payments [U.S. 
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1975, pp. 7-11]. 
10The form of the "jobs development investment credit" was similar to ITC that 
was abolished in 1969. It allowed a credit of 7% of the cost of personalty in the year 
of acquisition. 165
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The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended the "temporary" 
increase in ITC until December 31, 1980. The Revenue Act of 1978 
made the "temporary" increase permanent, effective January 1, 
1981. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE 
ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM (ACRS): 1981-1985 
ACRS: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) represents 
a major turning point in the evolution of depreciation and tax pol-
icy with the first appearance of the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS). Until ERTA, Congress was concerned that tax 
depreciation rules conformed to sound accounting and economic 
principles. Under ERTA, this function of the depreciation deduc-
tion no longer seemed important. In fact, ACRS was so different 
from what accountants and economists typically referred to as 
depreciation that the deductions were called "cost recovery" 
instead of depreciation. With ERTA, simplifying tax rules and 
encouraging investment seemed far more important than con-
forming to accounting practice for financial repor t ing. 
Under ACRS, personalty was categorized into one of four 
"recovery classes." Assets were grouped according to the number 
of years over which their original cost was recovered. Of the four 
personalty recovery classes, only the three-year and five-year class-
es were frequently used. The ten-year and fifteen-year classes 
were reserved for a relatively few specialized assets. Under ERTA, 
all depreciable realty had a 15-year recovery period. 
There were several reasons for enacting ACRS. First, Congress 
concluded that prior depreciation and ITC provisions required 
revisions because they did not provide the investment stimulus 
that was considered essential for economic expansion. Second, 
Congress believed that the prior law was unnecessarily compli-
cated. Third, the real value of depreciation deductions had 
declined because of inflation. It was hoped that ACRS would 
compensate for this problem by giving assets shorter lives [Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, p. 73]. A fourth reason 
mentioned in several hearings was to help the U.S.'s balance of 
payments problem by increasing the nation's competitiveness in 
international trade via increased productivity from investment in 
more modern equipment. In addition to major revisions in depre-
ciation, ERTA modified ITC making it more compatible with 
ACRS. 
166
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
158 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
Post-ERTA Modifications: 1982 to 1985: During the four years fol-
lowing ERTA, a series of three different pieces of legislation grad-
ually rolled back some of ERTA's generosity. First, the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) required either a 
reduction in depreciable basis or a reduced ITC.11 In addition, 
when ERTA was originally enacted, more accelerated cost recov-
ery schedules were planned to begin in 1985 and 1986.12 TEFRA 
repealed the planned accelerations in depreciation deductions. 
Second, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 lengthened the recov-
ery period for realty from 15 to 18 years. In addition, special limi-
tations for passenger cars were enacted.13 Finally, the Imputed 
Interest Act of 1985 further lengthened the realty recovery period 
from 18 to 19 years. 
All three pieces of legislation were enacted during a time 
when cutting federal budget deficits was a primary concern [U.S. 
Congress, House, 1982; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1985]. The modifications in TEFRA were based on a con-
cern that the combined effect of ITC and the accelerated depreci-
ation in ACRS had been too generous [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1982, p. 126]. In 1984, Congress was con-
cerned that real-estate depreciation had led to excessive tax shel-
11TEFRA required a taxpayer to reduce the depreciable basis of property by 
one-half of ITC taken. Taxpayers could elect to depreciate the full depreciable 
basis of property if they reduced ITC taken. Under this election, property eligible 
for the 10% ITC only received an 8% credit. Property eligible for a 6% ITC received 
a 4% credit. 
l2The ACRS schedules, as enacted in 1981, were developed to approximate 
150% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a switch to straight-
line for later recovery years. Under ERTA, the schedules were to change in 1985 to 
approximate 175% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a 
switch to sum-of-the-years' digits for later years. In 1986, the schedules were to 
change once more reflecting the use of 200% declining balance with a switch to 
sum-of-the-years' digits. 
1 3 T h e Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 limited ACRS deductions to $4,000 for the 
first year and $6,000 each year thereafter for passenger automobiles. In addition, 
ITC was limited to $1,000 ($667 if the taxpayer elected to reduce ITC to be able to 
depreciate the full cost of the asset rather than reducing the depreciable basis by 
one-half of ITC). Congress believed that ITC and ACRS should be used to stimulate 
capital formation rather than to subsidize what it perceived to be "the element of 
personal consumption associated with the use of very expensive automobiles'' 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. In addition, 
there was a perception that taxpayers tended to overstate the proport ion of busi-
ness use of automobiles. It was Congress' belief that the ACRS and ITC limits 
would assist with compliance in this regard [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 
Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. 167
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ters to the detriment of more productive investments [U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1984]. When ERTA was 
enacted in 1981, the role of depreciation in income measurement 
was not a concern. By 1985, this concern had resurfaced when the 
Senate Finance Committee felt that "the useful life of most real 
property exceeds 18 years and that an increase in the cost recov-
ery period for real property would more correctly measure the 
income from real property" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1985, p. 15]. 
1986 TO PRESENT 
Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is 
the final major shift in depreciation and tax policy. TRA86 
repealed ITC and made additional modifications to ACRS, result-
ing in MACRS. Cultivating investment as a policy goal was not 
abandoned, but the means of doing so were considerably 
changed. 
TRA86 was enacted to increase the fairness, efficiency, and 
simplicity of the tax system [Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986, p. 6]. Congress wished to reduce the role taxes 
play in investment and consumption decisions. Rather than tar-
geting specific forms of investment, Congress believed that the 
"surest way of encouraging the efficient allocation of all resources 
and the greatest possible economic growth was by reducing statu-
tory tax rates" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1986, p. 
98]. 
TRA86 repealed ITC. As opposed to the 1969 repeal, the cur-
rent repeal has been far more long-lived as ITC has not reap-
peared. See Table 1 for a summary of ITC changes. Congress 
believed that ITC "discriminated against long-lived investment and 
was used as a tax shelter device" [Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986, p. 10]. Instead of targeting investment for a 
defined set of assets, capital formation incentives under TRA86 
were provided by lower tax rates and accelerated depreciation. 
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TABLE 1 
Changes in the Investment Tax Credit and Rationale for Change 
Legislation 
Revenue Act of 1962 
H.R. 17607 [Public Law 89-800] 
H.R. 6950 [Public Law 90-26] 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 
Revenue Act of 1971 
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 
Revenue Act of 1978 
Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Change 
Investment tax credit enacted 
Investment tax credit suspended 
effective 10/10/66 to 12/31/67 
Investment tax credit 
suspension lifted effective 
3/10/67 
Investment tax credit repealed 
Investment tax credit reinstated 
Temporary increase in the 
investment tax credit from 
7% to 10% 
Temporary increase extended 
to 12/31/80 
Temporary increase made 
permanent effective 1/1/81 
Reduction in depreciable basis 
or reduced credit 
Investment tax credit repealed 
Congressional Rationale 
Stimulate capital formation 
Ease inflation and relieve 
distortions across sectors in 
the economy 
Economic pressure appeared 
to have lifted 
Ease inflationary pressures 
Creating jobs 
Revive economy and 
increase employment 
Stimulating investment 
Stimulating investment 
Combined effect of ACRS and 
investment tax credit was 
perceived to be too generous 
Enhance neutrality of tax system by 
repealing a provision that discriminat-
ed against investment in longer-lived 
assets 
In addition to repealing ITC, Congress modified ACRS. MACRS 
was designed to "provide for more neutral depreciation treatment 
across diverse assets" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
1986, p. 10]. Congress once again returned to the notion that 
recovery periods should more closely reflect the actual useful 
lives of assets. 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993: The Revenue Reconciliation 
Act of 1993 was enacted during a time when reducing budget 
deficits was a primary goal. In it, Congress lengthened the non-
residential realty recovery period from 31.5 to 39 years. With this 
legislation, Congress turned full circle toward having depreciation 
reflect "proper" income measurement with regard to depreciable 
real property. It felt that depreciation deductions had been larger 
than the actual decline in the value of property. In order to 
measure more accurately the economic income derived from 
using nonresidential realty, the recovery period was increased to 
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39 years [U.S. Congress, House, Budget Committee, 1993, pp. 625-
626]. With this change the recovery period for buildings returned 
to an amount close to what it was prior to ERTA. With the use of 
component depreciation14 and the facts and circumstances meth-
ods of depreciation, depreciable lives for buildings was effective-
ly 36 to 37 years [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, 
p. 20]. The changes in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 are 
the most recent changes in depreciation. See Table 2 for a sum-
mary of depreciation changes over time. 
TABLE 2 
Changes in Depreciation and Rationale for Changes 
Legislation or Administrative Change Congressional Rationale 
Action 
Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909 
Revenue Act of 1913 
Bulletin F first issued (1920) 
Bulletin F first revised (1931) 
TD 4422 (1934) 
Bulletin F 2nd revision (1942) 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
Small Business Tax Revision Act 
of 1958 
Revenue Procedure 62-21 
Revenue Act of 1962 
Depreciation first appeared 
Depreciation appeared as part of 
the first income tax under the 
16th Amendment 
Determination of depreciation 
expense remained taxpayer 
determined 
Determination of depreciation 
expense remained taxpayer 
determined but an attachment 
provided examples of useful lives 
for over 2,700 different assets 
Required taxpayers to furnish a 
schedule supporting their 
depreciation deduction; limited 
depreciation to an asset's useful life; 
shifted the burden of proof to the 
taxpayer to demonstrate that 
depreciation was properly 
determined 
Treasury Department recommended 
useful lives for over 5,000 assets 
based on studies conducted during 
the Depression 
Congress allowed businesses to use 
any depreciation method as long as 
it did not exceed twice the straight-
line rate 
Immediate expense election 
first introduced 
Provided guideline lives based on 
an industry-by-industry basis rather 
than an asset-by-asset basis 
Section 1245 recapture introduced 
for the first time 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
Stimulate investment while 
remaining within accepted 
economic and accounting 
principles 
Assistance to small businesses 
(Administrative action) 
Raising revenue (recapture 
provisions designed conversion of 
ordinary income to capital gains) 
"Component depreciation allowed a taxpayer to depreciate the parts of a 
building over differing useful lives rather than depreciating the entire over a uni-
form life. 
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TABLE 2 (cont.) 
Legislation or Administrative Change Congressional Rationale 
Action 
Revenue Act of 1964 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 
Revenue Act of 1971 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
Imputed Interest Act of 1985 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 
Recapture (Section 1250) extended 
to buildings 
Section 1250 recapture tightened 
Class Life Asset Depreciation Range 
System introduced (ADR) 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) introduced 
Depreciable basis reduced if 
full investment tax credit taken 
Real property lives extended from 
15 to 18 years 
Real property lives extended from 
18 to 19 years 
Modified ACRS introduced 
extending recovery periods for 
personalty and realty (residential 
realty lives extended to 27.5 years 
and nonresidential extended 
to 31.5 years) 
Extended recovery period for 
nonresidential realty to 39 years 
Raising revenue (recapture provisions 
designed conversion of ordinary 
income to capital gains) 
Revenue raising 
Encourage investment 
Investment stimulus, simplifying 
law, and compensating for inflation 
effects 
Perception that 1981 provisions 
were too generous 
Deficit reduction 
Deficit reduction and bringing useful 
lives for realty closer to actual useful 
lives 
Enhance neutrality in tax system 
Better measurement of economic-
income 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the 90 years since the inception of the modern income tax, 
tax policy and depreciation have come nearly full circle. Until 
1954, depreciation's role was primarily one of proper income 
determination. In 1954, Congress first entertained the notion that 
depreciation could be used to further other tax policy goals, 
specifically encouraging capital formation. From 1954 to 1981, 
income measurement and economic motivations were the prima-
ry tax policy considerations. The investment credit, initially 
enacted in 1962, was turned off and on during this period, justi-
fied entirely on economic grounds. ERTA's enactment in 1981 
marked a major turning point in depreciation policy. For the first 
time, the role of depreciation in income determination was 
ignored. Encouraging investment and simplifying the tax rules 
were the primary motivations behind the law. Soon after ERTAs 
enactment, revenue-raising concerns became important and 
Congress began to lengthen depreciable lives over a series of leg-
islative acts. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 abandoned the notion of 
targeting investment in certain types of assets. The neutrality of 
the tax system became important. ITC was repealed, and ACRS 
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was modified based on neutrality considerations. By the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress had come full circle with the 
desire to have better income measurement. Encouraging certain 
forms of investment was no longer paramount. 
Despite Congressional use of depreciation and ITC to further 
economic goals, the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of 
these tax policy tools is quite mixed. There is no consensus about 
the effectiveness of these measures. Since depreciation is based 
on when an asset is placed in service, taxpayers are left with a 
hodgepodge of regulations as a complex legacy of Congressional 
policymaking. For the time being, the current rules for new acqui-
sitions are relatively simple and have returned to useful lives that 
are closer to what they were before ERTA's enactment. History 
indicates, however, that as economic pressures change, deprecia-
tion and ITC are particularly vulnerable to modifications. Each 
change adds another layer of complexity for taxpayers. The 
impact of taxes on investment has been, and is, clearly an impor-
tant issue that warrants further study to assist policymakers in 
shaping the law. 
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BIBLICAL BASIS OF FORTY-YEAR 
GOODWILL AMORTIZATION 
Abstract: Current U.S. GAAP mandates amortizing goodwill 
over no more than 40 years. Although many commentators sug-
gest that 40 years is an arbitrary time span, there is a Biblical 
basis for 40-year amortization. The Bible refers to 40 years as 
the life of a generation. Since amortizing goodwill over no 
more than 40 years corresponds to amortizing it over no more 
than one generation of talented employees or customers, the 
process is not completely arbitrary 
Goodwill is an asset because it represents future economic 
benefits, often attr ibutable to a talented work force or a 
favorable customer following. Under current GAAP, Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No. 17, "Intangible Assets" (APB 17), 
goodwill acquired after October 31, 1970 must be amortized over 
a period not to exceed 40 years.1 
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Both the APB and subsequent commentators have suggested 
that the 40-year goodwill maximum amortization period is a com-
pletely arbitrary time span. There is a Biblical basis, however, for 
this amortization period. The Bible suggests that the life of a gen-
eration does not exceed 40 years. To the extent that goodwill is 
attributable to a talented work force or a favorable customer fol-
lowing, amortizing goodwill over no more than 40 years corre-
sponds to amortizing it over no more than one generation of tal-
ented employees or customers. Accordingly, this 40-year period is 
not a completely arbitrary time span. 
NATURE, RECOGNITION, MEASUREMENT, 
AND AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL 
In accounting for goodwill, it is useful to distinguish among 
its nature, recognition, measurement, and subsequent amortiza-
tion.2 
Nature of Goodwill: FASB Concepts Statement No. 6 [1985, para. 
25] defined an asset as probable future economic benefits 
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of a past 
transaction or event. Three essential characteristics of an asset 
were noted [FASB, 1985, para. 26]: 
(a) It embodies a probable future benefit that involves 
a capacity, singly or in combination with other 
assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to future 
net cash inflows. 
(b) A particular entity can obtain the benefit and con-
trol others' access to it. 
2Unfortunately, many commentators have defined goodwill without distin-
guishing among its nature, recognition, and measurement. For example, Cooper 
and Ijiri [1983, p. 238] defined goodwill as: 
1. The current value of expected future income in excess of a normal 
return on the investment in net tangible assets; not a recorded or reported amount 
unless paid for. 
2. The excess of the price paid for a business as a whole over its book 
value, or over the computed or agreed value of all tangible [and identifiable intan-
gible] net assets purchased. 
The first definition defines goodwill in terms of its measurement (i.e., its cur-
rent value) and then summarizes the recognition rule that goodwill is not record-
ed or reported unless paid for. The second definition also defines goodwill in 
terms of its measurement as an excess. 
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(c) The transaction or other event giving rise to the 
entity's right to or control of the benefit has 
already occurred.3 
In its 1999 Exposure Draft, "Business Combinations and 
Intangible Assets," the FASB [1999, paras. 180-185, 190] concluded 
that goodwill meets the asset definition in SFAC No. 6: 
(a) Goodwill is an asset because it embodies future 
economic benefits. 
(b) The economic benefits are nebulous but are 
reflected by the premium an enterprise com-
mands over the sum of the fair value of its compo-
nent parts. 
(c) Control over the benefits is provided by the 
acquiring enterprise's ability to direct the policies 
and management of the acquired enterprise. 
(d) The past transaction or event is the transaction in 
which the controlling interest was obtained by the 
acquiring enterprise. 
Recognition of Goodwill: Under GAAP, goodwill is recognized 
when it is purchased. Purchase usually occurs when there is a sig-
nificant change in ownership. A change in ownership results in a 
new accounting entity, which in turn necessitates a new basis for 
net assets purchased, including the recognition of goodwill. For 
publicly owned corporations, the most common change in an 
accounting entity results from a purchase-type business combina-
tion. Goodwill usually is recognized in business combinations 
under purchase accounting. It is also recognized by subsidiaries 
issuing separate company financial statements under push-down 
accounting following a significant change in ownership, and may 
be recognized incident to the admission or withdrawal of a part-
ner from a partnership. The measurement and amortization of 
goodwill are separate issues. 
3SFAC No. 6 also noted that an asset commonly has other features that help 
identify it; for example, an asset may be tangible, exchangeable, or legally enforce-
able, but these features are not essential characteristics of assets, and their absence, 
by itself, is not sufficient to preclude an item's qualifying as an asset. That is, an 
asset may be intangible, nonexchangeable, and the entity's rights to obtain its ben-
efits may not be legally enforceable. 176
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Measurement of Goodwill: Under APB 16 [1970, para. 87], good-
will is measured as the excess of the price paid for a business as a 
whole over the fair value of its identifiable net assets. That is, 
goodwill is measured as the excess of the cost of an acquired busi-
ness over the fair value of the tangible and identifiable intangible 
assets acquired less liabilities assumed.4 Because goodwill is mea-
sured as an excess or residual, accountants have long; understood 
[e.g., Canning, 1929, pp. 42-43] that reported goodwill is a master 
valuation account. That is, the amount reported for goodwill is 
inter twined wi th the amount repor ted for all o ther assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed. Given the cost of an acquired 
business, the lower the amounts reported for the identifiable 
assets acquired (and the greater the amounts reported for the lia-
bilities assumed), the greater the amounts assigned to goodwill, 
and vice versa. 
Amortization of Goodwill: Presumably, the recognition and 
measurement of goodwill as an asset presuppose that it is an asset 
in the first place. The amortization of goodwill is a separate issue. 
This paper is concerned mainly with the rationale for the maxi-
mum 40-year amortization of goodwill under APB 17, not the 
nature, recognition, or measurement of goodwill. 
PRACTICE PRIOR TO APB OPINION NO. 17 
Before APB 17, the accounting for goodwill was prescribed 
by Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, "Restatement and 
Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins" [ARB 43, ch. 5]. Under 
ARB 43, goodwill was considered a type (b) intangible asset with 
indefinite life. As a type (b) intangible asset with indefinite life, 
goodwill cost was either: 
(1) capitalized until a limit on its useful life or a loss of 
value was evident, at which time it was amortized 
or, if worthless, writ ten off as an extraordinary 
loss; or 
(2) amortized to expense at the discretion of manage-
ment even though no present evidence pointed to 
a limited term of existence or a loss of value. 
4In an Exposure Draft, the FASB [1999, para. 21] reaffirmed this approach to 
measuring purchased goodwill. 
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Criticism of the accounting for goodwill under ARB 43 cen-
tered on the acceptability of alternative accounting methods. 
Some companies amortized goodwill over a short arbitrary period 
to reduce the amount of the asset as rapidly as practicable. This 
practice was criticized because it understated income during the 
amortization period and overstated income in subsequent peri-
ods. Other companies retained goodwill as an asset until evidence 
of loss of value was apparent, and then recorded a material reduc-
tion in a single period. This practice was criticized because it over-
stated income before the loss was recognized and understated 
income in the period of write-off.5 
APB OPINION NO. 17: RATIONALE FOR 
REQUIRED AMORTIZATION 
Under APB 17 [1970, para. 27], goodwill acquired after 
October 31, 1970 was to be amortized by systematic charges to 
income over its useful life. (Goodwill acquired before October 31, 
1970 continued to be subject to the accounting requirements of 
ARB 4 3 ) Useful life was estimated over a range with upper and 
lower limits when fixed existence was not determinable, but the 
amortization period was not to exceed 40 years. APB 17 [para. 29] 
also noted that when the indeterminate life of an intangible asset 
such as goodwill was likely to exceed 40 years, the asset was to be 
amortized over 40 years, not an arbitrarily shorter period. 
APB 17 [para. 23] required amortization of goodwill on what 
it termed an arbitrary basis. It [paras. 22-23] reasoned that even 
when there was no evidence of limited life or decreased value, 
amortizing goodwill on an arbitrary basis might recognize 
expense and asset decrease prematurely, but delaying amortiza-
tion until a loss was evident might recognize expense and asset 
decrease after the fact. A practical solution, APB 17 [para. 23] 
concluded, was to set minimum and maximum amortization peri-
ods. It based this conclusion on the observation that few, if any, 
intangible assets last forever, although some might seem to last 
indefinitely. Amortizing goodwill was necessary, according to 
APB 17 [para. 23], because goodwill inevitably disappears at some 
5At various times, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) urged the 
APB to make the accounting for goodwill more uniform. According to minutes of 
the September 10-13, 1969 APB meeting [APB, 1969, p. 3], the SEC made known to 
the APB that it favored mandatory amortization of goodwill over a period of about 
33 years. 178
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future date. Since that date is indeterminate, the amortization 
period is arbitrary. 
OTHER LITERATURE 
Various writers have commented on the arbitrariness of 40-
year amortization of goodwill under APB 17. For example, Kieso 
and Weygandt [ 1998, p. 596, emphasis added] noted that the 40-
year amortization requirement was based on the premise that only 
a few, if any, intangibles last forever: "Sometimes, because useful 
life is difficult to determine, a 40-year period is employed because 
it is practical, although admittedly arbitrary." 
Similarly, Hendriksen and Van Breda [1992, p. 645, emphasis 
added] noted that "[t]his 40-year period is arbitrary and can be 
defended only on the basis that it is long enough so that the 
income of no period is significantly affected. The effect is to neu-
tralize or sterilize the allocation of goodwill with respect to the 
information presented to investors and creditors."6 
BIBLICAL BASIS 
Although the APB and various commentators suggested that 
the 40-year amortization period is completely arbitrary, the Bible 
suggests that 40 years is a time period of special significance and 
that the life of a generation does not exceed 40 years. 
Significant Time Span: The Bible [New World Bible, 1984] is 
replete with references to 40 years as a time period of special sig-
nificance. Isaac and Esau married at 40 [Genesis, 25:20, 26:34]. A 
man was full-grown at 40 [Exodus, 2:11; Acts, 7:23; cf. Joshua, 14:7; 
Samuel, 2:10]. At age 40, Moses defended his oppressed brethren 
and struck the Egyptian taskmaster [Acts, 7:23 ] 7 After another 40 
6Hendriksen and Van Breda [1992, p. 645, emphasis added] also noted that 
"[n]ot every one has agreed with the 40-year term for the amortization of goodwill. 
For instance, banking authorities and the SEC require banks and thrifts to write 
off unidentified intangibles, such as goodwill, over a period not to exceed 
25 years . . . The Australian Accounting Research Foundation has proposed a maxi-
mum of 20 years for goodwill. Businesses, on the other hand, have argued that 50 
to 100 years would be more appropriate. Since no theory exists to guide the 
choice, whatever period is selected is inherently arbitrary." 
7Forty years is also a time span of special significance in several other civiliza-
tions. Forty years is the age when Buddha began preaching and the beginning of 
old age in Japan [see "Properties," n.d.]. In ancient Rome, it took 40 years of hard 
fighting in Latium and Etruria to restore Rome's power after Rome was sacked by 
and then ransomed from a marauding Gallic tribe in 390 BC. In modern Turkey, to 
see someone "once in 40 years" means to see someone "rarely" [Cooper, 1987, p. 18]. 179
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years, an angel appeared to Moses in the wilderness of Mount 
Sinai in a flame of fire in a bush [Acts 7:30]. Saul reigned as king 
for 40 years [Acts 13:21]. The 40-year reigns of David, Solomon, 
and Joash [2 Samuel, 5:4; 1 Kings, 2:11, 11:42; 1 Chronicles 29:26; 
2 Chronicles, 9:30, 24:1] are proof of divine favor. The lame man 
that Peter raised up and made to walk as a divine sign was more 
than 40-years-old [Acts: 3: 7, 23]. 
Eighty (or two times 40) years were ripe old age [II Samuel, 
19:34-35; Psalms, 90:10]. Moses was age 80 when he was sum-
moned by the Lord to be His messenger to tell Pharaoh to free the 
Israelites [Exodus, 7:7]. Eighty years was the term of Joseph's ser-
vice to Pharaoh [Genesis, 41:46, 50:26]. One hundred twenty (or 
three times 40) years was maximum life span [Genesis, 6:3]. Moses 
was age 120 when he died [Deuteronomy, 34:7]. 
Life of Generation: The Bible [New World Bible, 1984] is also 
replete with references to 40 years as the approximate life of a 
generation.8 Most prominent is the 40-year period the ancient 
Israelites spent in the Sinai wi lderness [Exodus, 16:35; 
Deuteronomy, 2:7, 8:2, 29:5; Joshua, 5:6; Nehemiah, 9:21; Psalms, 
95:10; Amos, 2:10, 5:25; Acts 7:36, 7:42, 13:18; Hebrews, 3:9, 3:17] 
until a corrupted generation died out [Numbers, 14:33, 32:13]. 
The generation was corrupted by reports of ten of 12 spies who 
spent 40 days scouting the land of Canaan. Ten of the 12 spies 
reported that the inhabitants of Canaan were too strong for the 
Israelites to conquer. Based on these unfavorable reports, most of 
the Israelites lost faith in the Lord's promise to give them the Land 
In Islam, the Koran is replete with references to 40 years as a period that is 
especially meaningful. Forty years is the age at which man attains his full strength 
[Shakir, 1983, 46:15], and the age at which Mohammed received his call 
[Bridgewater, 1967, p. 1397]. It is also the age of Mohammed's first wife at mar-
riage [Gibb, 1974, p. 280], and the age at which Abu Baqr converted, assuming that 
he converted three years after Mohammed received his call. 
8
 The Bible itself repeatedly refers to 40 years as the approximate life of a gen-
eration. On the other hand, average life span in Biblical times no doubt reflected 
high childhood mortality. Assuming two linear distributions, if average life span in 
Biblical times was 40 years and half the population lived an average of ten years, 
average life span of those surviving childhood (X) would be 70 years; hence, the 
Biblical reference [Psalms, 90:10] to three score and ten as average life: 
. 5 0 0 + .5(10 yrs.) = 40 yrs. 
.5X + 5 yrs. = 40 yrs. 
.5X = 35 yrs. 
X = 70 yrs. 180
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of Canaan notwithstanding His delivering them with signs and 
miracles from Egypt. Initially, the Lord proposed to strike the 
Israelites with pestilence and disown them because they lost faith 
in Him despite His signs and miracles as he brought them forth 
out of the land of Egypt. But Moses pleaded with the Lord, seek-
ing the Lord's forbearance for the Israelites, and the Lord relented. 
The Lord decreed, however, that not one Israelite over age 20 who 
lost faith would enter the Promised Land. Rather, He decreed that 
those that lost faith should wander and die in the Sinai over a 40-
year period. Only after this 40-year period would their children 
leave the Sinai and enter the Promised Land. Thus, this 40-year 
period corresponds to the time the ancient Israelites spent in the 
Sinai wilderness until the corrupted generation died out. 
Forty years is also the time span Ezekiel prophesized that the 
land of Egypt would be desolate and the Egyptians dispersed 
among the nations as punishment for their ill treatment of the 
Israelites and for Pharaoh's arrogance [Ezekiel, 29:1-11]. 
Presumably, this 40-year period corresponds to the time the 
ancient Egyptians would spend scattered among the nations until 
that corrupted generation also died out. 
Similarly, 40 years of peace followed the victory of Othniel and 
the Israelites over the Mesopotamians [Judges 3:9-11] and the vic-
tory of Gideon and the Israelites over the Midians [Judges 8:28]. 
On the other hand, there was 40 years of Philistine 
oppression of the Israelites in punishment for their evil 
ways following the death of Abdon [Judges, 13:1]. 
And there was 40 years of misrule by Eli culminating in the defeat 
of the Israelites and capture of the covenant ark by the Philistines 
[1 Samuel, 4:1-18]. These 40-year rules of the tribal chieftains 
[Judges 3:11,8:28,13:1; 1 Samuel, 4:18] represent roughly one gen-
eration each. The 80 years of peace following the victory of the 
Moabites [Judges, 3:30] represents roughly two generations. The 
Bible counts the 480 years from the Exodus to the building of the 
temple [1 Kings 6:1] as 12 generations in 1 Chronicles [6:3-8].9 
9 There are several interpretations of 1 Chronicles [6:3-8] as to why the period 
from the Exodus to the building of the temple spans 12 generations. One inter-
pretation is that Aaron, Eleazar, and Phineas were alive at the start of the Exodus; 
hence, these generations should be excluded from the other enumerated genera-
tions, leaving 12 generations. Another interpretation is that the number of gener-
ations from the Exodus to the building of the temple is counted by excluding the 
first and the last generations, leaving 12 generations. Still another interpretation is 
a rabbinic commentary [Metzudas David, n.d., of 1 Chronicles (5:29-34) of the 
181
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Thus, the 40-year period is not a completely arbitrary time 
span. Forty years corresponds to the maximum life of a genera-
tion. Moreover, a 40-year period is distinguishable from other 
round-numbers of years. For example, 30 years is less than one 
generation, and 50 years is more than one generation. Thus, the 
40-year period in Israel's history was of real-world significance. 
The source and significance of the 40-year period in Judeo-
Christian civilization stems from this Biblical basis. 
APPLICABILITY TO GOODWILL AMORTIZATION 
Goodwill is an asset because it represents future economic 
benefits, often (although not always) due to a talented work force 
or a favorable customer following for some given products and 
services. The cost of goodwill should be amortized over its 
expected useful life. 
To the extent that goodwill is attributed to a talented work 
force or a favorable customer following, its maximum useful life 
cannot exceed the remaining service lives of its work force or the 
remaining lives of its customers. That is, to the extent that good-
will is attributed to a talented work force or a favorable customer 
following, its maximum useful life cannot exceed one generation 
of talented employees or customers.10 
As noted above, the Bible is replete with suggestions that the 
life of a generation is 40 years. Two former APB members recol-
lected vague connections of the APB 17 40-year maximum rule 
and the Israelites' 40-year sojourn in the Sinai desert. In a tele-
phone conversation, Sidney Davidson said that "he heard the 
Hebrew version of the Bible], which (redundantly) included the same enu-
meration of generations as found in 1 Chronicles [6:3-8] but was not included in 
the King James version of the Bible. This commentary stated explicitly that the 
high priesthood passed from father to son for 12 generations from the Exodus to 
the building of the temple. 
10To the extent that goodwill is attributable to other unrecorded intangible 
assets, more of the purchase price should be allocated to these assets and less to 
goodwill. Any remaining goodwill may be attributable to other factors, such as 
ongoing research and development projects, brand names, marketing campaigns, 
or favorable asset configurations. To the extent that goodwill is attributable to 
other factors, it should be amortized over the useful lives of these other factors, 
usually less than 40 years. But this paper focuses on the correspondence of the 40-
year maximum amortization period under APB 17 and one generation of employ-
ees or customers. These other factors are not germane to this correspondence as 
a rationale for the 40-year amortization rule under APB 17. 182
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story" that the APB considered the Israelites' 40-year sojourn in 
the Sinai desert in its deliberations on goodwill amortization, but 
does not recall the source of the story or the APB member who 
introduced it into the deliberations. Similarly, Charles Horngren 
suggested that the APB 17 40-year maximum rule and the 
Israelites' 40-year sojourn in the Sinai desert might have been 
some side comment during the APB's deliberations, but he did not 
know the source of the side comment. Thus, the 40-year amorti-
zation rule under APB 17 has links to the Biblical suggestion that a 
generation is 40 years. 
Indeed, Philip Defliese, APB chairman when APB 17 was 
issued, was quoted by an anonymous reviewer as noting that, ". . . 
the 40-year amortization period was to correspond to the assumed 
working life of the youngest employee at the time of acquisition . 
. . . that any goodwill attributable to employees must die out by the 
time the last one leaves ... ." Thus, even the former APB chairman 
viewed the 40-year amortization period as corresponding to the 
maximum service period of one generation of employees.11 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent that goodwill is attributed to a talented work 
force or a favorable customer following, its maximum useful life is 
approximately one generation of employees or customers. As first 
suggested in the Bible and then elsewhere, the life of a generation 
is approximately 40 years. Accordingly, the 40-year maximum 
amortization period of APB 17 has a real-world significance sug-
gested initially in the Bible. It is not a completely arbitrary time 
span. 
11Admittedly, in a rapidly changing business world, the average period indi-
vidual employees work for a single employer is growing shorter, as is the average 
life cycle of products and services for which there is a favorable customer follow-
ing. But the maximum 40-year amortization rule of APB 17 was developed in the 
late 1960s and finalized in 1970, a far less rapidly changing era. In this less rapidly 
changing era, the average period individual employees worked for a single employ-
er frequently was their entire career, often 40 years or thereabouts. Similarly, in 
the less rapidly changing era of the late 1960s, the average life cycle of products 
and services was longer, suggesting a longer time span for a favorable customer fol-
lowing. The 40-year amortization period may well correspond to maximum useful 
life of goodwill in a less rapidly changing era of the late 1960s. 183
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Abstract: While accounting researchers have explored interna-
tional publishing patterns in the accounting literature general-
ly, little is known about recent contributions to the specialist 
international accounting history journals. Specifically, this 
study surveys publishing patterns in the three specialist, inter-
nationally refereed, accounting history journals in the English 
language during the period 1996 to 1999. The survey covers 
149 contributions in total and provides empirical evidence on 
the location of their authors, the subject country or region in 
each investigation, and the time span of each study. It also clas-
sifies the literature examined based on the literature classifica-
tion framework provided by Carnegie and Napier [1996]. 
INTRODUCTION 
Academic interest in the publishing patterns of leading inter-
national journals in accounting and finance has been strong for 
many years. The focus has understandably been on journals pub-
lished in the English language, which inevitably injects cultural 
bias into such investigations [see, for example, Carmona et al., 
1999]. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence generated by such 
studies provides bases for assessments of scholars' research track 
records and career advancement prospects. It also influences 
decisions made on competitively sought research funding. At the 
time of writing, the authors are unaware of any empirical study 
that has specifically examined publishing patterns of internation-
Acknowledgments: The authorsare grateful to the members of the 
Accounting History Research Interest Group, Deakin University, and to partici-
pants at a research seminar held at the Cardiff Business School for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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ally refereed journals that specialize in accounting history. Such 
specialist journals in the English language are small in number 
and, thus, pose a sample suitable for a longitudinal study. 
Accounting history is a growing and influential field of study. 
The three dedicated journals in the field published in English are 
the Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ) (U.S.); Accounting, 
Business and Financial History (ABFH) (U.K.); and Accounting 
History (AH) (Australia/New Zealand). As the New Series (NS) of 
AH appeared in its current form for the first time in 1S>96, the cur-
rent study will span the four years from 1996 to 1999. AHJ was ini-
tially published in 1974, while ABFH initially appeared in 1990. 
ABFH was published twice yearly to 1993, from which time its 
publication rate increased to three issues per annum. AHJ and the 
NS of AH have appeared twice yearly since their inceptions. 
Of course, not all contributions to the accounting history lit-
erature appear in specialist, international history journals. Many 
key articles on accounting's past appear in general journals on 
accounting, such as Abacus, Accounting and Business Research, 
and British Accounting Review. In addition, accounting history is 
prominent in journals in the sociological, interpretative, and criti-
cal traditions, particularly Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal; and Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting. Key works in accounting history also 
appear in other outlets, such as New Works in Accounting History, 
published by Garland. As a result, this study of publishing patterns 
in specialist, international accounting history journals profiles a 
section, albeit an influential one, of the accounting history litera-
ture during the designated period. Further research, that exam-
ines the international publishing patterns of all journals that fea-
ture accounting history, is a topic ripe for future investigation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next 
section reviews recent contributions to the literature on interna-
tional publishing patterns generally rather than in accounting his-
tory specifically. There follows the presentation of the empirical 
results of the study and, in the following section, a discussion of 
these results. The final section offers concluding comments and 
outlines suggestions for further research. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Jones and Roberts [2000], in their study on international pub-
lishing patterns by means of an investigation of leading U.K. and 
U.S. journals, identified a number of themes in forerunner studies 
187
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on leading journals. These authors outlined the key themes or 
interests they discerned as follows: interest in the prestige of indi-
vidual journals; interest in evaluating both individual and institu-
tional productivity; interest in aspects of publication and produc-
tivity, such as the quality of doctoral programs; factors contribut-
ing to published outputs; measures of research productivity; time 
delay in doctoral productivity; bibliometric distributions; and pro-
motion, among other themes. As they pointed out, the vast major-
ity of data are concerned with U.S. and U.K. journals with very lit-
tle direct attention being paid to non-U.S. and non-U.K. journals 
[Jones and Roberts, 2000, pp. 1-2]. 
The overwhelming conclusion of the prior studies is that U.S. 
and U.K. institutions dominate the leading journals [see, for exam-
ple, Heck and Bremser, 1986; Heck et al., 1986; Heck et al., 1990; 
Jones and Roberts, 2000]. In a study of the international content 
of U.S. academic accounting journals published between 1980 and 
1993, Prather and Rueschhoff [ 1996] found that the percentage of 
total articles in selected U.S. journals that reflected non-U.S. or 
international content was generally low but had increased during 
the study period. However, a notable exception was AHJ as for the 
study period, international content was found in 42.44 per cent of 
the total articles in AHJ, constituting 40.68 per cent of total pages 
[Prather and Reuschhoff, 1996, p. 7]. 
Jones and Roberts [2000] studied the contents of five leading 
U.S. journals and five leading U.K. journals for the calendar years 
1996 and 1997. In particular, the study investigated the nationali-
ties, as discerned by institutional affiliation, of the authors who 
had published the 702 articles in these ten journals. The U.S. jour-
nals selected were: The Accounting Review, the Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, 
The Journal of Finance, and the Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis. The U.K. journals chosen were Accounting 
and Business Research; Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Financial Accountability and Management; the Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting; and Management Accounting Research. 
It was found that authors publishing in the U.K. journals were 
mainly from U.S. and U.K. institutions, with just over one-third of 
them coming from other countries. However, for the top U.S. jour-
nals, only ten per cent of the authors hailed from outside the U.S. 
These findings led the authors to conclude, "accounting academia 
is very parochial" (p. 15). 
In their study on articles published in 13 "well-respected" 
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accounting journals during the period 1992 to 1997, Carmona et 
al. [1999] found that an overwhelming majority of European con-
tributions to these journals were writ ten by scholars affiliated 
with British institutions of higher learning. In attempting to 
explain this finding, Carmona et al. [1999, p. 479] pointed out that 
"the European setting is composed of a complex web of cultures, 
languages and research traditions whose characteristic traits are 
not always tracked by publications in well-regarded, English-writ-
ten accounting research journals." The authors also suggested that 
this finding also "posits considerable doubts on the extent to 
which it is correct to form the notion of European accounting 
research" (p. 463) [see also Zambon, 1996, p. 409]. 
Rodgers and Williams [1996] rendered an example of a study 
analyzing contributions to a single journal, The Accounting 
Review, over the extended period 1967-1993. By examining pat-
terns of research productivity in The Accounting Review, the 
authors set out to provide a partial history of the stratification 
process in U.S. academic accounting. Rodgers and Williams [ 1996] 
found that articles in The Accounting Review w e r e dominated by 
authors from a relatively small number of "elite" U.S. institutions. 
Lee [1997] subsequently extended the work of Rodgers and 
Williams [1996] to determine whether the existence of an U.S. 
"elite" was a phenomenon confined to The Accounting Review. 
Lee [1997] examined the composition of the editorial boards of 
six major accounting research journals from 1963 to 1994. Three 
of these journals were U.S.-based; namely, Journal of Accounting 
Research, The Accounting Review, and the Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, while the other three emanated from elsewhere, 
Abacus (Australia); Accounting and Business Research (U.K.); and 
Accounting, Organizations and Society (U.K.). The major finding 
of Lee's study was that a perceived U.S. "elite" was not restricted to 
The Accounting Review, but was a prominent feature of all the 
journals examined, "irrespective of journal age, geographical loca-
tion, or scholarly focus" [Lee, 1997, p. 12]. According to Lee [1997, 
p. 27], such dominance has implications for the manner in which 
accounting knowledge is produced and tends to restrict some-
what the extent of academic contributions in accounting to 
resolving practical problems facing the accounting profession 
[Lee, 1997, p. 27]. 
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METHOD 
Publication data were derived from the three specialist 
accounting history journals published in the English language 
from 1996 to 1999. It is recognized that the inclusion of journal 
articles written in English overlooks contributions to specialist 
journals not published in English. Nevertheless, this approach is 
consistent with that adopted in recent studies of accounting liter-
ature and thereby provides a basis for the comparison of results. 
The unit of analysis is the individual article. This study 
includes research articles, replies, and notes/comments, but 
excludes editorials, tributes, book reviews, and reports on confer-
ences held. This approach is broadly consistent with that adopted 
in similar studies [e.g., Zivney et al., 1995; Carmona et al., 1999] 
except for the inclusion in the current study of commentaries on 
research. Two such "comments" by Goldberg [1997] and Burrows 
[1999]1 both appeared in AH and have been recognized as contri-
butions in this study for two reasons. First, the comments related 
primarily to the accuracy of assertions made in two books on the 
history of aspects of accounting in Australia authored by Burrows 
[1996] and Linn [1996] respectively. Second, the two comments 
concentrated on the nature and limits of oral evidence in histori-
cal research. Consequently, the comments were deemed to be key 
contributions to the literature with wide interest to accounting 
history scholars. 
A total of 149 contributions were identified for examination 
and constituted the sample for this study. These contributions 
were analyzed on the following grounds: 
(i) location of authors (country or region/institution) 
(ii) country or region studied 
(iii) time period studied. 
The literature was then categorized according to the literature 
classification framework provided by Carnegie and Napier 
[1996]. 
The location of the author(s) was taken to be the nation-
1These two comments comprised the total number of articles published in 
these specialist journals during the survey period that were writ ten by authors 
affiliated with the University of Melbourne. 
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ality of the institution or organization with which the author(s) 
was affiliated on publication. Consistent with prior research, the 
data are presented and analyzed based on the number of publica-
tions, adjusted for the number of authors involved rather than on 
the basis of numbers of pages or other factors [see, for example, 
Heck et al., 1990; Borokhovich et al., 1995; Carmona et al., 1999]. 
For example, where three authors were involved from institu-
tions located in three different countries or regions, each author 
was allocated a 0.33 weighting to represent his/her respective 
contribution at face value. 
Nine country or region classifications were used to represent 
both the location of the author and the host country of the study. 
These are detailed as follows: U.K., U.S., Australia, France, Canada, 
Asia, New Zealand, Spain, and "Other." The "Other" classification 
was used to capture those countries that were less frequently rep-
resented. This categorization provided a clear basis by which arti-
cles published in each journal could be analyzed and insights on 
the propensity of scholars to conduct accounting history research 
beyond their country of origin and/or to collaborate with scholars 
in other countries. 
The host country for each study was identified on examining 
further each article making up the research sample. Contributions 
were considered to relate to a particular country or region where 
that subject country or region could be specifically identified. On 
occasions, studies were concerned with more than one country 
and were weighted accordingly (e.g., studies focusing on three dif-
ferent locations were weighted on the basis of a 0.33 allocation for 
each). Where studies were not clearly set in any specific country, 
most often in the instance of a contribution on historiography, a 
classification code of "N/A" was applied. Analyzing the subject 
country or region has implications for highlighting the "interna-
tional" nature of the field of accounting history, particularly when 
considered in light of the location(s) of the author(s) concerned. 
Contributions were also analyzed according to the historical 
time span of the respective studies. Specifically, an article con-
cerned with accounting thought, practice, or regulation in both 
the 19th and 20th centuries was weighted on the basis of an allo-
cation of 0.5 for each period, unless it was clear that the prime 
focus was on only one of these centuries. Most often, the time 
period was conveniently identified by authors in the abstract, key-
words, and/or introduction. Where this was not the case, such 
contributions were examined further to deduce the necessary 
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information. Where pieces could not be assigned to a specific 
time period, a classification code of "N/A" was adopted. 
In order to gain insights into the themes and approaches 
adopted by researchers in the contributions comprising the sam-
ple, the literature classification framework provided by Carnegie 
and Napier [1996] was applied. In order to explore and evaluate 
accounting history literature as the new century approached, 
Carnegie and Napier [1996] identified broad themes and 
approaches by which the literature could be classified.2 These 
themes and approaches are outlined below: 
• studies of surviving business records of firms 
• utilization of accounting records in business history 
biography 
• prosopography 
• institutional history 
• public sector accounting 
• comparative international accounting history 
While this classification framework was found to encompass 
most of the contributions comprising the sample, a further cate-
gory, "historiography," was adopted in this study. Contributions 
were classified as historiography to the extent that their main 
focus was to discuss, debate, or comment on the "body of tech-
niques, theories and principles associated wi th historical 
research" [Parker, 1997, p. 114]. For the purpose of this study, his-
toriography articles were not specifically assigned a particular 
time span and were, accordingly, accorded the N/A classification 
code. 
RESULTS 
Of the 149 components of the sample, 66 were published in 
ABFH, 47 in AHJ, and 36 in AH Particulars on the locations of their 
authors are presented in Table 1. This table provides information 
on both the number and percentage of total contributions by 
authors correlated to their country or region. 
2The literature classification framework provided by Carnegie and Napier has 
also been applied by Carnegie and Potter [2000] in a survey of the Australian 
accounting history literature that was published between 1976 and 1999. 192
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Particular patterns are discerned from the results in Table 1. 
First, U.K. and U.S. authors appear to be prominent in number 
across the three specialist journals. U.K. authors provided a total 
of 51.33 (34.45%) of the 149 contributions in the sample. 
Americans authored 41.5 (27.85%) of the contributions, while 
Australians supplied a total of 22 (14.77%). When the results are 
analyzed by individual journal, the prominence of authors within 
each, by country or region, becomes more easily seen. U.S. 
authors were responsible for 33 (70.21%) contributions to AHJ, 
not surprisingly since AHJ is a U.S.-based journal, published by the 
Academy of Accounting Historians (AAH) [Coffman et al., 1989]. 
AHJs author constituency broadly reflects the extent of U.S. mem-
bership in the AAH (67.9%), even though total membership of the 
Academy, comprising both individuals and institutions, is spread 
across 29 countries.3 For the U.K.-based ABFH, British authors 
were most prominent, contributing 33.5 items (51.15%), while 
French authors were responsible for 12 contributions (18.32%).4 
Of the three journals it is apparent that AH, the journal of the 
Accounting History Special Interest Group of the Accounting 
Association of Australia and New Zealand, is generally less 
"parochial," although ABFH, as discussed subsequently, was found 
to publish works from more countries or regions than both AHJ 
and AH. Both Australian and U.K. authors were prominent in AH, 
with scholars from these locations making equal contributions 
(40.28%) for a combined total of 29. 
Contributions were, of course, made either by single authors 
or by authors working collaboratively. The total number of con-
tributors to each journal were ABFH (86), AHJ (70), and AH(50).5 
This translates to an average number of authors per contribution 
as follows: ABFH (1.30), AHJ (1.49), and AH (1.39). Since account-
ing history is increasingly recognized as a maturing field of 
inquiry [Fleischman et al., 1996; Parker, 1999], with many cross-
3Information on the geographical dispersion of the AAH membership was 
obtained from the Academy's website, accessed on May 26, 2000. Coffman et al. 
[1998] provided information on the membership trends for the AAH during the 
period 1989 to 1998. 
4It is to be recognized that Vol. 7, No. 3 of ABFH was a special issue, focusing 
on French accounting history. It is comprised of six articles writ ten by French 
scholars. This single issue constituted 50% of total contributions by French authors 
in the research sample across these three specialist journals. 
5These figures are provided to indicate the extent of collaboration in contri-
butions identified in each journal and have not been adjusted for authors involved 
with more than one contribution during the period under examination. 
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border research opportunities awaiting researchers [Carnegie 
and Napier, 1996, 2000; Carnegie and Potter, 2000], further analy-
sis was conducted to establish the propensity of accounting histo-
rians to collaborate with authors located in other countries or 
regions. Specifically, an analysis of contributions was undertaken 
to establish the total number that were published by sole authors 
and the total number co-authored. These patterns of authorship 
were then analyzed by journal and on a per-country basis. The 
results are outlined in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Patterns of Authorship 
ABFH 
AHJ 
AH 
No. 
% 
No. 
% 
No. 
% 
Single author 
49 
74.2 
27. 
57.4 
23 
63.9 
Multiple authors 
17 
25.8 
20 
42.6 
13 
36.1 
Total 
66 
100 
47 
100 
36 
100 
Exploration of the "international" nature of accounting histo-
ry was undertaken through further analysis of the contributions 
written by multiple authors. Table 3 outlines the results of this 
analysis. 
TABLE 3 
Analysis of Jointly 
Written Contributions 
ABFH 
AHJ 
AH 
No. 
% 
No. 
% 
No. 
% 
U.S. 
2 
11.8 
17 
85.0 
2 
15.4 
U.K. 
7 
41.2 
1 
5.0 
2 
15.4 
Aust. 
2 
11.8 
0 
0.0 
4 
30.8 
Can. 
0 
0.0 
1 
5.0 
1 
7.7 
N.Z. 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
1 
7.7 
U.S./Aust. 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
1 
7.7 
U.K./Aust. 
3 
17.6 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
U.K./Other 
2 
11.8 
1 
5.0 
2 
15.4 
Aust./Other 
1 
5.9 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
Total 
17 
100 
20 
100 
1 
100 
195
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2000
Carnegie and Potter: Publishing Patterns in Accounting History 187 
The table demonstrates a marked reluctance by researchers to 
collaborate with authors located outside their country of origin. 
Only ten contributions (6.6%) featured authors collaborating 
from different countries or regions (U.S./Aust. 1; U.K./Aust. 3; 
U.K./Other 5; Aust./Other 1). As outlined in Table 3, only one con-
tribution was identified where an American author collaborated 
with a colleague from another country or region. ABFH and AH 
demonstrated a stronger propensity to publish cross-border con-
tributions during the study period. 
The vast majority of contributions were writ ten by individuals 
employed in academic positions or by individuals wi th close and 
ongoing affiliations with academic institutions such as emeritus 
appointments. ABFH generated the most nonacademic authors 
with six in total; for AHJ and AH only one nonacademic author 
contributed to each journal. Of the authors connected with 
academe, data were collected to establish "dominant institutions" 
in accounting history based on the contributions comprising the 
sample. Table 4 provides information on those institutions most 
frequently featured. As indicated in Table 4, a total of 46.5 of the 
149 contributions (31.2%) were writ ten by individuals connected 
with one of only nine institutions of higher learning. 
TABLE 4 
Institutions Offering Most Contributions 
Institution 
Cardiff 
Newcastle 
Deakin 
Exeter 
LSE 
La Trobe 
Sheffield 
Edinburgh 
Wollongong 
TOTAL 
Location 
(U.K.) 
(U.K.) 
(Aust.) 
(U.K.) 
(U.K.) 
(Aust.) 
(U.K.) 
(U.K.) 
(Aust.) 
No. 
% of total 
No. Contributions 
6 
6 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 6 5 
31.2 
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Table 5 provides particulars of these dominant institutions 
based on placements in each journal. For each of the journals 
examined, a relatively small number of institutions contributed a 
sizeable percentage of the total contributions published. Based 
on the results in Tables 1 and 5, the dominant institutions for 
ABFH are largely U.K.-based, with the journal proving an attractive 
publication outlet also for researchers from France and Australia. 
Dominant institutions for AHJ are generally in the U.S., although 
Newcastle, an U.K. university, was the most dominant supplier of 
contributions for the period of study. These tables also show that 
authors from institutions in Australia and U.K. were key contribu-
tors to AH. 
What is not evident from Tables 1 and 5 is the number of aca-
demic institutions represented by contributions identified in each 
journal for the period. Although more contributions were pub-
lished in ABFH (66) than in AHJ (47) and AH (36), articles in AHJ 
represented a greater diffusion of institutions of higher learning, 
amounting to 45 in total, than was the case for ABFH and AH with 
34 and 24 respectively. While Table 3 indicates a general reluc-
tance on the part of U.S. authors to collaborate with scholars from 
other countries, there is a strong propensity for American authors 
to collaborate with colleagues from other U.S. academic institu-
tions. The geographical concentration of authors is also reflected 
in the subject country/region results outlined in Table 6. 
Of these three journals, the extent of subject countries or 
regions under examination was found to be the largest for ABFH 
with contributions on 16 countries or regions. This result com-
pares with AHJ and AH with eight and five respectively. Of the 
total contributions, a total of 56.08 (37.64%) dealt with U.K. 
accounting history, while U.S. accounting history was the subject 
matter in 32.33 (21.7%) studies. These results may be compared 
with the location of authors presented in Table 1, wherein it was 
revealed that British authors contributed 51.33 (34.45%) and 
American authors 41.5 (27.85%) of total publications. The data 
presented in Tables 1 and 6 were then analyzed together in order 
to assess, where possible, the frequency with which authors stud-
ied accounting history in venues other than the country or region 
of their origin. While the number of contributions from British 
authors equates to articles on British topics, the key points to note 
pertain to authors located in both the U.S. and Australia. Table 1 
indicates that while 41.5 contributions (27.85%) came from U.S. 
authors, only 32.33 (21.70%) contributions concerned U.S. 
accounting history. This disparity can be explained by two factors. 
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First, several articles by U.S. authors examined accounting history 
in other areas, including Asia, the Middle East, and the U.K. 
Second, several contributions were given the classification code 
of "historiography" and were thus deemed not to be country or 
region-specific. Table 1 also shows that Australian authors were 
responsible for 22 contributions (14.77%), yet only 7.08 of them 
(4.75%) related to Australian accounting history. Further analysis 
reveals that several contributions from Australian authors, partic-
ularly those published in AH, were classified as "historiography," 
while several pieces by Australian authors concerned accounting 
history in other countries or regions. Of particular note from 
Table 6 is the relatively few number of efforts that center on Asia 
(5), Spain (2), and Italy (0.33), which can possibly be explained, at 
least in part, by language constraints facing authors in these loca-
tions. 
In order to discern any trends in the time horizons of account-
ing historians contributing to particular journals, data were col-
lected pertaining to the time periods examined in the 149 contri-
butions. The results are presented in Table 7. 
While the time period selected for examination by accounting 
historians is often determined by the availability of surviving 
records, certain patterns are evident in the Table 7 information. 
Most studies (108.65 contributions, 72.92%) were concentrated in 
the 19th (38.4 contributions, 25.77%) and 20th (70.25 contribu-
tions, 47.15%) centuries. The 18th century seemed to hold consid-
erably less interest for accounting historians, but this may be 
explained by a lack of primary evidence during an era marked by 
revolutions across the globe, with implications for the contents of 
archives, then and now. As outlined in Table 7, studies pertaining 
to the 20th century were most frequently found in ABFH and AHJ 
with 34 and 26.25 respectively. Contributions relating to the 19th 
century were most common for AH, with 13.5 contributions 
(37.5%). 
Table 8 presents the results of classifying the articles using the 
framework provided by Carnegie and Napier [1996].The table 
reveals a concentration on institutional history, with business his-
tory and studies of surviving records of firms also frequently pub-
lished. While factors influencing the selection of research activi-
ties can be complex,6 part of the interest in institutional history is 
6
 For example, Sikka et al. [1995, p. 114], writing in the context of accounting 
research in general, argued that research activities are "political" to the extent that 
they support or challenge traditional frameworks or ideas and prioritize certain 
values or concerns. 200
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explained by the relatively recent emergence of historical studies 
concerned with various aspects of professionalizing activities in 
accounting.7 In addition, several studies related to developments 
in accounting regulations and regulatory processes were also 
placed in the "institutional" classification. Perhaps not surprising-
ly, many of the contributions classified as "institutional history" 
pertained to countries where the accounting profession, the cap-
ital market, and associated regulatory systems and processes are 
generally well developed. Several biographical and historiograph-
ical studies were also published, particularly in the later years of 
the study period. Also of note in Table 8 are the 8.5 contributions 
that focused on accounting history in more than one country or 
region. Of these, seven are examples of "diffusion" studies, which, 
according to Carnegie and Napier [2000, p. 5], are directed at 
examining "how accounting techniques, institutions and concepts 
are transferred through a range of different mechanisms." As Table 
8 indicates, wide scope seems to exist for accounting history 
scholars to develop the field, especially in biography, prosopogra-
phy, public-sector accounting history, and CIAH studies. 
DISCUSSION 
The results outlined in the preceding section appear to indi-
cate the existence of a relatively insular international accounting 
history research community dominated by a small number of insti-
tutions and authors. Authors from the U.K. were more likely to 
publish in the U.K.-based ABFH, U.S. authors generally published 
in AHJ; while U.K. and Australian authors were prevalent, in equal 
por t ions , in the Australian/New Zealand-based AH. Where 
accounting history contributions were undertaken by more than 
one author, collaboration was more likely to occur with col-
leagues located within the same country or region. While this out-
come, of course, is determined to some extent by practical con-
siderations such as time, the selection of appropriate research top-
ics, and the accessibility of archival material, there appears to be a 
general reluctance on the part of accounting history researchers 
to collaborate with colleagues in other countries or regions. 
The geographical patterns of authorship were also reflected 
7
 For example, Vol. 9, No. 1 of ABFH, guest edited by Stephen Walker, was ded-
icated to the professionalism of accounting. This special issue of six articles yield-
ed five studies on institutional history, while the other contribution was consid-
ered to fall within the domain of CIAH. 
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in the subject countries or regions in the case of each journal. The 
subject countries or regions chosen for studies on accounting's 
past were relatively few in number. U.K. accounting history stud-
ies were the most frequent, followed by contributions pertaining 
to accounting's past in the U.S. In comparison to the U.K. and the 
U.S., relatively few contributions were concerned with account-
ing history in Australia and even less so with New Zealand, Asia, 
and Spain. Such low numbers may not reflect the general state of 
accounting history research in these locations, particularly 
Australia [see, for example, Carnegie and Potter, 2000]. There was 
a paucity of research examining accounting history in more than 
one country, which is also reflected in the relatively low number 
of studies assigned the CIAH classification. 
In general, authors seemed more likely to concentrate their 
research on the 19th and 20th centuries. When the studies were 
classified using the Carnegie and Napier [1996] framework, it 
became evident that the majority, that is 112 in number or 75.16%, 
were captured by three of their thematic classifications—institu-
tional history, business history, and studies of surviving business 
records. The emerging number of contributions on historiogra-
phy is reflected in Tables 7 and 8 and explains, to a large extent, 
why 6.71% of total contributions were classified "N/A" for the 
study period. Interestingly, there were no historiography articles 
in ABFH during this period. Analysis of the information contained 
in Table 8 indicates that several avenues exist for further research 
in areas such as biography, prosopography, public-sector account-
ing history, and CIAH [see Carnegie and Napier, 1996, 2000; 
Carnegie and Potter, 2000]. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This study has investigated publishing patterns in three dedi-
cated, internationally refereed, accounting history journals in the 
English language based on a total of 149 contributions published 
between 1996 and 1999. These contributions were analyzed 
according to the location of authors, subject country or region, 
and the investigation time period. These contributions were then 
arranged according to the literature classification framework 
developed by Carnegie and Napier [1996]. 
While accounting historians lay claim to belonging to an inter-
national scholarly community, this does not appear to be reflected 
by the contributions published in three specialist accounting 
journals during the period of this study. ABFH, AHJ, and AH each 
204
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
196 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
boast editorial boards comprising leading accounting historians 
located in a variety of different countries. There are also several 
"international" accounting history research conferences each 
year. For instance, each of these journals is associated with a par-
ticular accounting history conference.8 Further, the World 
Congress of Accounting Historians has been held every four years 
at different locations around the globe.9 Notwithstanding these 
events, contributing authors represent relatively few countries or 
regions, and even collaborative efforts most often involve authors 
from the same country or region. Of the 149 contributions identi-
fied in this sample, only nine examined aspects of accounting his-
tory in multiple countries. 
Several worthwhile avenues for further research arise from 
this study. First, as noted in earlier sections, the sample selected is 
limited to specialist accounting history journals in the English 
language during a four-year period. Opportunity exists to perform 
a similar analysis on a larger sample that would also capture the 
discipline in general accounting journals, as well as in sociologi-
cal, interpretative, and critical journals. This extension would 
enhance claims as to the breadth of international publishing pat-
terns in accounting history and would allow for more in-depth 
comparisons to be made with the results of similar studies con-
ducted on accounting literature in general. 
Research could also be undertaken to explore and elucidate 
various specific patterns identified in this study. While this article 
has articulated certain publishing patterns in contributions to 
three accounting history journals, future research is encouraged 
to explore why these patterns arise.10 Such research might eluci-
date why historical researchers located in different countries are 
prone to publish their outputs in locally based journals and 
whether this inclination is, in any way, linked to perceptions of 
journal quality. Researchers might also delve further into the rea-
sons for a broad focus in accounting history on the 19th and 20th 
centuries, and why certain categories of research remain totally or 
8For example, the second Accounting History international conference will be 
held in Osaka, August 8-10, 2001. The Cardiff Business School hosts the annual 
ABFH conference, while the Academy of Accounting Historians also holds an 
annual research conference in North America. 
9
 A World Congress will be held every two years, on a trial basis, from 2000 for-
ward. 
10Similar calls were made by Carmona et al. [1999] on examining publishing 
patterns in the European Accounting Review. 
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virtually ignored. 
The results of this study provide insights into recent interna-
tional publishing patterns in a section of accounting history liter-
ature in recent years. We are yet to discern whether these patterns 
are typical of the larger body of accounting history literature or to 
grasp with confidence why such patterns arise. Further research 
is likely to assist in elucidating these matters. 
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REVIEW OF BOOKS: 
A RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE 
James Ole Winjum, The Role of Accounting in the 
Economic Development of England; 1500-1750 
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New 
Deal 
Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, Cost Terminology and 
Cost Theory: A Study of its Development and 
Present State in Central Europe 
Doris Langley Moore, Lord Byron Accounts Rendered 
What is the role of book reviews in the Internet era? Such was 
the query of a colleague upon learning of my appointment as 
Book Review Editor of the Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ). 
When we are able to download books and journals, as well as cre-
ate and read online reviews at our favorite Internet bookstore, 
does the published book review serve any purpose? Not wanting 
to eliminate my position at its outset, I decided that a useful way 
to answer this question would be to revisit and re-examine previ-
ous book reviews in AHJ. 
BOOK REVIEWS IN AHJ 
Since its inception in 1977, AHJ has published approximately 
300 book reviews of newly published and reprinted works. A 
quick glance at the works reviewed, their authors and reviewers, 
indicates the breadth of publishing in accounting history and pro-
vides a who's who of members of the discipline. We find books 
and reviews by Zeff, Winjum, Schoenfeld, Wells, Kawahara, 
Katano, and Woolf. Many individuals have contributed to both 
sides of the ledger, authoring and editing volumes, as well as 
reviewing them. Themes appear and re-appear, such as double-
entry bookkeeping, standard costing, financial reporting, and 
accounting theory. The reviews demonstrate the global disper-
sion of the discipline, with works emanating from Asia and the 
Pacific Rim, Europe and the U.K., Scandinavia, and North America. 
AHJ replaced The Accounting Historian, with its first three 
volumes reproducing its predecessor. The following section sam-
ples the book reviews contained in these three volumes. The 208
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selections are a personal choice, not a statistical sample. They 
cover the broad range of topics and geography contained in the 
cohort of 22 reviews. After excerpting these reviews, I provide a 
brief summary of key points. The latter illustrate the continued 
value of the review vehicle to highlight ever-important topics in 
accounting history research and historical research more general-
ly. 
EXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 1, NUMBERS 1-4, 1974 
James Ole Winjum, The Role of Accounting in the Economic 
Development of England; 1500-1750 (Center for International 
Education and Research in Accounting, 1972, 252 pp.) 
reviewed by Marc J. Epstein (pp. 36-37) 
Though Yamey, Edey, and Thomson provided an 
introduction and overview to the development of 
accountancy in England..., no comprehensive 
study has been made of the development of 
accounting in this period in England. Further, 
though the Sombart thesis is a well accepted 
notion, a rigorous test of that thesis had not been 
conducted. James Winjum successfully completes 
both tasks...Central to the entire study is the test of 
the Sombart thesis that double-entry bookkeeping 
was 'both a manifestation of the spirit of capital-
ism in its formative decades as well as a propulsive 
agency furthering a significant economic and cul-
tural development.' Through an examination of 
extant accounting treatises and textbooks and 
merchant accounts of England (1500-1750), 
Winjum finds the proof necessary to support the 
thesis... 
Over the last few years, discussion has continued 
on the validity of the Sombart thesis. The contri-
bution of this test of the thesis is obvious. It is also 
important to note the research methodology 
employed. Winjum's study provides the results of 
extensive investigation into both treatises and 
original records and provides a thorough discus-
sion of the previous support of the thesis by influ-
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ential scholars. 'Scissors and paste history' is clear-
ly not being used here in this carefully researched 
study... 
The book is a major contribution to the literature 
of accounting history generally and English eco-
nomic and accounting history specifically...The 
book is highly recommended as evidence of quali-
ty accounting history research. 
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal (Yale 
University Press, 1970, 270 pp.) 
reviewed by Hugh Hughes (pp. 39-40) 
The New Deal, broadly perceived as a reform 
movement, has been the subject of previous com-
prehensive studies. As Parrish notes in the intro-
duction, he is concerned with illuminating 'a por-
tion of the larger debate; the relationship 
between American businessmen and reform.' He 
attempts to identify the reformers, their motiva-
tions, and the consequences of reform.... 
This is no Cinderella tale which Parrish relates - it 
is a study of legislation incessantly attacked by 
detractors who in some instances do manage to 
dilute or eliminate what appear to have been 
worthwhile reforms. The personal papers are par-
ticularly helpful here in shedding light on the feel-
ings and frustrations of both advocates and foes of 
these measures and of the philosophies motivat-
ing them. 
An important feature of the book is that it is not 
primarily concerned with the accounting profes-
sor or accounting practices. Accountants... are but 
one of a number of parties whom Parrish attempts 
to place in perspective, and it is this perspective 
that today's accounting practitioner or professor 
should find of most benefit... 
To the accounting historian, the book is signifi-
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cant for this same perspective, for the evolution-
ary study of a government institution of primary 
importance to accountants, and for its methodolo-
gy-
EXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 2, NUMBERS 1-4, 1975 
Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, Cost Terminology and Cost Theory: 
A Study of its Development and Present State in Central Europe, 
Monograph 8 (Center for International Education and Research in 
Accounting, 1974, 177 pp.) 
reviewed by M.C. Wells (pp. 74-76) 
This monograph contains a comprehensive and 
readable account of the development of various 
theories of p roduc t ion costs by p rominen t 
German writers. For those of us who are incom-
petent in any but our own language, it is a long 
overdue introduction to a highly developed and 
rather specialized field... 
Of particular interest to accounting historians will 
be Schoenfeld's description of the origins of vari-
ous cost theories, the background of the German 
Uniform Chart of Accounts and his evaluation of 
European theory development. Throughout that 
development, the close connection between cost 
accounting and economics is clearly drawn. 
Schoenfeld has adopted the role of reporter, not 
advocate. His monograph is a work to be taken 
seriously and studied closely by all who profess an 
interest in cost accounting practices and theories. 
Although the emphasis on German literature is 
somewhat narrower than the title implies, the 
English language literature has been considerably 
enhanced by this addition. 
EXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 3, NUMBERS 1-4, 1976 
Doris Langley Moore, Lord Byron Accounts Rendered (Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1974, 511 pp.) 
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reviewed by Hans Johnson (pp. 92-94) 
Lord Byron is remembered today for his literary 
genius and controversial life style. Lord Byron 
Accounts Rendered is the author's second bio-
graphical study of the poet. In her latest effort, 
Moore has tapped a previously unused wealth of 
documentary evidence per ta ining to Byron's 
financial affairs. Antonio Lega Zambelli, Lord 
Byron's trusted aide, kept meticulous records of 
incomes and expenditures...Such is the volume of 
documentation that author Moore comments, 'we 
have Byron's domestic economy so minutely yet 
unconsciously reflected that there can scarcely be 
anything comparable in the annals of famous 
men...' 
Accounting historians interested in the biographi-
cal use of personal financial information will find 
the book beneficial as an example of research 
technique and synthesis of complex evidential 
material. Moore's approach is chronological with 
interpretation of important events and personali-
ties based upon her study of the Zambelli records. 
The author, being very knowledgeable on the life 
of Byron, carefully weaves personalities, places 
and events together with monetary exchanges in 
such a manner as to reveal interesting n e w 
insights... 
SUMMARY 
Although the sample of reviews is small and constrained, 
these reviews and the source books provide the accounting histo-
rian with insights that remain relevant long after their initial pub-
lication. The reviews provide glimpses that enable the 
reader/researcher to determine the overall theme of the original 
work, its potential relevance to his or her own research, and hope-
fully motivation for the reader to explore further. Reviews can 
provide a starting point from which to obtain a form of triangula-
tion for research of a similar nature. Finally, the review reveals the 
reviewer and the perspective that he or she has adopted. 
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Even if the review does not prompt one to seek out the origi-
nal source, certain themes evident in these reviews strike a chord 
with accounting historians: 
•Accounting in its context — the reviews all demonstrate that 
accounting cannot be studied outside of its context, be it eco-
nomic, political, social, or cultural. 
• Accounting as part of everyday life — the account of Byron is 
a good example of this feature of accounting, a role and the power 
of which are increasingly recognized in our accounting history 
research. 
• The linkage of accounting to other disciplines — this linkage 
is evident, be it economics (as with cost accounting in Germany) 
or the influence of political economy (as in terms of the New 
Deal). 
•The importance of sound methodology — the reviews all 
note the careful attention to methodology, sources, documenta-
tion, and evidence. 
• Perspective — as we write history, we adopt a perspective. 
Recognizing this point of view is necessary in order to write con-
vincingly. 
Whether we write books or launch our research on an 
Internet site, these points remain a relevant and requisite part of 
our accounting history craft. 
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Third Asian Pacific Interdisciplinary Research 
in Accounting Conference 
15-17 July, 2001 
The University of Adelaide, South Australia 
IN ASSOCIATION WITH 
ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNAL 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
After its first two conferences in Sydney (1995) and Osaka (1998), APIRA now moves 
to Adelaide in 2001. The premier food and wine city of australia, centre of a thriving 
arts and film industry, and a top-rated convention city in the Asia Pacific, Adelaide is 
home to the editorial offices of AAAJ. Following the large international contingent at 
Osaka, we are expecting APIRA Adelaide to be the largest conference of its type ever 
mounted in Australia. 
We seek papers addressing the relationships between accounting, auditing and 
accountability and their social, economic, institutional and political environments.. 
Our scope includes: 
Social and Environmental Accounting; Accounting and Gender and/or Feminist 
Theories; Accounting and Accountability in the Public Sector; Non-profit 
Organizations' Accountability; Accounting Policy and Standard Setting; Corporate 
Regulation and Accountability; Accounting Professions; New Forms of Accounting 
and Auditing; Professional and Business Ethics; Accounting and the Public Interest; 
Critical, Explanatory, Oral and Visual Approaches to Accounting History; Critical 
and Ethnographic Case Studies of Accounting in Action; Accounting and 
Management Planning and Control; Accounting and Technology; Accounting and 
Culture; Accounting and the Home; Methodological and theoretical Issues; 
Accounting Communication 
Three paper copies of completed papers must be sent to Professor Lee Parker at the 
AAAJ editorial office (below) no later than 1 December 2000. All papers will be ref-
ereed. Refer to website address above for further submission requirements and 
details. 
EMERGING SCHOLARS' COLLOQUIUM 
A forum for doctoral students, new faculty and emerging researches will be held on 
14 July, immediately prior to the conference. Attendance is strictly limited and will 
be by application. Refer to website for further details 
ALL ENQUIRIES TO: 
APIRA 2001 website: http://www.commerce.adelaide.edu.au/apira/ 
Email: aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au 
Postal: APIRA 2001, School of Commerce, 
The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 
South Australia 5005 
Conference organiser: Ms Gloria Parker Tel 61-8-8303 5524 
Conference Chair: Professor Lee D. Parker 
Conference Committee: 
Professor James Guthrie, Professor Jesse Dillard 
Macquarie Graduate School Management University of New Mexico 
Professor Richard Laughlin Professor Hiroshi Okana 
Kings College, University of London Osaka City University 
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AUTUMN 2000 
Accounting and Business Research 
Volume 30 Number 4 Autumn 2000 
Contents 
Articles 
The investment opportunity set and the M. Hossain 
voluntary use of outside directors: New S.F. Cahan 
Zealand evidence M.B. Adams 
263 
Performance measurement and the use 
of league tables: some experimental evi-
dence of dysfunctional consequences 
Incentives and disincentives for voluntary 
disclosure by pension funds: international 
evidence 
Kevin Keasey 
Philip Moon 
Darren Duxbury 
275 
Paul J. M. Klumpes 287 
FRS3 earnings, Headline earnings, and 
accounting-based valuation methods 
Is true and fair of over-riding importance?: 
a comment on Alexander's benchmark 
Stephin Lin 
Martin Walker 
299 
Christopher Nobes 307 
Detecting earnings management using 
cross-sectional abnormal accrual models 
K. V. Peasnell 
P. F. Pope 
S. Young 
313 
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Accounting, Business & Financial History 
Since the commencement of the 1979 economic reform programmes 
accounting in China has been subject to many changes. Considerable 
efforts have been made to advance our understanding of current practice 
of Chinese accounting. However, the history of accounting thought and 
practice may be significant in terms of understanding present attitudes 
exhibited within the profession. Chinese accounting has a long history. It 
once took the lead in the world in ancient times and made a great contri-
bution to the development of world accounting. It is with the intention 
of extending knowledge in the important field that a special issue of 
Accounting, Business & Financial History is to b e published on 
"Accounting history: Chinas Contributions and Challenges." 
Economic reforms in China over the past two decades have been accom-
panied by structural advances, legislative activities and the provision of 
institutional and professional guidelines for accounting. These reflect 
requirements for international recognition of the discipline together 
with other forces of the modern era. However, patterns of accounting 
development in China over thousands of years encompassing the dynas-
ties, western influences and revolutionary edicts have accommodated the 
cultural environments in which practice has occurred. The competence 
of Chinese accountants in this context. The special issue of Accounting 
Business Financial History will address the subject of Chinese financial 
history and it's development, the sub-editors for the issue will be Maxwell 
Aiken, La Trobe University Melbourne and Wei Lu, Monash University, 
Melbourne. Papers on all aspects of Chinese accounting history are wel-
come. Possible topics include, but are not limited to: 
• The influence of Chinese philosophies on accounting 
• Government accounting 
• Auditing 
• Bookkeeping 
• Culture and accounting 
• The development of certified public accountants 
• Chinese innovations in management accounting 
• International influences on accounting 
This special issue is to be published in the first quarter of 2002. Papers 
will be subject to the usual review process. Submissions should be made 
no later than the 31 January, 2001 to: Dr. Wei Lu, Department of 
Accounting and Finance, Monash University, Caulfield Campus, PO Box 
197, Caulfield East, Victoria 3145, Australia. 
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS 
APPLICATION FOR 2001 MEMBERSHIP 
Individual Membership $45.00 
Student Membership: $10.00 
Name: (please print) 
Mailing Address: 
City: State: 
Zip Code: Country: 
Accounting History Area of Interest: 
Phone: Fax: 
E-Mail: 
Method of Payment: check enclosed 
Mastercard Visa 
Card Number: 
Expiration Date: 
Signature: 
Mail to: Professor Gary P. Spraakman 
Atkinson College 
York University 
Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 
Canada 217
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2000
